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Abstract 
The four essays in this thesis focus on two areas where financial institutions 
can affect equilibrium: the importance of the design of monetary institutions for the 
equilibrium inflation rate, and the link between financial intermediation and the real 
economy. 
The first essay takes a political economy perspective to explain differences in 
inflationary performance in the post communist economies. It is argued that these 
differences largely result from political choices rather than structural differences. 
Based on empirical evidence we describe some institutional mechanisms that can 
prevent reversal of stabilisation policies after a change of government. 
The second essay uses an overlapping generations model of money to analyse 
what the consequences are, for the distribution of real assets and inflation, of having 
more than one agent extracting seigniorage. As described in the first essay un-
coordinated monetary policy caused continued high inflation in some transitional 
economies. Here it is shown how Russia's inflationary performance after 
liberalisation can be explained by our model. 
The third essay uses a moral hazard framework to derive a testable hypothesis 
linking the degree of inequality and the volume of financial intermediation. This link 
is part of the transmission mechanism running from inequality via the financial 
sector to real growth in some recent models of economic development. We test the 
hypothesis using a new World Bank data set on inequality and find only partial 
support for the moral hazard model in the data. 
The fourth essay uses a random matching framework to model a financial 
market without intermediation. The economic consequences of this are analysed and 
it is shown that in the search economy the dispersion of project returns can affect 
the growth rate. This is not the case in the intermediated economy where only the 
mean of the project return distribution matters for growth. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
10 
This thesis deals with issues in monetary econorrucs and financial 
development. While the essays contained cover different aspects in these fields, the 
general message across all chapters is that institutions matter for economic 
outcomes. 
Economists have long been criticised by political scientists for focusing on 
outcomes rather than the processes leading to the outcomes. This, it has been 
argued, makes the policy advice of the economist removed from the real world 
where decisions are made in a political setting rather than by a benevolent social 
planner (Persson and Tabellini( 1994». On the other hand economic theorists argue 
that policy advice should be based on models with a clear metric for what 
constitutes welfare of the agents in society (Townsend (1995». 
There is a huge output of policy advice concerning areas undergoing change. 
The transition process in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union following 
the breakdown of the socialist one party system and the plan economic model is a 
pertinent example, the entire development literature another. 
The fight against inflation in the transition economies has been high on the 
recent policy agenda. In the first two essays in this thesis we focus on this aspect of 
transition and try to highlight both the political and economic aspects of the 
phenomenon. In The Politics of Inflation in the Former Socialist Economies 
(written jointly with Peter Boone) we take a broad political economy perspective to 
explain the differences in inflationary performance in the transition economies. The 
essay surveys the inflationary experience of all the former socialist economies 1. 
While all countries experienced a huge price jump at the outset of liberalisation the 
subsequent inflationary performance has varied greatly across countries. Some 
countries like Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic stabilised quickly and have 
maintained low inflation since then. Others like Russia attempted stabilisation but 
1 We define this to include the countries of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Thus the 
analysis excludes China and other Asian economICS that arc also undergoing changes in these 
vears. 
1 1 
have since then followed a zigzag course between high and low inflation. Others 
again experienced continued high inflation and some had episodes of hy -perinflation 
over several years before finally moving on to a stabilisation course. We argue that 
these differences in inflationary performance resulted largely from political choices 
rather than from structural differences. By recounting the history of the stabilisation 
policies in some of these countries we show how political leadership was a key 
determinant for whether a country initially chose to stabilise or not. A key problem 
facing a pro-stabilisation political leader is the reversal of his reforms after a change 
of government. Another problem is that the institutional breakdown in these 
economies has resulted in un-coordinated implementation of policies, notably 
monetary policy. Again we use a survey of the evidence from the transition 
economies to illustrate some of the economic mechanisms that have been used by a 
reformer acting in what the former Polish Minister of Finance Balcerowitz has 
called "the period of extra-ordinary politics" at the outset of the reforms to try to 
prevent this policy reversal and induce policy co-ordination. Examples include 
"poison pills" which are policies that induce huge losses if there is deviation from 
the stabilisation course; conditional foreign aid and constitutional reform of 
budgetary processes. 
After this survey of the issues concermng stabilisation in the transition 
economies we go on to study in greater detail one of the aspects highlighted above. 
In Institutions and Inflation we focus on the implications of the design of monetary 
policy institutions for the inflationary performance and economic welfare in the 
economy. The paper was inspired by Russian monetary policy implementation in 
1992-93. We document how directed credits were a key factor driving the Russian 
money supply during this period and how these directed credits until early 1993 
were granted in an un-coordinated fashion by several spending ministries, the 
central bank and the president. This led to near hyperinflation in late 1992. From 
1993 a credit commission co-ordinated all credit issues and the inflationary 
pressures in Russia eased. We use an overlapping generations model of money with 
heterogeneous agents to analyse the consequences for economic welfare and 
inflation of the co-ordinated and un-coordinated situation respectively. In this way 
12 
our analysis captures both the importance of institutions for economic outcomes, 
that is stressed by political scientists, and the metric for economic welfare, stressed 
by economic theorists. 
The model consists of private agents who use fiat money to smooth 
consumption across two periods and pairs of state and fiat agents. The state agents 
have no endowment of the consumption good but instead receive the seigniorage 
revenues created by their fiat partner. The fiat agents have the right to issue money 
and do so in a way that maximises the welfare of their state agent partner. The 
economy consists of an infinite sequence of generations of private agents and state-
fiat pairs. We use a sub-game perfect equilibrium set up to model the interaction of 
money issuing agents across generations and show how both private agent and state 
agent welfare is maximised when there is only one money issuing agent. Thus the 
model is an example where a general equilibrium set up with clear welfare criteria 
can be used to discuss the importance of institutions for economic welfare. 
While the analysis described above mainly deals with the importance of the 
design of the institutions in charge of implementation of monetary policy, the next 
two essays focus on how financial institutions in general are linked with the real 
economy. There has long been an ongoing debate in economic development 
between proponents of the Schumpeterian view that financial institutions matter for 
the real economy and proponents of the view that the real sector leads the financial 
sector (Lucas(1988)). In Inequality and Financial Development we analyse part of 
the transmission channel from income distribution via the financial sector to 
economic growth that is implied in recent models of economic development. One 
example of such a model is Piketty( 1997) who uses a moral hazard argument to 
determine who has access to borrowing from an intermediary and thus can 
undertake efficient investment projects, and who is credit constrained and thus must 
invest sub-optimally. We do not attempt to test Piketty's model in its entirety but 
we show how the moral hazard mechanism underlying his analysis implies that the 
degree of inequality in the economy affects the size of the formal financial sector. 
More specifically we derive a hypothesis stating that there is a non-linear 
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relationship between the degree of inequality and the level of financial development 
which is conditional on the level of average national income in the economy. In a 
poor economy increased inequality increases the amount of financial intermediation 
by lifting more agents over the cut-off level of wealth implied by the moral hazard 
set up, in a rich economy increased inequality reduces intermediation since it makes 
entrepreneurs richer and thus less reliant on outside financing. 
The World Bank has recently published a cross-country data set on inequality 
and we use this data set to test the above model. We find that while there is a non-
linear relationship between inequality and intermediation in our sample, the sign 
switches in the data do not match the sign switches implied by the theoretical 
analysis. The empirics show that while there appear to be a positive relationship 
between inequality and intermediation in economies with national income between 
US$ 500 and US$ 4000 and a negative relationship for richer countries, which is in 
accordance with the model, there also is a negative relationship for countries with 
national income below US$ 500. This is against the predictions of the theoretical 
model. The analysis in this chapter thus suggests to us that while there is some 
evidence supporting the relevance of the models of economic development based on 
a moral hazard mechanism of intermediation, caution is urged when using these 
models as a basis for providing policy advice since it appears that they do not 
capture the all aspects of the link between inequality and finance. While the welfare 
metrics are prominent in these models it is not clear whether the models capture the 
institutional arrangements of the real world. 
The link between the financial sector and the real economy is also the topic of 
the final essay Search in Financial Markets. Here we try to capture the effects of 
the absence of financial intermediaries for growth in a simple set up based on the 
Romer(1986) endogenous growth model. We compare the outcomes for 
consumption and savings in two economies: one is a random matching economy 
where investors search for entrepreneurs with viable investment projects, the other 
is an economy where an intermediary places the savings of all investors with the 
entrepreneurs. We show how there are several extra channels through which the 
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growth rate can be affected in the search economy compared with the intermediated 
economy. Of course variables directly linked to the search environment only matter 
in the search economy, but in addition we show how the dispersion of the 
distribution of project returns matter for growth in the search economy while only 
the mean matters in the intermediated economy where all projects are pooled 
together. While the institutional analysis in this chapter is rather simplistic since all 
conclusions are based on a comparative static analysis, the model represents a first 
attempt to use the search framework to model the financial market. This is 
important since autarchy until now has been the benchmark against which financial 
institutions have been compared, while the alternative in the real world might be 
closer to the set up of the search economy. There are after all very few Robinson 
Crusoes in the modern world. 
While the essays in this thesis all deal with institutions and econOIll1C 
outcomes they are presented as separate chapters and can be read independently of 
each other. 
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Chapter 2 
The Politics of Inflation in the 
Fonner Socialist Economies l 
This paper takes a broad political economy perspective to explain the differences in 
inflationary performances in the former socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. It is argued that these differences to a large extent result from 
political choices in the individual countries rather than from structural differences or 
policy mistakes. Based on evidence from these economies a description is given of some 
economic mechanisms a pro-stabilisation political leader can introduce in his stabilisation 
program to help maintain the low inflation equilibrium even in the case where he is 
ousted from government. 
1 This chapter was written jointly \\ith Dr. Peter Boone of the LSE. It is to appear as a book 
chapter in a forthcoming CEP publication on the transitional economies. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The economic refonn process in Eastern Europe and the fonner Soviet Union was 
preceded by the collapse of the entire political system in the socialist countries. After 
decades of socialism the one party system broke down, and new political leaders 
emerged. This breakdown in the political process meant that many of the checks and 
balances on political decision making were lost. In this paper we argue that this is a key 
fact which is needed to understand the subsequent pattern of inflation and liberalisation 
across these countries. 
One of the first economic implication of the breakdown of the political system was 
a loss of confidence in domestic money. Under the socialist system the main instrument 
for savings was domestic money. When the USSR broke apart there were fifteen central 
banks suddenly able to create rouble money. In most of Eastern Europe, political tunnoil 
led to rapid increases in the money supply as governments issued credits to their 
supporters. The result was initially creeping inflation, which soon spiralled into outright 
price explosions as people realised continued inflation would erode the value of their 
savings. As a consequence they sold money balances for goods and foreign exchange. 
Thus the initial prices jumps, which were very often much larger than economists and 
policy makers had anticipated, reflected not the past "monetary overhang" but rather 
sudden losses in confidence due to political tunnoil. 
After these initial large price jumps some countries were able to contain inflation 
through orthodox stabilisation programs. But many countries embarked on policies 
which for several years kept inflation high. As shown in figure 2.1, these same countries 
tended not to liberalise their economies (as measured by the World Bank index of 
liberalisation). This begs the question: why did some countries choose not to implement 
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Figure 2.1 Inflationary Performance and Liberalisation. 
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full liberalisation and stabilisation while others implemented both very quickJy') One 
possible answer is that gradual reforms would lead to better economic outcomes. But in 
fact, empirical evidence suggests that at best the slow reformers were no worse off in 
terms of their total output decline. Furthermore their policies have prevented needed 
structural adjustment so that these economies have taken much longer to recover from 
the recession. 
In this paper we argue that the real reason underlying the lack of reform in some 
countries again was the breakdown in the political process. What happened was that in 
the vacuum following the political breakdown the old elites and rent-seekers captured 
the political initiative in these countries. In order to sustain their powers, and sequester 
incomes, they issued credits and maintained distortionary policies. This brought these 
groups enormous resources. In Russia in 1992 revenues from net credit issue alone 
equalled 32.7% ofGDP. Other countries in the CIS earned similar incomes from credit 
issuance. When such large amounts of funds are available, it is no surprise that 
politicians that wanted stabilisation faced enormous and sometimes violent opposition 
from those fighting to gain access to these resources. Whenever the pro-reform lobby 
lost the battle, high inflation was maintained and distortionary policies continued for 
several years. 
This explanation, relying on political factors, also helps explain the illusionary 
"fiscal crisis" in many of these countries. While total revenues (including seigniorage) to 
many governments in the CIS and Eastern Europe have remained high, these countries 
have not maintained social programs such as pensions and health care at adequate levels. 
In this paper we argue that this is yet another consequence of the underlying political 
crisis in these countries. When the government is controlled by old elites and rent 
seekers that are grabbing for resources, it is no surprise that the politically weak and 
particularly those that benefit from social programs, do not gain from the implemented 
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policies. The end result of this has been much greater poverty than would othef\\;se 
have occurred. 
If our arguments are correct and factors related to the breakdown of the political 
system affected the size of the initial price jump, whether the country stabilised or 
experienced continued high inflation and what the distributional consequences of the 
pursued policies were, then we can draw several lessons from the break up of the 
communist system and the diverse performance of the different economies. It seems that 
some countries tackled the breakdown differently than others and that the way chosen 
had severe impact on the subsequent economic performance. Thus we argue that the 
economic performance of any former socialist economy was heavily influenced by 
political choices in that economy and not entirely determined by structural factors. The 
lessons learnt from the different choices made and the reasons for these choices can be 
useful when designing policies in future situations where there is political breakdown 
and near anarchy. First, it is clear that stabilisation programs must focus on measures 
that help reinstate political checks and balances, and promote co-ordination of decision 
making. We argue that democratic reform is an essential part of this. But in addition we 
discuss several economic mechanisms that can be implemented to promote stabilisation. 
These include a macroeconomic version of a "poison pill," i.e. a policy initiative which 
tends to reduce inflation, and once introduced is difficult to reverse. Currency boards are 
one example of such policies. Other examples of policies that can help enforce long term 
stabilisation are: conditional foreign assistance targeting political co-ordination, pre-
emptive policy strikes, and the design of detailed budgetary processes. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses what factors caused the 
initial price jumps and the eroding confidence in the stability of domestic money Section 
2.3 examines the rationale for continued high inflation in many countries, and presents 
evidence that rent -seeking and support for the old elite were the prime causes of this 
Section 2.4 discusses why countries, after several years of high inflation, have 
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subsequently returned to low inflation. Section 2.5 uses the analysis of the experience of 
the former socialist economies to draw lessons for future stabilisation policies. Section 
2.6 concludes. 
2.2 The First Price Jump 
The inflation experience of every country we consider can be divided into two 
components. In all the former socialist economies reform began with an increase in the 
rate of inflation. The rise in official prices that took place after price liberalisation in part 
reflected a general monetary overhang. But once the overhang was cleared subsequent 
inflation was driven by other underlying factors. 
The initial price jump episodes in the former socialist economies had surprising 
features. Table 2.1 shows the pattern of inflation after reforms began in 26 countries. 
The highest price rise generally took place at the start of reform programs as price 
liberalisation occurred. These price rises were generally far greater than policy makers 
initially forecast, and they caused immediate social hardships as the value of past savings 
was greatly eroded overnight. F or example at the start of the Polish stabilisation 
program it was estimated that prices would rise by 35% in January 1991, this compares 
with an actual increase of 70%.2 In Russia the IMF estimated prices would rise by 500/0 
after the January 1992 price liberalisation.3 But instead prices rose by a startling 250%. 
The large rise in prices can be explained by a severe loss of confidence in money as a 
savings vehicle near the time of the reforms. This can be understood by examining the 
pattern of money demand, money supply and parallel market prices. Under the planning 
system the government maintained strict control over money circulation so that the 
demand and supply of domestic money, measured at official prices, were more or less 
equal. With stable prices households were willing to hold money for both savings and 
~ See Gomulka(l994). 
:5 See IMF( 1992). 
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Table 2.1 Inflation in the Fonner Socialist Economies 
Inflation at Peak and Recently in Fonner 
Socialist Countries 
Year of Peak Highest Level Level in 1994 Level in 1995 
Albania 1992 226 28 9 
Armenia 1994 5458 5458 179 
Azerbaijan 1994 1500 1500 536 
Belarus 1994 2200 2200 73 
Bulgaria 1991 335 89 70 
Croatia 1993 1516 98 3 
Czech Republic 1991 57 10 10 
Estonia 1992 1069 48 30 
Georgia 1994 18000 18000 164 
Hungary 1991 34 19 29 
Kazakhstan 1994 1980 1980 177 
Kyrgyz Republic 1993 1209 280 49 
Latvia 1992 951 36 27 
Lithuania 1992 1020 72 25 
Macedonia 1992 1925 654 18 
Moldova 1992 1276 327 25 
Mongolia 1992 321 145 65 
Poland 1990 586 32 32 
Romania 1993 256 131 33 
Russia 1992 1353 220 184 
Slovakia 1991 61 14 II 
Slovenia 1992 201 20 10 
Tajikistan 1993 2195 2195 240 
Turkmenistan 1993 3102 2400 2500 
Ukraine 1993 2735 842 342 
Uzbekistan 1994 746 746 254 
Source: As reported m Aslund, Boone and Joimston( 1996). Origmal data from de Melo, Denizer and Gelb 
(1995) and World Bank Country Economic Memorandums. various issues. 
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transaction purposes. Money market equilibrium in this simple setting is thus: 
~t = m(YI'1t pE/tsVs > t) 
t 
The important point here is that the demand for domestic money contains both a 
transactions component which is affected by output (y t ) and the short term cost of 
holding money (1t t )4, and a savings component which is affected by the expected future 
rate of inflation (Et1t s V s > t )S. If we invert this equation we can find the price level that 
is consistent with individuals being willing to hold the outstanding domestic money. If 
official prices are set too low then money demand would be less than money supply and 
parallel market prices would rise to reflect the excess money supply. As official prices 
are liberalised they jump to the level of parallel prices. This is one interpretation of how a 
monetary overhang might cause an initial price jump. 
However there seems to be more to the price jump than a just the realignment of 
official and parallel prices. In all countries liberalisation was preceded by an explosion of 
parallel market prices6. There are several factors that affected parallel market prices at 
the time. The gradual opening of parallel markets and reduced legal restrictions on 
transactions should have lowered parallel prices. This would occur because greater 
supply on the parallel market should reduce the relative price differential with official 
markets. Thus the sharp rise in parallel prices must be attributed to an alternative source. 
We believe the main source was a fairly sudden loss in confidence in domestic money as 
a means of savings (i. e. an increase in Et1t s V s> t). In every country the money supply 
grew relatively slowly during this period, but the threat of high inflation coming from 
4 These two components are the standard components in the transactions demand for money 
literature. See Goldfeld and Sichel( 1990). 
5 See Cagan(l956) 
6 See IMF country staff reports and for Russia see Russian Economic Trends for data on parallel 
market exchange rate data. 
price liberalisation, and a rational belief that the authorities would lose control of 
monetary policy, would certainly have been enough to cause a flight from monetary 
savings. With a legacy of high savings in domestic money any loss of confidence could 
lead to a many fold increase in prices. The result in many countries was a price explosion 
that appeared in parallel prices sometime before liberalisation. Thus it seems that the 
initial price jump partly reflected a realignment of official and parallel prices, but partly 
also reflected a reduction in people's confidence in domestic money. 
Some people have argued that this pnce Jump was avoidable. For example 
Goldman(1994) argues that monetary reform, such as dividing all bank accounts and 
cash by three, could have prevented the initial inflation. If the authorities had reduced 
enterprise and business deposits by a greater factor than household savings, then the 
losses of the pensioners and households could have been reduced. But this measure 
could have exacerbated problems for other reasons. Such monetary confiscation might 
reduce people's confidence in money even further, causing prices to rise in any case or 
necessitating even greater monetary reform. In addition monetary reform would not 
have changed the basic incentives to cause higher inflation in the future. As discussed 
below, money confiscation would not change the incentives for issuing money in the 
future. And in fact, enterprises would have had even greater reason to demand new 
credits for "working capital" that could have precipitated higher inflation. 
The loss of confidence in domestic money that appear to have exacerbated the 
size of the initial price jump could have been caused by the populations anxieties over 
what economic policies were to be pursued subsequently. The subsequent experience of 
most of the former socialist economies has warranted these concerns. 
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2.3 Subsequent Inflation 
In most countries the inflationary perfonnance after the initial price jump was 
dismal. As shown in table 2.1, even as of 1994 inflation continued at weU oyer 50% per 
annum in eighteen out of twenty-six countries. There was no technical reason that these 
countries could not have maintained lower inflation - after an initial price jump it was 
fully possible that inflation could be reduced and fall to 1 or 2% per month within weeks 
of the start of refonns. Even when there are substantial official price increases after the 
initial price liberalisation, it is possible for relative prices to adjust so that monthly 
inflation remains low. This means that the subsequent high inflation was a choice of the 
responsible authorities rather than a required outcome. 
2.3.1 Economic Rationale for High Inflation 
There are two basic categories of explanations as to why the authorities chose to 
pennit high inflation. The first reason is that policy makers may rightly or wrongly 
perceive this to be to the benefit of the economy. The initial economic collapse, the 
changed economic system, and subsequent political tunnoil meant that government 
revenues fell sharply at the start of refonns. In the short run, with few alternative means 
to raise tax revenues, seigniorage became one of the easiest sources of financing. An 
optimising policy maker would want to equate the marginal benefits of higher 
government expenditures with the marginal cost of financing those expenditures. If 
benefits are high, or inflation is perceived not to be costly (or even not caused by money 
issue !) then increasing money issue and inflation would be a justifiable response. 
According to this explanation the countries with the greatest economic problems, 
and hence the worse fiscal constraints, would be the ones that benefited most from 
seigniorage revenues. We would expect the countries with the largest external and 
internal shocks, such as those most affected by the C~fEA shock, countries \\lith 
25 
relatively greater need for restructuring, countries at war, and those \\ ith the sharpest fall 
in fiscal revenues, to have the highest inflation rates. In these cases inflation would be 
costly, but it would serve a useful purpose in financing producti\·e expenditures. 
A related reason in favour of inflation is given by Calvo and Coricelli( 1992) who 
argue that the legacy of imperfect financial markets, which meant that government credit 
was the only source of financing available to enterprises, made credit policy especially 
important in former socialist economies. They argue that after the initial price jump 
enterprises were faced with extremely low real working capital balances. This limited 
their ability to produce and hence contributed to the output decline. In their model a less 
restrictive monetary policy would have led to higher output. Thus if they are right we 
would expect loose monetary policy to be correlated with greater output Figure 2.2 
plots the relation between the cumulative output decline (1989 to 1995) and inflation 
(1990 to 1995) in 22 former socialist countries. The most striking observation here is the 
strong negative relation between output growth and inflation. The data does not seem to 
support Calvo and Coricelli's hypothesis. In fact as was pointed out by Bruno and 
Easterly( 1995) the data, if anything, seems to suggest that stabilisation actually improves 
rather than worsens output performance.7 This is perhaps taking the argument a bit too 
far. As already pointed out, the observed negative correlation might also reflect the 
reverse situation. That is, countries with severe shocks (low output growth) may have 
had more to gain from seigniorage financing (high inflation) than countries with smaller 
output shocks. Closer examination of figure 2.2 seems to support this hypothesis. As 
can be seen, countries from the CIS, and countries at war, have higher inflation rates 
than other countries. In order to examine the main country characteristics that correlate 
- Other authors have drawn similar conclusions from this simple relation. See for example. de \ 1elo. 
Denizer and Gelb( 1995). World Bank( 1996). EBRD( 1996). Sachs and Warner( 1995) and Fischer et. 
31.(1996). 
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Figure 2.2 Inflation and Cumulative Output Decline 
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with high inflation, we report, in table 2.2, some results from cross-country regressions 
where we regress cumulative output decline on inflation, a dummy reflecting \\·hether 
the countI)' was in the rouble zone (former USSR), and a dummy for countries at war 
The results show that after controlling for rouble zone and war, there is no longer 
a significant correlation between growth and inflation. This fact suggests that tight credit 
policy was not a key factor explaining the output decline in these countries. However 
these results also suggest that pro-stabilisation policies did not serve to reduce the 
output decline. A reasonable interpretation of these regressions is that monetary policy 
had little overall impact on the subsequent economic decline. This conclusion does not 
mean that monetary policy did not play a role in affecting the timing of the decline and 
the timing of the return to growth. Figure 2.3 plots the correlation between inflation and 
growth in 1995 alone, and table 2.2 shows some regression results in which we control 
for the effects from wars and rouble zone membership. This plot and the regressions 
show that in 1995, even after conditioning on these variables, there was a strong 
negative correlation between inflation and growth. The countries that had the highest 
growth rates were all countries that had stabilised. The countries that had continued high 
inflation in 1995 had the lowest growth rates. These countries might have avoided large 
output declines early on but at the cost of large recessions later on. 
The main effect of monetary policy in the former socialist economies thus seems 
to be on the timing of the start of the recession. If one probes a bit deeper one finds that 
this has been through its effect on restructuring policies. Aslund, Boone and Johnson 
(1996) show that countries that reduced inflation tended to have more rapid growth of 
the private sector, greater institutional change as proxied by the EBRD indices, and 
more rapid growth of services. Lack of stabilisation in part reflected a policy of 
continued subsidies to the state sector. The countries with high inflation were able to 
raise extremely large amounts of seigniorage. As shown in table 2.3, these levels of 
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Table 2.2 Output and Inflation 
OLS Regressions: Dependent Variables 
i) Output 1995/Output 1990 
ii) Growth Rate of Output 1995 
Output 1995/Output 1990 Gro'"'th Rate 1995 
10g(Price -0.048" 
Level (0.01) 
1995IPrice 
Level 1991) 
Cumulative 
Liberalisation 
Index 
Fonner USSR 
War 
R2 0.65 
N 23 
Notes: 
" significant at 5% level. 
t-statistics in parentheses 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
0.133" 
(0.03) 
-0.340· 
(0.09) 
-0.183· 
(0.07) 
0.80 0.48 
23 25 
-3.470" -3.400" 
(0.57) (0.83) 
0.007 3.517" 
(0.03) (0.78) 
-0.348" 
-0.281 
(0.08) (2.38) 
-0.19t" -0.101 
(0.05) (2.08) 
0.79 0.64 0.64 0.47 
25 23 23 25 
3.307" 
(1.43) 
-0.600 
(3.45) 
-0.144 
(2.26) 
0.47 
25 
War, and Fonner USSR are dummy variables set to one for countries in war or members of the fonner USSR 
respectively. 
Cumulative Liberalisation Index from De Melo, Denizer and Gelb(1995) measures the degree of 
liberalisation of the economy as described in the text. The index ranges from 0 to 4. 
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seigniorage generally far exceeded levels in Latin America and were truly enonnous. In 
Russia seigniorage equalled approximately 330/0 of GNP in 1992. The primary 
beneficiaries of seigniorage in the CIS countries, Romania and Bulgaria \\'ere 
enterprises. With negative real interest rates this was an important source of finance to 
enterprises which kept the state sector producing and limited refonns that would be 
induced by hard budget constraints. Why then did the policy makers in some countries 
choose to delay restructuring by maintaining lax monetary policies while others went for 
the immediate stabilisation option and thus plunged directly into recession'7 The above 
analysis seems to suggest that it could not have been because continued lax policies 
provided the economy with better options after a couple of years of delayed stabilisation. 
The data, if anything, supports the opposite view that the economies that delayed 
stabilisation suffered more subsequently. 
2.3.2 Politics and the Credit Process 
We might conclude from these facts that the policy makers who did not stabilise 
simply made mistakes. They initially thought loose credit would give enterprises time to 
adjust, and this in turn would limit ultimate output declines and restructuring costs. In 
retrospect credit policy has had little impact, so the policy measures were at best 
unhelpful and turned out to be costly due to social costs of continued inflation. But this 
view complet~ly ignores political explanations of inflation, and these seem far more 
reasonable than economic arguments or explanations based on ignorance. Under the 
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Table 2.3 Seigniorage and Natural Resources 
illustrative Potential for Revenues from Money Creation 
and Natural Resources 
Real Value of Net Credit Issue l Major Natural Resource Exports 
(% GNP: 1992) Outside FSU3 
($ million of cotton, oil and gas) 
Estonia 0.2 0 
Hungary 0.4 0 
Poland 6.4 0 
Romania 6.4 0 
Latvia 11.92 0 
Albania 14.4 0 
Lithuania 19.72 0 
Kyrgyzstan 29.12 0 
Moldova 32.62 0 
Russia 32.71 24,200 
Ukraine 34.5 small 
Kazakhstan 35.7 1,000 
Belarus 42.8 0 
Turkmenistan 63.2 840 
Uzbekistan na 673 
Notes: 
1 Where available (see note 2)The data show the change in net credits to government plus gross credits to the 
rest of economy by the monetary authority measured as a fraction of GNP. These are calculated on a quarterly 
basis. To calculate. quarterly GNP, we allocated annual nominal GNP according to the quarterly pattern of 
producer price indexes (or consumer price indexes when producer prices were unavailable). The estimates 
will tend to overstate the real value of credits if there are long lags in credit allocation, and when quarterly 
inflation is high. ·lhe high measures for Turkmenistan reflect this. The Russian measure is calculated using 
monthly data so the inflation bias should not be large in this case. Data from IMF: Economic Trends for 
various countries, IMF: International Financial Statistics for CIS countries, Russian Economic Trends 
(various), Ukrainian Economic Trends October 1994. 
2 These estimates are based on credits from conunercial banks and the monetary authorities. This \\111 
therefore be substantially larger than credits from the monetary authority alone. To the extent that 
governments also directed commercial bank loans, and given negligible nominal interest rates during this 
period in most countries, this may be a better measure of the resources available to the authorities that 
control credit issue. 
3 Data from IMF Economic Trends for respective countries. 
Soviet system the link between monetary variables and demand was well understood. 
While policy makers were unfamiliar with free prices, they were well aware for seventy 
years that economic balance required stringent control on credit and money issue. And 
while officials such as the Russian Central Bank chainnan Vtktor Gerashchenko arQUed ~ 
that money issuing was not inflationary, he may have done so more to support his policy 
of liberal credits to the industrial lobby, rather than truly believing a statement which \\'as 
very clearly incorrect in Russia by the end of 1992. Even in Ukraine, notorious for its 
lack of professional economists, Oleh Havrylyshyn argues that ignorance and lack of 
careful consideration of stabilisation policies was not the primary factor explaining the 
choice ofloose credit policies:8 
" .. progress in reforms is not hampered primarily by a lack of understanding about 
the objective measures of stabilisation and adjustment that need be taken. What 
is most lacking is a sufficiently large constituency that is both committed ... and 
able to see through [such measures) ... the 30 March Economic Reform Program 
of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers was no less sensible or orthodox than the 
Russian Letter of Intent to the International Monetary Fund of February 1992. In 
practice, the main difference was a reformist Russian cabinet. .. the Ukrainian 
government allowed a huge expansion of credits to the economy starting in mid-
1992, revealing its lack of commitment to the stabilisation goals set out in 
March. The Russian government did the exact same thing ... because it was 
unable to convince the public body on the need for monetary constraint. " 
Is it true that the answer to the question again should be found in the breakdown 
of the political system and that subsequent high inflation was caused by a lack of political 
consensus rather than by wrong economic judgements or ignorance by the policy makers 
in the affected economies? There are several reasons to think so. The most basic reason 
can be gleaned from re-examining table 2.3. The credit issues that occurred in these 
countries bordered on the obscene. The amounts are truly enormous, and even if we 
believe that some industries needed subsidies, and that households deserved better social 
programs, the 32.70/0 of GNP seigniorage in Russia is far greater than would have been 
needed to pursue a careful and well-targeted program. In the first year of reforms over 
800/0 of Russian enterprises reported profits and in Poland all of the top 500 enterprises 
reported profits. This was in part due to accounting methods, but it was also due to the 
8 Havrylyshyn. Oleg (1994) p. ~29. 
ability of enterprise directors to suppress wages gIven their relative power oyer 
employees. Most enterprises had substantial scope to sell inyentories and to sell foreign 
exchange to provide financing. But with highly negative real interest rates, and large 
profits to be made from credits, it is no surprise that they all demanded credits. A 
program that targeted a few politically sensitive enterprises could have been worked out 
costing only 3-5% of GNP. 9 
Likewise a well designed social support program would have been very cheap. 
The IMF estimated that an extensive social safety net, along with increased benefits to 
pensioners and health care provisions would have cost roughly 30/0 of GNP in 1992. 
Thus in combination, an enterprise support program and a social safety net would cost 
only 8% of GNP, less than one quarter of the 33% of GNP seigniorage raised in 1992. 
These numbe~~ show that monetary policy was simply out of control in Russia, and 
I.· 
likewise in the other high inflation countries during the early stage of refonTI. A more 
careful examination of credit policy provides additional evidence that the process was 
hijacked. While there is little evidence on the pattern of credit issue by country, Russia's 
experience provides what appears to be a common trend. In 1992 there was no 
centralised program for monetary policy and orders for new credits frequently came 
from the parliament, government and president. The benefactors of these huge credits 
were not those groups that were socially harmed most: for example pensions remained 
relatively low and access to them was very limited. Subsidised credits were given to the 
agroindustrial complex, northern territories and major industries. In June 1992 Gaidar, 
after trying to implement a tight credit policy, caved in to the demands of the industrial 
lobby in order .to protect the privatisation program. He remarks on this directly in his 
Lionel Robbins Lectures 10: 
.... So we were ready to begin the process of privatization. Unfortunately, it coincided with a civil 
crisis during which pressure mounted to weaken monetary policy and increase drastically the 
9 See IMF et. al. (1991). 
10 Gaidar(l995) pp.42-43. 
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budget deficit When we could no longer withstand the pressure, we loosened monetary and 
financial Ii " -po cy. 
This pattern of large credits to the industrial lobbies and agriculture repeats itself 
throughout the CIS countries, Bulgaria and Romania. In a few cases, such as Estonia. 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, where refonnists managed to maintain a social consensus 
(at least for some time) with the populatio~ the demands for credits by industry could 
be fought off But in those countries where refonnists were weak, or where no 
refonnists came to power, the social consensus necessary to fight off large industrial 
concerns and fight inflation was not strong enough or simply non-existent. 
A related reason for the lack of monetary discipline is corruption. There is 
substantial evidence that corruption and bribery was rife in Ukraine and Russia and 
particularly in Central Asian countries during the first few years of reforms. 
Handelman( 1994) documents the Chechyna scandals of 1992 where gangs obtained 
promissory notes authorised by the regional branch of the Russian Central Bank in 
Chechyna. These were subsequently honoured by commercial banks in other parts of 
Russia and in one arrest some $200 million dollars worth of cash was collected. 
Triesman(1995) examines the allocation of preferential credits in the Moscow region. 
While these credits were ostensibly aimed to improve food supplies in the Moscow 
regio~ in his econometric work he finds that an enterprise director's "connections with 
Moscow city authorities" is the only variable that can significantly explain which 
enterprises received funds. No variables related to food supplies or other factors 
reflecting stated purposes of the credits were explanatory. In Ukraine, while there is no 
recorded evidence of central bank corruptio~ there are similar incidents. For example, 
the fonner prime minister has been charged with embezzling several hundred million 
dollars. In such an environment it is understandable that officials would come under 
enonnous pressures to issue credits for personal gain. 
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The sheer size of potential seigniorage is in itself a factor that made inflation 
almost inevitable. The amounts that were available were so substantial that anyone 
person would have been under enonnous pressure to break credit limits. It would have 
taken a set of detennined politicians, a government with a strong political base, and a 
weak opposition to prevent inflation in a country as large as Russia. In smaller countries 
where increases in money issuing would lead directly to inflation through exchange rate 
depreciation which would lead to an increase in import prices, there would have been 
smaller benefits of inflation. In such a situation a detennined refonner would face less 
opposition. In the Czech Republic there was a strong leader able to build consensus. 
And in Poland, Balcerowicz ironically was unopposed in the first few months largely 
because his government represented the major force that would have benefited from 
industrial credits, i.e. the Solidarity trade union. In all these cases personal leadership 
undoubtedly played a key role in weighing the balance of forces in favour of 
stabilisation. 
To conclude it seems that the countries that experienced continued high inflation 
did so because rent seekers had captured the political process following the breakdown 
of political institutions. This, rather than structural explanations and explanations based 
on ignorance amongst policy makers seems to be the reason for the high inflation. This 
view is supported by the sheer size of the seigniorage revenue extracted and by its 
distribution. 
2.4 Why has Inflation Fallen in Most Countries as of 1996? 
But if there were such great pressures for inflation, what then has allowed 
countries to stabilise over time? As seen from table 2.2, by 1995 more than half the 
countries had managed to reduce inflation below 50% per annum after several years of 
high inflation, and virtually every CIS country is now on track to bring inflation to 2-3% 
per month sometime in 1997. There are many possible explanations. Figure 2.4 
36 
illustrates one key reason in the case of Russia. Seigniorage declined rapidly from the 
unprecedented highs in 1992 to much smaller levels in 1995. This is true even for the 
same high inflation rates as occurred in 1992. The main reason for this appears to be the 
rapid development of financial markets which helps people avoid the inflation tax. \Vhen 
the payments system was slow, and there were few alternatives to holding funds in 
roubles, enterprises and households became hostages to the inflation tax. As agents 
found means to conserve on money balances, they avoided the inflation tax and money 
velocity rose. The levels of seigniorage gained in 1992 would certainly lead to 
hyperinflation in Russia today, so the benefits from inflation have been reduced sharply. 
A second reason for the fall in inflation is the foreign financial assistance provided 
and the desire of politicians to become part of the world economic system. Substantial 
bilateral and multilateral aid to CIS countries has been conditional on agreement with the 
IMF over a monetary program. The IMF has made low inflation a key requirement of 
any agreed program. It is no surprise that every country that has stabilised has taken 
advantage of Th1F loans when they embark on a program. There is still some dispute as 
to whether these benefits are marginal or significant. Sachs( 1994b) argues that such 
short term assistance can provide key support for a political leader fighting off the 
interest groups that favour high inflation. Alternatively Gomulka(1994) argues that 
assistance can play only a minor role, and political determination at the start is key. No 
doubt the answer depends on the specific situation in the economy. In Russia, during the 
first year of reforms, the potential gains from seigniorage were far greater than any 
conditional aid that was offered. In addition, IMF programs required price and trade 
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Figure 2.4 Seigniorage and Inf1ation in Russia 1992-1994 
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liberalisation that would have seriously reduced the scope for gains worth well over $20 
billion dollars for various interest groups. It is not surprising that the scope for these 
gains had to be reduced, and that opposition to high inflation had to increase, before the 
government could credibly sign on to an IMF program. 
A third reason for the reduction in inflation is the improvements in the political 
system that have taken place particularly in the former rouble zone countries This 
includes both the organisation of political parties and improvements in the policy making 
process. In countries where there are free elections, inflation has become one of the key 
concerns of the population. Granville and Shapiro( 1996) report that a one percent 
reduction in inflation will reduce the number of Russians under the poverty line by 
700,000. In opinion polls Russians report inflation is their second major concern after 
unemployment. If these opinions are channelled into the formal political system, then 
they are bound to affect politicians desire to increase their control over inflation. 
Another reason why a well functioning political process reduces inflation is that it 
increases co-ordination among policy makers. After the initial collapse of the political 
system, rules for decision making were largely absent. In a few countries where one 
clear leader emerged decisions could be made coherentlyll taking into account all 
relevant costs and benefits. But this situation did not occur when many decision makers 
with competing interests became involved in policy making in a situation without well 
functioning rules for policy implementation. Aizenmann(1989) and IWrder(1996)12 
analyse the effects of this in a theoretical framework. If many different agents gain 
effective control over money issue - for example if the central bank responds to demand 
from the parliament government and president - then high inflation would be the 
equilibrium outcome. Each group will try to sequester credits for their own benefit, and 
11 This leader could still choose high inflation as his prefereed policy as was the case for instance 
in Ukraine. 
1~ Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
3<) 
they will only consider the costs that are specifically attributed to themselves 
Alternatively, when there is one clear group or individual responsible for credit policy, 
then that person bears the full burden and blame for the costs of inflation. 
An example where the absence of a well functioning decision making process 
caused inflation is the conduct of monetary policy in the CIS in 1992. After the break up 
of the fonner USS~ each of the CIS republics was effectively able to issue rouble 
credits. It was only natural that many of them would expand credit issue knO\\ mg that 
the inflation costs would be spread across all the republics while they gained the 
immediate benefits of seigniorage. This situation was only brought under control in July 
1992 when clear limits on credits from the Russian Central Bank to other republics were 
put in place. Even then it took another year before these credits were fully stopped. In 
1992 some 10% of GNP in monetary credits were given by Russia to the other 
republics. 
Lack of a well functioning political process can also lead to indecision which again 
can result in high inflation. Alesina and Drazen( 1991) present a theoretical model 
showing that when different decision makers (or groups of decision makers) are able to 
veto decision making, it can be individually rational for each of them to refuse 
agreements that would bring about stabilisation. They wait to take decisions in the hope 
that other groups will concede to better tenns. In such a situation the stock of 
government debt can grow substantially, or a high inflation equilibrium can be sustained, 
while each interest group waits hoping that another will concede to paying higher taxes, 
or will accept a reduction in the credits they receive, in order to stop the inflation. The 
lack of agreements over budget plans, and the inability of governments to work out 
decisive stabilisation programs, probably reflected this type of indecision. Improved 
political processes and rules help prevent inflation caused by this type of "war of 
attrition" by penalising those who are hijacking the process. 
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It seems that in most cases where countries did not stabilise initially_ the factors 
supporting continued high inflation has been eroded by subsequent economic and 
political developments. It appears that even in the former socialist economies which 
chose inflationary policies, stabilisation has occurred though \.\ ith a substantial delay 
While this is a positive development there are still lessons to be learnt from the early 
stabilisers as to what could have been done differently in the high inflation countries to 
promote early stabilisation and thus reduce the hardship suffered by the larger 
population. 
2.5 Lessons for Stabilisation 
When there is political chaos and uncertainty, it is tempting to argue that 
economic policies and strategies will play little role in determining whether a country 
stabilises. But .the lesson from the former socialist countries is that, at least to some 
extent, this is incorrect. There is no doubt that large seigniorage revenues, a well 
organised opposition in favour of loose credit policies, and a corrupt environment 
reduce the chances that a politician interested in stabilising an economy will succeed. But 
there are lessons and examples from the CIS that show stabilisation is still possible even 
in these extreme envirorunents. The aim of this section is to examine some of these 
lessons. 
How economic policies affect outcomes is determined largely by the nature of 
political leadership in the economy. The economic policies implemented in the former 
socialist economies were not determined purely by historical legacies of institutions and 
fundamental economic factors. If this was the case then how could we explain the 
enormous differences in economic policies actually implemented? Was it predetermined 
destiny that Albania would join the group of rapid stabilisers while Romania and 
Bulgaria stayed behind with high inflation? And why did Kyrgyzstan manage to stabilise 
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early and generally follow liberal macroeconomic policies while all her neighbours \\"ere 
mired in interventionist policies with high inflation? 
The success and failures of all these countries in part reflected differences in 
political leadership. In Ukraine there was undoubtedly an opportunity to enter into 
serious reforms right from the start. President Kravchuk won the support of the 
population for his strong nationalist stance, but there was little discussion of his 
economic priorities. A determined president could have called for economic reform and 
built a strong political base through popular support. If Kravchuk had been a spirited 
reformer as well as a nationalist then he might have succeeded. Likewise, amongst the 
Central Asian Republics President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan is the only example of a 
president that was determined to implement radical market reforms. He continuously 
fought with the parliament and government to gain power over economic policies and 
implement reforms. It was his popularity, and a series of referendums which he soundly 
won, that gave him the political support needed to implement stabilisation. It is easy to 
imagine that without his determination, and with a person more similar to Nazarbayev of 
Kazakhstan in power, Kyrgyzstan would never have implemented the program it chose. 
In this section we look at the options facing a pro-stabilisation leader who at a 
given point in time has the opportunity to design an economic reform program. Since a 
key problem faced by reformers is the reversal of their stabilisation attempts, the 
question we pose is: what policy options help ensure that reforms can continue? There is 
a long literature on stabilisation and the optimal design of economic programs. This 
literature focuses mostly on Latin America and is concerned with issues such as wage 
controls, other price controls, and the choice of an optimal exchange rate regime at the 
start of stabilisation. We do not focus on these types of issues both because they are 
already well discussed in this literature, and because to some extent they are less relevant 
in former socialist countries. In many of the former socialist countries there was no need 
for wage and price controls. In these countries trade unions and workers seemed to have 
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weak bargaining power relative to enterprise directors. In Eastern Europe there wel 
-
few strikes and no evidence that wage demands would fuel inflation as they did in Latin 
America. In Poland for example workers elected enterprise directors in state enterprises. 
and wage controls were implemented to limit wage growth in the first few years of the 
program. 
Instead we focus on the political arena where clear patterns across countries have 
emerged in terms of links between political developments and economic reforms. There 
are several options and issues worth considering. These relate to the underlying causes 
of inflation described in the previous section. We focus on four major policy options that 
we label: (1) poison pills (2) pre-emptive policy changes (3) conditional assistance and 
(4) deadlines and reform of the political process. There is very little theoretical work on 
these issues, and therefore the discussion will at times be superficial. We do however 
believe that these examples provide insights into important issues and are valuable 
starting points for future research. 
2.5.1 Poison Pills 
The leaders of stabilisation programs often claim that they only have a short 
period of time to carry out policies before opposition builds up and it becomes difficult 
to conduct reform. This is what Balcerowicz refers to as the "period of extraordinary 
politics" or what is sometimes called a window of opportunity. An extreme example is 
the situation faced by the Gaidar team. When they came to power different members of 
the team stated they were unlikely to last even six months. As shown in the empirical 
results tight monetary policy speeds up industrial decline and restructuring and hence the 
industrial lobby is a natural opposition to stabilisation. Loose credit helps postpone the 
eventual decline. This raises the possibility that short term stabilisation may be politically 
self sustaining. Once a country embarks on a stabilisation program that lasts long enough 
for real restructuring to start, the enterprises that are against reform will lose power as 
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their size declines, and their level of employment is reduced. This will naturally reduce 
their political power since the threat of employment cuts and strikes now is less 
punishing. This in tum will strengthen the pro-stabilisation forces and lead to a 
continuation of the stabilisation policies. However in addition to relying on such self-
sustaining policies a pro-reform policy-maker acting in a window of opportunity can 
introduce a so called "poison pill" to sustain sound macroeconomic policies. 
In corporate finance poison pills are a well known invention to prevent corporate 
take overs. Some countries have implemented similar devices in their economic policies. 
One example of an economic policy with "poison pill"-features is a currency board. In 
Estonia the central bank governor with the support of the government announced a 
fixed exchange rate, and introduced a currency board system, in July 1992. This was just 
prior to elections. By introducing such a system the governing politicians effectively 
changed the incentives of subsequent governments. The poison pill aspect of a currency 
board is that it is extremely difficult to reverse without risk of financial turmoil. Under 
the rules of operation the Bank of Estonia must always buy or sell foreign exchange on 
demand at a given exchange rate from all domestic entities. There are no provisions for 
suspension of foreign currency sales. The exchange rate is pegged and there are onerous 
procedures for changing it. The parliament must approve any change in the exchange 
rate, and this ensures there will be a real risk of news leakage and hence a run on foreign 
reserves prior to an agreement being reached in parliament. Unless there is wide 
consensus on. changing the rules, it would be dangerous for anyone group to open a 
Pandora's Box by trying to change the system. 
A currency board locks in a number of important macroeconomic polices that are 
needed for stabilisation. First, by law the Bank of Estonia is not permitted to issue 
domestic credit. It can only issue base money through foreign exchange purchases. 
Second, the currency is fully convertible for current account transactions. And since the 
central bank must buy and sell foreign exchange resulting from current account 
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transactions, the money supply will adjust to ensure balance of payments equilibrium. 
With the exchange rate fixed, domestic prices will be anchored by import competition. 
Third, since the central bank cannot issue credits to the government or to commercial 
banks, the system forces an immediate adjustment in both the budget, industry and the 
banking sector. The government can only spend its tax revenues and must rely entirely 
on non-inflationary financing - this ensures that subsidies will be cut and price controls 
can be scaled back as they are not needed. Enterprises will not receive credits from the 
central bank and hence restructuring cannot be postponed. Finally, the banking system 
cannot be bailed out. While in many countries commercial banks with poor loan 
portfolios maintained liquidity by borrowing from the central bank, in Estonia these 
banks ran into severe problems early on and were forced into bankruptcy. Since the 
government could not afford to bail out the banks, depositors lost a fraction of their 
accounts. This had the positive result of forcing households to recognise the risks 
inherent in each bank, and encouraging them to place their money in safer banks. In an 
environment where many new banks are being created (for example some 2500 banks 
formed in Russia in 1992) this is an important start to limiting moral hazard problems in 
the banking sy~tem. 
, .. ' 
A second example of a poison pill also comes from Estonia. After fixing the 
exchange rate the Bank of Estonia sold futures contracts up to eight years ahead, at low 
fees, promising to sell foreign exchange at 8 Kroner per DM. We do not know the total 
amount of sales, but this is a very clear form of poison pill. Any central bank governor 
that in the future chooses to devalue the currency will face losses on these outstanding 
futures contracts. The intriguing aspect of the currency board system is that it changes 
the political payoffs to policy reversals. Figure 2.5 shows a simple sketch of how the 
payoffs might change. Suppose that in the first stage of a game the government is unsure 
of whether it will stay in power in the second stage, and if it does not, an alternative 
group which relies on anti reform support will come to power. Suppose further that if 
reforms last long enough. here two periods, they will not be reversed since the major 
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proponents of reversal will be sufficiently weakened. The payoffs to alternati\'e policies 
are shown in figure 2.5. If in the second stage of the game the opponents come to power 
the net payoff from reversing reforms is B-A when there is a poison pill, or B when there 
is no poison pill. This makes it clear that there are two key criteria necessary for a poison 
pill to work: 
1. the opponents must pay and perceive a penalty when they reverse refonns; 
2. the opponents' perceived penalty must be greater than the perceived net gains 
from policy reversal. 
Note that the effects of a poison pill may also be painful for other members of society. 
Therefore the risk of a poison pill is that if (1) and (2) are not satisfied, the poison pill 
will backfire. If the opponents choose to reverse policies in spite of the poison pill, then 
as the pill is invoked all members of society will bear the costs. A second problem arises 
if the new government is able to attribute the costs of invoking the pill on the previous 
government. Then even though the costs of the pill are potentially large, they may still 
not be borne by the persons in power and thus the poison pill might not prevent policy 
reversal and in fact worsen the realised outcome compared to the situation where there 
is policy reversal but no poison pill. 
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Figure 2.5 The Impact of a Poison Pill on the Subsequent Inflation Choice 
Political Battle 
Leader Stays 
High Inflation 
B-A 
Leader Chooses Policy 
Poison Pill 
Low Inflation 
C 
No Poison Pill 
Leader Stays 
High Inflation Low Inflation 
B C 
A: Cost to the new leader of setting off the poison pill. 
B: Benefit from high inflation to the new leader. 
C: Benefit from low inflation to the new leader. 
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In Estonia the currency board was popular as it immediately stabilised prices after 
the spell of high inflation experienced while Estonia still used the rouble. It seems 
reasonable that the public would have attributed any failure of the system to the actual 
government that tried to reverse policies (witness the recent Mexican default or Turkey's 
early experience under Ciller). Given the relatively small amounts that are to be gained 
from breaking the rule it is quite possible that opponents to stabilisation would decide, 
once the currency board existed, to maintain the system once they arrived in power. 
While the currency board seems to have worked in Estonia it is not clear if such a 
system would be politically effective in a larger country such as Russia. In Russia as 
discussed previously the total benefits of breaking off pro stabilisation reforms were 
seigniorage revenues equal to 32.7% of GNP in 1992. Likewise the banking sector and 
the industrial sector in Russi~ the two groups that would most oppose a currency 
board, were much larger than in Estonia. Estonia also had an "advantage" because ethnic 
Russians made up a disproportionately large portion of the population in the industrial 
sector. This made it easier for a nationalist government to implement stabilisation which 
primarily hurt industry. 
2.5.2 Pre-emptive Policy Changes 
It is also possible, at least in theory, that partial or pre-emptive policy changes may 
change the payoffs to political actors so that reforms are maintained. In Ukraine there 
was a power vacuum in the auturrm of 1993 after a coal miners strike incited a political 
battle between the parliament and president. The result of the struggle was a 
compromise agreement to hold new elections for the parliament and the presidency. As 
the various groups waited for the elections, in December 1993 the governor of the 
central bank launched a single handed attempt to reduce inflation from hyperinflationary 
levels. He virtually stopped credit issue and there was an immediate decline in inflation 
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and output. l3 The policies met with substantial criticism from President Kravchuk, and 
he vowed to fire the governor once elections were over. In surprise results Kravchuk 
lost the elections to former Prime Minister Kuchma, and once Kuchma came to po\\-er 
he faced the choice of reversing the stabilisation or agreeing to it. Given that many of the 
costs of stabilisation had already been borne, and given a promise from the IMF to 
approve aid if stabilisation was maintained, Kuchma after his election faced a much 
different situation than that of December 1993. The past costs of stabilisation were 
already sunk, and any reversal would mean he would have to repeat the exercise again 
sometime later. By making a pre-emptive attack on inflation the central bank governor 
changed the incentives enough for Kuchma for him to eventually decide to continue the 
relatively tight monetary policies. 14 
A similar pattern was seen in Serbia. After an episode of hyperinflation in 1993, 
the minister offinance announced a stabilisation program in Jan~ary 1994 with a pegged 
exchange rate. At the same time the government announced that the budget deficit 
would be 15% of GNP. Without other sources of financing this deficit could only be 
financed through money issue. Since the authorities had built up enough reserves to 
more than cover outstanding Ml, the pegged exchange rate was credible for 
approximately four to five months if the budget deficit was implemented as planned. 
After this time the outstanding stock of base money would have surpassed foreign 
reserves, and with continued money issue people would expect an exchange rate 
collapse. As in the Ukrainian case, the initial public support for the stabilisation changed 
the nature of the political game. The pro-stabilisation ministers within the government 
were strengthened by the early support and success of the program as inflation fell. It 
was then clear that unless the budget was adjusted the program would break down_ In 
13 See later versions of Ukrainian Economic Trends. 
14 It was not at all clear that Kuchma would have chosen stabilisation in any case. He had pre\iously 
been Prime Minister in Ukraine during a high inflation period and in the election campaign he did not 
advocate stabilisation or radical refonn. 
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April the cabinet finally agreed on a reduced deficit so failure was avoided. Once again it 
seems likely that the early stabilisation, and the subsequently changed payoffs to those 
supporting and opposing budget cuts, turned out to be sufficient to shift the balance of 
opinion in favour of budget cuts by April. 
It should not be surprising that pre-emptive actions on the part of a small group 
with some temporary power over exchange rate policy, or monetary policy, would 
change subsequent incentives for political actors. But in practice it is not clear whether 
these will be enough to prevent the reversal of reforms. Many countries have stabilised 
for a temporary period and then reversed reforms. In Ukraine the decision to maintain 
course was in part due to the change of leadership, and was also helped by other factors 
such as the IMF money that was available if reforms were maintained. In Serbia the 
decision to stop financing the war ensured the budget could be kept in reasonable 
balance, and fingers had already been burnt from the severe hyperinflation in 1993. Pre-
emptive strikes probably work in an environment where the costs and benefits of 
inflation are nearly balanced. If there are strong forces opposing the necessary 
stabilisation policies then high inflation may be unavoidable. 
2.5.3 Conditional Assistance 
There are many advocates of conditional foreign aid. There are both economic 
and political arguments for giving aid. As described in section 2.2, during the economic 
crises in former socialist countries budget revenues fell and there were legitimate 
demands for broad social programs. In such a situation inflation may be a logical choice 
by government officials. If a government could instead borrow to cover temporary 
spending needs and revenue shortfalls, then they could avoid the social costs of inflation. 
Indeed many of the requests for aid by recipient countries were constructed along these 
lines. However as we have previously argued the notion of fiscal crisis in many of the 
former socialist economies missed the nature of their underlying problems. It was the 
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breakdown of the political system, and lack of well-directed financing. that was at the 
heart of so-called fiscal crises. 
A related reason for economic aid is to cover balance of payments needs. In the 
former socialist countries imports fell drastically when the CMEA trading regime ended 
and state orders were halted. There were also problems with developing a viable inter 
state payments system early on. Given the level of exports, foreign aid can support 
higher output and wages by limiting the decline in imports. But here aid can only have a 
small impact: at best it will be several percent of GNP, and such amounts are small 
compared with the declines in real GNP and purchasing power reported for CIS 
countries. 
Since the direct economic impact of foreign aid most likely would be small, one 
main role of foreign aid should instead be to support weak governments that aim to 
introduce and maintain good policies (Sachs(l994b)). In this case small amounts of 
funds may be helpful if they translate into greater political power. In many CIS countries 
the liberal factions of governments had only limited control over state resources. When 
foreign assistance was made conditional on introducing policies they preferred, it could 
possibly tip the balance of political power in their favour. However given the large 
amounts of resources that were up for grabs in many countries (see table 2.3) it is no 
surprise that aid was ineffective at the start of reforms in many countries. The essential 
issue is whether there are enough net benefits from aid to the groups in power so that 
once they receive the aid they will be willing to implement the policies conditional on 
which the aid was granted. Since Th1F programs require that the amount of credits 
issued are cut and that trade restrictions and other rent seeking policies are stopped, this 
will only happen when the net benefits of the policies favouring rent seeking groups 
decline, and only then will the political balance tip in favour of reformers. Thus the role 
offoreign aid in promoting initial reforms may be limited. 
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Aid may be more helpful in a role of ensuring policy co-ordination. When inflation 
and general economic breakdown is caused by a lack of co-ordination of policies across 
different interest groups, then the process of negotiations and conditional aid which the 
IMF begins may actually help end this lack of co-ordination (see below). For example. 
IMF programs demand that the government limit their foreign borrowing In \1ongolia 
and Ukraine, where there were brief periods where any ministry could take on foreign 
loans (and they did!), such simple rules could have helped co-ordinate overall fiscal and 
monetary strategies. The difficulty here is that each interest groups that has veto powers 
over these decisions must be willing to accept the conditions. Since typically the Th IF 
deals only with the central bank and government, they may not be able to reach 
consensus when the parliament or other authorities that feel they get no benefits from 
foreign assistance. Because countries will only enter into aid programs when they are 
committed to reform, it is impossible to tell whether aid plays a critical role in the 
process of reform, or whether it is marginal or ineffective. VIrtually every CIS country 
has now entered into some sort of IMF program. In response to early criticism the llvfF 
introduced special financing in 1993 with reduced conditionality. This ensured that a 
large number of countries started programs, but it is not clear whether these programs 
sped up the process of stabilisation. One important role that early loans can play is to at 
least open up a clear dialogue with potential recipients. This allows them to better judge 
their own benefits and costs of reforms, along with providing technical assistance on 
program design. Since it also leads to small steps in the direction of reform, it may have 
acted as a "pre-emptive action" as described above which in tum made it more desirable 
for governments to continue the steps with broader IMF programs later on. 
2.5.4 Budget Process and Deadlines 
In former socialist countries poor economic policies were often caused by lack of 
co-ordination or rational indecision rather than because any single agent in absolute 
control chose them. Alesina and Drazen( 1991) argue that wars of attrition. where one 
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party has a veto right over decisions needed to stabilise the economy, can result in long 
periods of socially costly inflation. In their model it is possible to introduce mechanisms 
that change the incentives of each group such that they are more willing to make early 
agreements and concessions. In Aizenman(1989) and Ifurder(1996)15 lack of co-
ordination amongst policy makers drives the inflation process. If each ministry has the 
opportunity to effectively issue credits, say by pre-committing to spending and building 
up arrears, and if each of the spending agencies does not take into account the actions of 
other ministries, there is a potential for high subsequent inflation. 
These arguments suggest that rules which force co-ordination and speeds up 
decision making may help to ensure that stabilisation is sustainable. Indeed, in many 
countries lack of co-ordination between agencies was an important factor causing 
inflation. In Ukraine the parliament had the legal right to make special demands for 
emergency credits and spending up to 1994. This meant the government, parliament and 
central bank were all effectively able to issue credits. In Russia in the first year after 
liberalisation there was no clear process for credit co-ordination. This was further 
exacerbated by the right of both the government and president to grant tax waivers and 
make spending promises, and of the parliament to legislate similar changes. High 
inflation ensued. Once credit policies and overall budgetary policies were co-ordinated 
inflation fell. The lesson that can be drawn from these experiences is that procedures and 
rules that enforce political co-ordination can playa key role in ensuring stabilisation is 
successful. The specifics will depend on the country in question, but the following are 
some basic rules: 
1. There should be an ultimate arbiter that has the opportunity to penalise groups who 
do not make decisions. Such penalties should be obligatory though there may be 
discretion as to which group is penalised~ 
IS Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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2. There must be a mechanism which ensures participation and encourages agreement 
between all major political groupings in the process; 
3. There should be clear costs which can be attributed to each group when the process 
breaks down and deadlines are not met, and there must also be means for resohmo 
~ 
the crisis (such as an election) ifno ultimate agreement can be obtained; 
4. There should be a mechanism for ensuring implementation of the budget as plarmed 
and legal requirements that prevent deviations outside of emergencies. There must be 
one arbiter held responsible for deciding when deviations are legitimate. 
Even when such procedural rules are included in a stabilisation program, there 
may still be a problem of adherence. Such rules can only work when they are part of a 
program which is legitimately accepted by most political groups. If there is a "window of 
opportunity" when a leader can implement such rules, then they may in tum become 
difficult to change later on, thus locking in a stable budget making process which 
prevents wars of attrition, or inflation driven by un-coordinated policy making. 
2.6 Conclusion 
We believe that loose monetary policies and continued high inflation in the former 
socialist economies primarily reflected the political breakdown, the institutional 
breakdown and widespread corruption in these economies. Close examination of the 
policies has shown that credits and budget expenditures were directed to strong political 
lobbies rather than to reduce the social costs of adjustment. Since these strong lobbies 
were generally large industrial enterprises and the former political elite, the ultimate 
impact of high inflation was to slow structural adjustment. The enterprises that fought 
hardest for credits were undoubtedly the ones that needed the greatest structural reforms 
and downsizing in the transition process. By giving credits to these groups, loose 
monetary policies only delayed the onset of the output decline and may have had the 
perverse effect of strengthening the anti-reform lobby. However, in each country the 
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scope for rent-seeking and seigniorage declined over time as reforms progressed. So by 
1995 the benefits of loose credit policies were markedly reduced, and it is no surprise 
that virtually every country has now entered into a stabilisation program. 
These political explanations for high inflation provide lessons for stabilisation 
programs in the future. When instability is caused by political breakdown, and lack of 
checks and balances on leaders, then programs should be directed at these problems. 
This means focusing on policies which force or encourage co-ordination. Most 
importantly, democratic change can playa key role in ensuring that politicians are held 
responsible for their actions, and that the publics interests are channelled into the formal 
political process. The lesson from the CIS countries is that when the political system 
does not do this, high inflation and enormous rent-seeking can result. This means 
incorporating more political rules and conditionality into initial stabilisation programs. 
In addition there are more specific actions that leaders who face a short "window 
of opportunity" can take to co-ordinate economic policy and prevent reversal of 
reforms. We discussed how poison pills, pre-emptive policy strikes, checks and balances 
on budget processes, and conditional foreign assistance should be key ingredients in 
policy programs introduced in such a situation. These policies would need to be 
introduced alongside more standard and well-discussed fiscal measures (see for example 
Sargent( 1983)). 
What does this bode for the future paths of inflation of Eastern European and the 
CIS countries? We are optimistic. Since in many of these countries political processes 
are gradually being redefined, and since the benefits of seigniorage and rent -seeking have 
fallen, the root causes of high inflation have now been reduced. This suggests that in 
most of these countries we will not see recurring high inflations and instability, as 
observed for example in Latin America, in the future. Wherever there is a repeated 
breakdown of the political system., for example in war torn areas and where there is civi.l 
disorder, there may very well be further episodes of similar inflations In these cases, the 
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lesson from the fonner socialist countries should provide guidelines as to how to prevent 
long episodes of disruption. 
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Chapter 3 
Institutions and Inflation 1 
We present an overlapping generations model with three types of agents, private 
agents, and pairs of state and fiat agents. A state agent's income is the seigniorage 
revenue generated by the young fiat agent it is paired with. We introduce an 
equilibrium concept that allows us to study the welfare consequences of having 
more than one young state and fiat agent pair each period. We show that an 
economy will end up on the "slippery" side of the Seigniorage Laffer Curve as a 
consequence of having more than one seigniorage generating agent each period, and 
that both private and state agent welfare decreases as the number of state and fiat 
agent pairs increases. We show how Russia's inflationary perfonnance in 1992-93 
can be understood within the framework of our model. 
1 Charlie Bean and Ed Green supervised my work on this paper and prO\ided invaluable ad'ice. 
Thomas Sargent gave very helpful comments and suggestions. I had '/ery useful discussions \\ith 
Peter Boone. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Da,id Webb. The paper also bepefited from discussions from 
seminar participants at the Research Department of The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and 
the University of Arhus. 
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" An association of monopolists working for their O\\,TI interest C .. ) \\ill also work for the 
interest of consumers." (Cournot 1838). 
3.1. Introduction. 
In this paper we present a model economy in which the structure of the 
monetary institutions plays a crucial role in detennining the inflationary performance 
of the economy and affects the welfare of all agents in the economy. Our conclusion 
follows Coumot's reasoning in the sense that we conclude that the situation in 
which one agent co-ordinates the issue of fiat money and distributes the inflation tax 
revenue among the other claimants, Pareto dominates the situation in which all 
agents with money issuing rights generate their own inflation tax revenue by issuing 
fiat money separately. 
The term "inflation tax" refers to the view that the depletion of the real value 
of nominal money balances caused by inflation can be seen as a tax on these money 
balances. The rate of inflation constitutes the tax rate, and outstanding nominal 
balances constitute the tax base. In this set-up tax revenue will be zero if the tax rate 
is zero, or if the base on which the tax is levied is zero. Bailey(l956) applied the 
principles of optimal taxation to the study of the optimal use of the inflation tax. In 
an economy where agents' money demand is a negative function of the expected 
rate of inflation2, and inflation is a function of the money growth rate, one can 
derive the so-called Seigniorage Laffer Curve (figure 3.1). As the money growth 
rate increases from zero, inflation tax revenue increases, but since money demand 
falls as the money growth rate increases the tax base is reduced. Eventually this 
reduction in the tax base begins to dominate the positive effect on tax revenue 
coming from the increased tax rate and as the money growth rate increases above 
/..l. * tax revenue begins to fall. If the objective is to extract inflation tax revenue 
through issue of money balances, there is an optimal rate of growth of money in the 
economy and an associated optimal rate of inflation. 
::; Bailey uses Cagan's (1956) money demand function. 
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Figure 3. 1 The Seigniorage Laffer Curve 
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The OECD economies have highly developed systems for tax collection. This 
IS not the case in many developing countries who have yet to establish such 
institutions and in the transitional economies the collapse of the socialist economic 
system has severely impeded tax collection. Therefore the inflation tax has played an 
important role in these economies3. 
Many of ihe same economies have experienced episodes of very high inflation 
in which the economy has been almost entirely de-monetised. These episodes seem 
hard to reconcile with the optimal inflation tax literature, since they correspond to a 
situation in which the tax rate is set too high. A substantial economic literature is 
devoted to explaining these episodes - as Stanley Fischer has phrased it, the 
question is: "Why do countries end up on the slippery side of the Laffer CurveT 
(Fischer 1984). 
The literature contains several answers to Fischer's question. One set of 
models rely on a structure in which a unitary government issues money to finance a 
given deficit in an economy with a continuum of money-holding private agents. In 
all these models the source of the sub-optimality is the private sector formation of 
expectations of government policy. In Bruno and Fischer(l (90) multiple equilibria 
exist and the stability of different equilibria depends on how agents' expectations 
are formed. If agents have rational expectations only the equilibrium on the slippery 
side of the Laffer Curve is stable. Calvo (1988) shows how high inflation equilibria 
can occur purely as a self fulfilling panic. Chang (1994) shows how currency 
substitution can occur purely as an expectational phenomenon given fundamentals 
and how this can affect the government's ability to levy the inflation tax. Cukierman 
(1992) presents a model in the tradition of K ydland and Prescott( 1977) and Barro 
and Gordon (1983) where a government financing a deficit through the printing 
press will be forced on to the slippery side of the Laffer Curve in the absence of a 
commitment technology. Even though most of these models are based on reduced 
3 For the importance of seigniorage revenue in developing economies see Cukiennan. Edwards and 
Tabellini (1992). For the importance of seigniorage in transitional economies see chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
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form demand functions for money4, the authors simply assume that inflation is 
welfare reducing and therefore go on to give policy advice on how to reduce 
inflation. Since the high inflation, low seigniorage equilibrium in these models occur 
as a result of private agent expectations of government policy, the policy advice in 
these models all have the same flavour: to tie down private agent expectations the 
government must introduce a nominal anchor for its monetary policy. In a sense one 
can say that this type of policy advice gets around the problem by introducing a 
mechanism that exogenously ties down government policy. 
Another set of models focuses on the role of the design of government 
institutions for economic policy outcomes. Inefficient policies are caused by 
inappropriate design of institutions. Alesina and Drazen (1991) model delay in 
optimal policy reforms as the result of a war of attrition between two factions in 
government. Roubini and Sachs (1989) have used the same principle when 
explaining large fiscal deficits in countries with multi-party coalition governments. 
While these models address very important issues they pay relatively little attention 
to the foundations of their welfare analysis since they base their analysis on assumed 
reduced form welfare functions. Here we take the view that welfare economics 
should be based on economies built from first principles specifying agents' 
preferences, endowments, technologies and the environment. In monetary 
economics this imposes strong demands on the modeller since fiat currency has no 
value in the standard Walrasian equilibrium. Therefore the economist must specify 
frictions that give rise to a role for fiat currency. Theft:~ are several ways of 
introducing ~hese frictionss. In our model we will choose the overlapping 
generations framework which closes down the market for private claims between 
agents of different generations6. Some authors argue that a "currency in the utility 
function" formulation is another way of introducing fiat money into general 
equilibrium. While this type of formulation allows one to address issues from 
4 This is not true for Chang (1994). 
5 For an oveniew of the models that have dominated the micro based analysis of monetary poli~ 
in the last 15 years see Kareken and Wallace (1980). See also Sargent (1987). 
6 Wallace (1980) presents the case for the overlapping generations model as the best available 
model of fiat monev and stresses the importance of the missing market for generating value of 
money in equilibri~. He also takes issue with the claim that OLG models only capture the store 
of "alue function of money not the medium of exchange role (pp. 50-51). 
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monetary economics in the standard infinitely lived agent economy, it is at the same 
time susceptible to a very strong criticism in that one of the characteristics of fiat 
money is that it is intrinsically useless and therefore does not belong as an element in 
an agent's utility function 7. Aizerunan{l989) is one example of a general equilibrium 
model with an institutional explanation of sub-optimality of inflationary policies. 
The failure of several money issuing agents to co-ordinate their issue of fiat 
currency brings the economy on to the slippery side of the Laffer Curve. However 
his model relies on the currency-in-the-utility-function formulation and therefore 
makes the welfare analysis susceptible to the criticism mentioned above. Aizenrnan 
also fails to address in detail the strategic interaction between the different money 
issuing agents, and instead imposes a steady state exogenously. Zarazaga (1993) is a 
model built on the same principle as Aizerunan which sees co-ordination failure as a 
cause of sub-optimal policy. He pays more attention to the dynamic strategic 
interaction of the money issuing agents by drawing on a model from the industrial 
.. 
organisation literature that addresses core issues in enforcement of cartels under 
imperfect information (Green and Porter (l984». However Zarazaga's model is 
also based on a currency-in-the utility-function formulation and thus seems less 
applicable to issues related to inflation in fiat currency economies. 
Our model belongs to the second set of models. We will try to answer 
Fischer's question by relying on an institutional explanation of the inefficient 
economic outcome that is high inflation. However we also want our model to satisfy 
the criteria that allows us to undertake welfare analysis. This implies that we must 
build the model from first principles and show how fiat money can enter the general 
equilibrium with positive value. The justification for seeking an institutional 
explanation for high inflation stems from the observation that high inflation is most 
often associated with weak government. Before outlining ollr model we will give an 
example of a situation where institutions seemed to play an important role for the 
inflationary performance of an economy. 
7 See Wallace (1980) for a discussion of this issues(p.49) . 
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In January 1992 Russian prices were liberalised as part of an overall economic 
reform package. Liberalisation was followed by a step jump in prices of 2-t5% in 
January but thereafter monthly inflation rates fell rapidly to around 10 percent in the 
summer of 1992. In the autumn of 1992 inflation began to take off again and 
towards the end of 1992 hyperinflation seemed imminent, when the monthly 
inflation rate accelerated from 12 percent in September to 23 percent in October 
and 26 percent in November. The main source of growth of the monetary base in 
1992 was directed credits to various targeted sectors, and as table 3. 1 illustrates 
there was a large increase in the amount of directed credits in the second half of 
1992, at the same time as inflation began to accelerate. The key institutional fact 
regarding directed credits was that they in 1992 were granted by the central bank, 
on the initiative either of the bank itself. of various spending ministries, parliament 
or the president. As Sachs observes: 
"Until the spring of 1993, individual nurustnes, key members of parliamentary 
commissions, powerful industrial enterprises and influential regional authorities, all have 
had substantial sway on credit policy without any overall macroeconomic constraint."s 
The importance of these credits for overall monetary conditions in Russia in 
this period is underlined by the fact that commercial bank intermediation played a 
very small role during 1992 and 1993. The fraction of the money stock made up of 
claims directly on the central bank (i.e. base money) was much larger than in the 
DECD economies. This is illustrated in table 3.2 which shows that the ratio of total 
commercial bank lending to Central Bank of Russia (CBR) bank credits was 
between 1 and 2.2 through out 1992 and 1993. Furthermore the asset quality of the 
Russian Central Bank's claims on the agents who received the directed credits was 
questionable because the distinction between subsidies and credits had all but 
disappeared in the Soviet planning system. Ultimately these claims were claims on 
the government budget, which meant than in effect the monetary system 
8 Sachs( 1994a) p,49. 
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Table 3.1 Central Bank of Russia Credits 1992-1993 
1992 1993 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Ql Ql Q3 Q4 
Total CBR credits 34 127 113 203 95 50 96 49 
Credit to Government 
-63 72 102 65 33 -13 65 58 
Credit to banks 74 -50 -17 91 16 52 21 -7 
Directed credits 88 98 151 151 52 47 47 9 
Other credits 14 -7 3 5 7 7 1 0 
Liabilities to banks 27 141 170 65 43 2 27 15 
Interstate loans 22 105 27 47 45 11 11 -2 
Percentage change WIth respect to currency at the begmrung ofpenod. Ql=January-March etc. 
Source: RET and Govenunent Sources. 
Table 3.2 Russian Banking Intermediation 1992-1993 
1992 1993 
March June Sept Dec. March June Sept Dec. 
Total bank claims on rest of 1010 1488 3306 5583 8814 13572 20711 27930 
economy (1) 
CBR directed credits to banks 326 562 1273 2844 3884 5401 8025 8744 
:gross) (2) 
Commercial bank lending 684 926 2033 2739 4930 8171 12686 19186 
(excluding directed credits) 
113=1-2) 
Intermediation (3/2) 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.2 
Source: RET and Government Sources. 
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operated as though it were a pure fiat currency system with several money issuing 
agents. 
After Russian inflation began to accelerate in late 1992, the Russian 
government reformed the institutions dealing with allocation of directed credits. In 
October 1992 it was decided to establish a credit commission which was to co-
ordinate the use of directed credits. The credit commission assumed its role from 
the spring of 1993, and as is evident from table 3.1, the flow of directed credits was 
reduced substantially. Consequently the establishment of the credit commission has 
been credited as a major reason why hyperinflation was avoided: 
"On October 7th 1992, the president issued a decree on the formation of a government 
commission on credit policy ..... Empowering this commission probably saved Russia from 
hyperinflation. ,,9 
The effect of the high inflation in 1992 was to deplete the real value of rouble 
balances. A study has shown that the main loser was the household sector whose 
financial assets were mainly currency and low interest bearing deposits at the 
Sberbank 10. But the beneficiaries of the directed credits, the state owned enterprises 
who held deposits and some currency were also hit (Layard and Richter (1994)). 
In summary, until the establishment of the credit comnusslOn, there were 
several agencies issuing claims on the central bank independently of each other. The 
household sector holding money balances was hit by the implied inflation tax effect 
of these credits, but state owned enterprises were also affected to the extent that 
they held nominally fixed financial assets. In response to the rapid growth of 
directed credits in the second half of 1992, and accelerating inflation, the Russian 
government formed a credit commission which were to co-ordinate the use of 
directed credits. In the spring of 1993 the flow of directed credits was reduced and 
the acceleration of the inflation rate halted. 
9 Aslund (1995) p.193. 
10 Sberbank is the Russian sa\ings bank run by the government. 
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The events described above in our Vlev; justify taking the institutional 
approach to modelling inefficient policy outcomes. The case of Russia also gives us 
an opportunity to compare the welfare implications of different institutional regimes 
with Coumot's observations in mind. 
Our model has a standard overlapping generations structure In wruch the 
endowments of private agents are such that they wish to move consumption from 
the first period to the second period (i.e. save) in an environment with no inflation. 
There are no storage possibilities except for fiat money balances that yield a real 
return of minus the inflation rate between one period and the next. Into this standard 
structure, we then introduce another set of agents which consists of pairs of agents 
which we call respectively the state agent and the fiat agent. These agent pairs also 
live for two periods. The state agent in a pair has the same preference structure as 
the private sector agents 11. The fiat agent in a pair has as its sole role to issue fiat 
currency while young to extract seigniorage revenue. This seigniorage revenue is 
handed over to the state agent and supports his consumption. The fiat agent issues 
currency in a way that maximises the welfare of the state agent he is paired with. 
The model thus has a structure in which private agents are always adversely 
affected by inflation while state agents benefit from it. However since the state 
agent only receives income while young he too must save and is therefore adversely 
affected by the amount of inflation in the period in which he is old. This rate of 
inflation is in tum detennined by the actions of the next young fiat agent who is 
maximising the utility of his young state agent partner. We model the strategic 
interaction between young fiat agents of different generations as a game in which 
they each act once namely when they choose the growth rate of the money stock. 
We assume that the strategies of fiat agents are functions of the history of money 
issuance in the economy. In this way the fiat agent will take into account the effects 
of his action not only on the current inflation rate but also on future inflation rates. 
11 This formulation can be rationalised if one interprets the state agents as meaning households 
employed by the state sector. 
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We now outline the basic overlapping generations modeL Then we present the 
money issuing game where the players are young fiat agents. This game is first 
analysed for the case where there is only one young agent pair each period, which is 
our model equivalent to the situation after the credit commission was established. 
Then we analyse the same game in the situation with multiple young agent pairs 
issuing money each period, which is our model's equivalent of the Russian situation 
prior to the establishment of the credit commission. Finally we compare the 
equilibrium outcomes in these two cases and conclude. 
3.2. The Economy 
The economy consists of an infinite sequence of agents arranged in 
overlapping generations. All agents live for two periods. We will use the term 
'young' to refer to the time period in which the agent in born and 'old' to refer to 
the next period. There are three types of agents in the economy: private agents, and 
pairs of state and fiat agents. There is no popUlation growth and each generation of 
private agents consists of a continuum of agents normalised to size 1, while each 
generation of state and fiat pairs consists of a set of agent pairs of size n. There is a 
single non-storable consumption good in the economy. 
Private agent and state agent preferences are represented by a utility function 
u:R2 ~ R which is defined over the agent's consumption while young and while 
old. We write this as u t (c~ , c~+ I) where the superscripts refer to the agent's birth 
date and the subscripts refer to the time period of consumption. The utility function 
is increasing, continuous and concave in both arguments and satisfies the conditions, 
fiat agent paired with a state agent is concerned with maximising the utility of the 
state agent through money issuance as described below. 
Private agents receive an exogenous positive endowment of the consumption 
good. State agents' income comes solely from their fiat partner who can issue 
currency while young and hand over the proceeds "the seigniorage" to the young 
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state agent they are paired with. Given their income stream, pri\'ate agents and state 
agents will choose consumption and savings plans acting competitively in the 
markets for consumption goods and savings. The fiat agent has as its objectiye to 
maximise the utility of the state agent it is paired with by choosing a growth rate of 
the money stock while young. We first describe behaviour in the competitiye 
markets and then describe the problem facing the fiat agents. 
We distinguish agents in the competitive markets by superscripting private 
sector agents by a 'p' and state sector agents by an's'. The endowment vector of a 
private agent is (e~, e~+I) . We will analyse the case in which private agents in all 
generations receive an identical endowment w while they are young and nothing 
while they art old, thus the endowment vector 01- ,the private agents is 
(e~ ,e~+I) = (w,O). With preferences and endowments specified as above private 
sector agents obviously wish to save some of their endowment for consumption in 
old age. However the consumption good is not storable and agents can only save by 
holding fiat money. The optimisation problem facing a private sector agent is thus, 
(1) 
Where Pt denotes the price of time t consumption in terms of fiat money. Standard 
Lagrangian optimisation will show that the optimal consumption allocation is 
characterised by, 
(2) 
The private sector demand functions will be of the form c~t = c~t (w, P'·I )We 
Pt 
assume that both goods are normal goods which is identical to saying that both 
consumption while young and while old will increase as w increases. r~:. is the 
price of consumption at time t+ 1 relative to the price of consumption at time t, 
which is identical to the inflation rate 1t t+1 . An increase in the inflation rate will have 
both an income effect, since increased inflation reduces the real value of the 
endowment in terms of time t+ 1 consumption, and a substitution effect since 
inflation also. can be viewed as an increase in the price of consumption at time t~ 1 
relative to consumption at time t. We impose the restriction that consumption at 
time t and at time t+ 1 are gross substitutes. This assumption ensures that savings 
will decrease when inflation increases and substantially reduces the number of 
equilibria in our model I2 . 
Assumption 1 
Preferences are such that consumption at date t and at date t+ 1 are gross 
substitutes. 
Given the above assumptions we may write the private agents demand functions as, 
+ + + 
Where the ( + ) and( -) SIgnS refer to the sign of the partial derivative of the 
consumption function with respect to the argument. Notice that given our 
assumptions on preferences and the optimality condition in (2) the consumption 
function at date t+ 1 must be convex to the origin in 1t t+1 1. e. decreasing at an 
increasingly slower rate as consumption becomes more valuable. The savings 
function for a private agent is, 
(4) s~t(Wt'1tt+l)=W( -c~t(Wt'1tt.l) 
+ + + 
Since consumption at both dates is increasing in wealth, consumption at time t 
will increase by less than w and the savings function will be increasing in time t 
wealth. Savings are decreasing in inflation, but at a steadily slower rate (ie 
I:! Sargent(l987) p.233. 
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s~ > 0 ) for exactly the same reason as consumption at time t+ 1 decreases steadily 
slower as inflation increases. Recall that the savings function in our model is 
identical to the private sector demand for real money balances. The indirect utility 
function of a private agent can be written, u pI = U pI ( C ~t (w p It I _I ), c ~~ /w! ,1t t"'l )) 
+ + + 
The partial derivative with respect to inflation is negative since increased inflation 
reduces the feasible consumption set, thus 
(5) U pt = U pt (w pIt t+ 1 ) 
+ 
We now tum to the state agents. Each state agent when young receives a 
given amount of seigniorage from the fiat agent it is paired with. The assumption 
that state agents also only receive income while young is crucial since this is a way 
of ensuring that state agents also need to hold savings in the form of money 
balances. The effect of inflation on savings is a channel through which inflation can 
reduce state agent welfare. 
We will initially analyse the case where there is only one state and fiat agent pair. 
Total seigniorage revenue at time tis Mt-Mt _ 1 i.e. the addition to the nominal money 
Pt 
stock at time t divided by the price level. We call the growth rate in the nominal 
money stock !::L for Jl t . Total seigniorage can thus be written, 
M t - 1 
(6) M t - M t - 1 = M t (1 __ 1_). 
Pt PI Jlt 
The problem facing a state sector agent who has received a gIVen amount of 
seigniorage from its fiat issuing partner is, 
(7) 
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We can use the results from the analysis of the private sector agent to describe 
the consumption and savings functions of the state sector agent, thus, 
(8) cst = cst (M t 1 1t ) t t -(1--), t-'-1 , 
Pt III + 
st Sc (~,!. 1 ) d CI _ 1 = c t _, -'(I-).1t H an 
. P t !J. r _ 
+ + 
st(M t 1 ) M t (1 1) steM 1 ) S -(1--) 1t =-- - - -c ~I--) 1t . I P Il' 1+1 , 1-, 
t '. p t ~ I PI III ... 
+ + 
We now go on to characterise equilibrium in the savings market, recalling that 
the state agent savings function is his demand for real money balances. Thus our 
savings market equilibrium condition is identical to the money market equilibrium 
condition, 
(9) M t = pt ( 1t ) + st (Mt 1 ) St W t , 1+1 St -(I--),1t t+l PI + - Pt Il, _ 
+ 
We can interpret (9) as the money demand function. Doing this we summarise 
the properties of the money demand function in proposition 1. First let us note that 
for finite inflation private sector savings demand will always be positive. State 
sector savings demand is zero for ~ I = 1 since the state agent then has no income. 
As money growth increases the income effect causes state agent savings demand to 
go up, state agent savings are also decreasing in inflation. Also, let us note that the 
fiat agent that the state agent is paired with eventually will be choosing the growth 
rate of the money stock to generate income in a way that maximises utility of the 
state agent. State agent income will only be positive if seigniorage is positive, which 
it is for ~ I > 1. Given our assumptions on preferences the fiat agent will always 
choose a positive level of seigniorage so in equilibrium ~ I > 1 . 
Proposition 1 
For ~ I> 1: 
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d(A) d 2(M) d(~1) 
P t<O 'tj P t 0 d1t t, 2 > 'tj t , P t > 0 'tj t 
H d1t t + 1 d~t 
F or proof see Appendix A. 
We can now write the money demand function as, 
where the signs of the derivatives refer to the case where ~ t > 1. We can substitute 
this money demand function into (8) to get, 
These consumption functions can be substituted into the state agents utility function 
giving us the indirect utility function u~t (1t t+1' ~ t). The growth rate of the money 
stock affects indirect utility because it is the source of seigniorage, which constitutes 
the state agents income. Inflation affects indirect utility in two ways, directly 
through its effects on the consumption set of the state agent and indirectly because 
it affects the holdings of money balances in the economy, which constitute the basis 
on which seigniorage revenue is created. 
To solve the model we need to analyse the effects of inflation and money 
growth on the indirect utility function of the state agent. The general specification 
of preferences does not allow us to do this. In the folIo·Ning we will introduce 
additional assumptions on preferences that will allow us to derive an analytical 
solution of the model as a result holding in situations where the income of the state 
agent is small or inflation is high. The model can be solved numerically for more 
general allocations, as we will illustrate later in the paper. 
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Assumption 2 
st 
Preferences are such that u: ~ 0 for low w or high 1t 
u w 
One can show that assumption 2 on preferences holds for Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) utility functions which are of the fonn 
to I (i.e. if the elasticity of substitution 1/ (1- p) is high). 
With these restrictions on preferences we can go on to characterise the indirect 
utility function of the state agent more precisely. 
Proposition 2 
For 11 t > 1, 
dust 
--<0 'Vt 
d1t t+1 
F or proof see Appendix B. 
Thus we may write the indirect utility function as, 
(12) st st( ) U =u 1tt+I,llt 
+ 
Where the signs of the derivatives again only refer to the case where 11 t > 1. Also 
note that these analytical results hold only for the limiting cases where inflation is 
high or income is low. Later in the paper we will present numerical simulations of a 
more general case. 
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All that remains is to model the decision of the fiat agent on how much 
seigniorage to create when its objective is to maximise (12), and describe the 
equilibrium consequences for inflation, money demand and economic welfare To do 
this we follow the Ramsey approach outlined by Lucas and Stokey (1983). 
Equilibrium money demand from the competitive savings market is substituted into 
the optimisation problem of the fiat agent who chooses the growth rate of the 
money supply and thus acts as a feasibility constraint on his optimisation problems. 
The problem for the fiat agent is to choose a growth rate for the money stock 
at time t that maximises the utility of the state agent it is paired with. Every period a 
new fiat agent faces this problem. We introduce a strategic element in the 
interaction between fiat agents of different generations. In doing so we will assume 
that the action of the current state agent affects the actions of future state agents, or 
formally: that past actions are elements in the function (the strategy) that determines 
the action of an agent. In this way its actions today have consequences for the 
future. We now give a formal representation of an equilibrium concept where 
strategic interaction between fiat agents limits the money issuance. First we present 
the case where there is only one agent issuing money each period, and subsequently 
we extend the analysis to the case with several fiat agents each period. 
Definition: 
An equilibrium is a sequence of strategies {St} ~=o' private sector consumption 
allocations {( c ~t , c~! 1 )} :0' and state sector consumption allocations {( c ~t ,c~: 1 ) } ~=o ' 
such that, 
(i) Given /-10' I-ll" .. /-1t-1 and St+l .... St+n, St IS chosen so that it maxImISeS u st 
'Vt,n~oo. 
(ii) Given the implied price sequence of the economy, {( c;t , c;! I ) } ~"'O satisfies (1) 
and {(c:t ,C:~I) }~"'O satisfies (7). 
(iii) The money market equilibrium condition (9) is satisfied. 
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Given the way we have set up our model, a sequence of strategies that satisfy 
(i) will also imply consumption sequences that satisfy (ii) and (iii) since money 
market equilibrium is embedded in the indirect utility function of the state agent. 
However we have chosen to include the money market equilibrium explicitly in the 
definition to make this point clear. 
We derive our equilibrium concept from a game played between the young 
fiat agents of all generations. The game starts at date ° and runs forever. Each 
period a new fiat agent enters and as a single act chooses a growth rate of the 
money stock. When choosing a growth rate, the current fiat agent bases his choice 
on past growth rates chosen by previous fiat agents. He also takes into account that 
his current action is an element in the strategies of future agents. 
Call the set of players SA = {sat}:o . Each player chooses an action (a growth 
rate of money). The action set is IJ. t = (-00,00) t = 0,1,2, .. 00. A strategy s is a 
choice of a growth rate, based on past growth rates chosen. 
Formally the strategy of the first player who is active at time ° is to choose an 
action, while for players active from time 1 and onwards, a strategy is a mapping 
from past actions to a current action. We can summarise this in the following 
notation. 
Given the definition of strategies, we will outline the equilibrium concept of 
the game. Call a sequence of strategies for all players {St} ~=o a strategy profile of 
the game, and call the set of all possible sequences L. LeI w be a mapping that 
maps the set of sequences into utility levels for state agents. 
(13) w L ~ ust t = 0,1,2, ..... 00. 
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In words, given a sequence of strategies, we will have a complete list of growth 
rates of the money stock for all periods. Given this information, we can use our 
OLG model developed above to back out the implied consumption levels for all 
state agents. Given the consumption levels of the state agents, we can back out their 
utility levels. If we think of all possible sequences of strategies, we can back out all 
possible consumption sequences for the state agents and therefore all possible utility 
levels for them. An equilibrium sequence of strategies is defined by a situation 
where the strategy of any player i maximises the indirect utility of his state agent 
partner, given the history of money issuing and given the strategies of all other 
players. 
To narrow the set of equilibria we will assume in the following that agent play 
linear Markov strategies and ignore punishment type strategies of the type studied 
by Abreu (1988)13. In the following we look at the steady state equilibrium which 
has a constant rate of inflation. Given our assumptions this equilibrium will be 
unique. First we have to check that such an equilibrium indeed exists. A candidate 
sequence of equilibrium strategies is one in which every agent's strategy is to do the 
same as the previous agent. If the agent in last period expanded the money supply 
by 10 percent, the strategy of the current agent is to expand the money supply in 
this period by 10 percent and so forth. 
13 Punishment strategies belong in games where players move more than once. Even in single 
action games where players move in sequence threats can play a role. Our assump?on in this 
setting is similar to an assumption that strategies are hnear funcuons of last penods acUons. 
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Proposition 3 
If the strategy of every young fiat agent is to choose the same growth rate as 
the previous agent, then the inflation rate in the economy is equal to the 
growth rate of the money stock, formally, 
If ~ I = ~ I-I = ~ 'Vt, then 1t t = 1t = ~ 'V t . 
F or proof see Appendix C 
Therefore we can substitute the expression for the inflation rate with the 
money growth rate in the savings market equilibrium and in the indirect utility of the 
state agent at time t. 
Let us just briefly recapitulate the steps that led us to equation (14). We 
assumed that all fiat agents were playing the strategy of choosing the same growth 
rate as their predecessor. Proposition 3 then says that the inflation rate is equal to 
the rate of money growth. This solution for the inflation rate allowed us to express 
the indirect utility function of a state agent at time t as a function solely of 
exogenous variables and the current growth rate of the money stock which is under 
the control of the fiat agent he is paired with. From this expression we can derive 
the growth rate that it is optimal for the fiat agent at time t to choose given that the 
strategies of all future players are to play what he plays. Now notice that the 
indirect utility functions of the young state agents are identical at all dates since 
~ t = ~ 'Vt. Therefore the growth rate that is optimal at time t is also optimal at 
time t+ 1. Therefore the optimal strategy for the agent at time t+ 1 is to do what his 
predecessor did. We can therefore describe one sub game perfect equilibrium, which 
has a constant inflation rate. Let all players from date 1 and onwards play the 
strategy of doing what their predecessor did, and let the agent at time 0 choose the 0_ 
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growth rate of the money stock that maxmuses his indirect utility gJ"en the 
strategies of all players from date 1 and onwards. Then it will not be optimal for any 
player, choosing a growth rate at time 1. to deviate from his strate£\" of choosing the 
~. ~ 
same growth rate as his predecessor, given past actions and future strategies Below 
we will derive the solution to equation (14). Assumption 2 is instrumental in getting 
us a simple analytical result. 
Proposition 4 
st 
u1t Given ~ ~ 0 for low w or high 1t , the object of maximisation In these 
u w 
limiting cases for the fiat agent is total seigniorage revenue M (~, Il)( 1 - ~) . 
p ~ 
For all other cases the fiat agent will choose a point on the upward sloping 
part of the Seigniorage Laffer Curve. 
F or proof see appendix D. 
What proposition 4 says is that if the derivative of the indirect utility function 
with respect to income is much larger than the derivative of the indirect utility 
function with respect to inflation, then the fiat agent will maximise the state agents 
utility by maximising total seigniorage revenue. On the other hand, if the effect of 
inflation on state agent welfare is non-negligible the fiat agent will choose a point on 
the upward sloping part of the Seigniorage Laffer Curve. 
The unique solution for the growth rate of the money stock in the situation 
where all young fiat agents play the strategy of doing what the previous young fiat 
agent did can be found by differentiating the expression for total seigniorage 
revenue with respect to the growth rate of the money stock, setting this expression 
equal to zero and then solving for the optimal monetary growth rate. 
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The first order condition for maximisation of \1 (j.l, j.l )(1- _1) over j.l IS 
P j.l 
MIl d(~l) del) 
- (j.l, j.l )(-2 ) + (1- -)[ p + -p ] = o. 
p j.l j.l dj.l) dj.l2 
This expression forms a quadratic in j.l . The solutions are, 
(15) Jl = Y2 1 + 1 - p • 
{ 
4'~(" ")} 
S[+r,. 
Where we can rule out the root which is less than one since seigniorage revenue will 
be negative at this solution, so this must be a minimum. Thus the maximum \"alue is 
which is greater than 1. 
So far we have showed how our equilibrium concept can be used to find a 
finite equilibrium money growth (and inflation) rate in the case with only one young 
state and fiat agent pair each period. We now go on to characterise the general case 
where there are n young pairs each period, within this framework we can analyse 
the welfare consequences of changes in the number of agents who have access to 
issuing fiat money, or credits that are automatically monetised by the monetarv 
authorities. 
The set-up with n pairs is very similar to the set-up in the case analysed above 
where there was only one pair. On the money demand side the underlying 
optimisation problem is unchanged for the private sector agent and we just need to 
include n state agents instead of one in the savings market equilibrium On the 
money supply side we need to include the intra-temporal interaction between the n 
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money issuing young fiat agents in each generation alongside the inter-temporal 
interaction between young fiat agents of different generations which we have 
already modelled above. We first tum to the savings market equilibrium. 
We have chosen to express the growth rate of money chosen by each fiat 
agent as a gross rate. When there are n young fiat agents this implies that the total 
gross growth rate of money can be expressed as ~t=I (~~-1}1 and agent j's share of 
1=1 
total seigniorage can be expressed as o~ ~?-1 which when multiplied with total 
I (~~-1) 1=1 
seigniorage revenue r t gives the total income of agent j at time t, where, 
So the problem of young state sector agent j at time t receiving seigniorage from its 
fiat partner j is, 
Which yields a savings function, 
(18) stj - stj (5:: j r 1t ) Sf - St U t t' t+l 
+ 
Thus, the saVIngs market equilibrium consisting of private sector agents, 
representative state agent j and n-l other state agents is, 
(19) M t = sit (w p1t t+l) + s~J (8 ~rp1t t+l) + t s~ (8 ;rp1t t+l) 
Pt + - + - I") +-
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We can use many of the properties of the money market equilibrium which we 
derived for the case where there was only one state agent. \\'e summarise the 
properties of money market equilibrium in proposition 5, recalling again that gi\'en 
the restrictions we have imposed on preferences all fiat agents will choose gro\\1h 
rates Jl~ > 1 i=1,2, .... n Vt. 
Proposition 5 
For Jl ~ > 1 
d(~) d2(~) 
_....;..pt_<O Vt, __ ;_t_>0 Vt, 
d1t t+l d1t t+l 
d(~) 
_....;..Pl_>O Vt 
dJl~ 
F or proof see appendix E 
We can now use our characterisation of money market equilibrium, to derive 
consumption functions and indirect utility functions for all n state agents just as we 
did in the single state agent case. The only difference, compared with the case 
where there was only one state-fiat agent pair each period, is that both the growth 
rate chosen by fiat agent j that state agent j is paired with and the growth rates 
chosen by the fiat agents of all other pairs currently young will matter for the given 
state agents indirect utility. This is because money market equilibrium is affected by 
all choices of growth rates. Thus the indirect utility function for young state agent j 
n 
is U st] = U stj (n t+l ' Jl ~ , L Jl ~). This indirect utility function can be characterised 
i*j 
more precisely and the results in a situation with positive seigniorage are just the 
same as for the single agent case i.e. indirect utility of agent j is decreasing in n H 
and increasing in Jl:. 
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The objective of fiat agent j paired at time t with state agent j is to maximise 
n 
U stj = U stj (7t H , !l ~ , L !l ~ ). We use the same equilibrium concept as above with the 
l;ej 
addition that the intra-temporal interaction between young fiat agents of the same 
generation is captured by modelling the choice of agent j as being a best response to 
the choices of the other n-1 fiat agents of his generation. 
Definition: 
An equilibrium is a sequence of strategies {{ s: } ~=I } ~=o ' private sector consumption 
allocations {(cPt cpt )}OO t , t+ 1 t=O and state sector consumption allocations 
!l ~*j and iii J St+1 'St+2'······· St+n' St IS chosen so that it 
•• stj - ° 1 2 . - 1 . maXInUSeS u t - , , , .... 00 1 - ,2, ..... n , 
(ii) Given the implied price sequence of the economy {(cit, ci:l )} ~=o satisfies (1) 
and {{(csti CS~i )}n }OO satisfies (17). 
t , t I, ·-1 ' 
1- t=O 
(iii) The money market equilibrium condition (19) is satisfied. 
Call the set of players SA = {{sa: }n=}OO . Each player chooses an action 
1 1 t=O 
(growth rate of money). The action set IS !l~ = (~,oo) t = 0,1,2, ..... 00 
i = 1,2, .... n. A players strategy s is a decision rule that determines the growth rate 
of the money stock, based on the past growth rates, and on the growth rate chosen 
by the other contemporaneous player. 
Formally the strategies of the players at date ° is to choose a growth rate of 
the money stock as a best response to the choice of the other contemporaneous 
players, while for players active from time 1 onwards, a strategy is a mapping from 
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past actions and the action of the other contemporaneous player to a current action. 
The following notation formalises this. 
n 
where ~~;oOj = L (~! -1) + 1 i.e. the sum of the growth rates chosen by all the other 
i;oO j 
n 
young state agents of agent j's generation, and ~t-I = L (~~_I - 1) + 1 is the total 
i=1 
growth rate in period t-l, which of course is the sum of the growth rates chosen by 
all n young state agents in period t-1. Call a sequence ofst~ategies for all players 
{{ s~ } ~=I } ~o ' a strategy profile of the game, and call the set of all possible sequences 
~ 
L . Let w be the mapping that maps the set of sequences into a set of utilities for 
the state agents. 
(20) w i ~ u~ti t = 0,1,2, ..... 00 i = 1,2, ... n. 
In words, if we are given a strategy sequence, we can back out utility levels 
for all agents from our OLG model. Given all possible strategies, w gives us a list 
of all possible utility levels for all state agents. An equilibrium is a sequence of 
strategies, so that each fiat agent maximises the indirect utility of the state agent he 
is paired with, given the history of money issue, the strategies of future agents and 
the actions of his contemporaries. 
Again we assume that agents play linear Markov strategies. We also restrict 
our attention to symmetric equilibria. We now proceed to characterise the steady 
state equilibrium which has a constant inflation rate. 
n 
Recalling that ~ t = L (Il: - 1) + 1 and imposing symmetry on all n young 
I = I 
agent pairs in each generation, we see that a candidate equilibrium strategy 
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sequence is one where ~~ -1 = [~t-! -1]/n i = 1.2 .... n V t ~ 1. That is, each 
young fiat agent chooses a growth rate that is ~ times the total growth rate of last 
n 
period. W.e now use the same line of argument as presented in the single pair case to 
determine whether such an equilibrium indeed exists. 
First note that, if all agents from date t+ 1 onwards play this strategy, the 
agents at time t will know that the money growth rate that results from the sum of 
their growth rates will be the money growth rate in all future periods. Using the 
arguments in proposition 3, the constant rate of future inflation can therefore be 
determined as the sum of the growth rates chosen by the current agents. 
n 
(21) 1t = ~ = L (~i - 1) + 1 
i=! 
Substituting this expressIOn into the savmgs market equilibrium and 
subsequently' substituting this into the indirect utility functIons of the young state 
agents at date t, we get the following set of indirect utility functions. 
n n 
(22) ustj = ustJ(Il~ + L(Il~ -1), Il~ + L(Il~ -1)) 
Optimisation of (22) over Il ~ will give us the growth rate that is optimal for 
fiat agent j at time t, given the growth rates chosen by all other young fiat agents i at 
time t, and given that the strategies of all of the players in subsequent periods is to 
choose a growth rate that is ~ times the total growth rate in the previous period. 
n 
Just as in the single pair case the indirect utility functions of the young state agents 
are identical at all dates. Therefore we will again have the result that the growth rate 
that is optimal at time t is also optimal at time t+ 1. Theref~re the optimal strategy 
for the fiat agent at time t+ 1 is the same as the optimal strategy for an agent at time 
t. Therefore we can describe one sub-game perfect equilibrium in this game, which 
has a constant inflation rate. Let all players at time 1 and onwards play the strategy 
84 
of issuing money equivalent to .;; times last periods total money growth, and let the 
agents at time ° choose the optimal growth rates given the choice of the other 
contemporaneous agent and given the strategies of all future agents. Then it \\·ill not 
be optimal for any player choosing a growth rate at time t, to deviate from his 
strategy of choosing a growth rate of .;; times the total growth rate from last period, 
given that is what the other contemporaneous players are doing, and given that this 
is what all future players will do. To detennine the equilibrium money growth rate, 
we therefore just need to find the symmetric Nash equilibrium in growth rates at 
time 0, detennined by optimisation of equation (22). We impose simplifying 
assumptions on the preference structure of the young state agents identical to the 
ones imposed in proposition 4 to derive an analytical solution. 
Proposition 6 
u sti 
Given _7t_. ~ 0 for low w or high 1t Vi , then the object of maximisation in 
u
stl 
w 
these limiting cases for fiat agent j is his share of total seigniorage revenue 
given the choice of the other n-l young fiat agents (*), 
The proofs are identical to the proofs of proposition 4 in appendix D, except 
for a constant term consisting of the choices of the other n-l young fiat agents 
in a generation, which from the viewpoint of agent j are fixed in the Nash 
equilibrium setting. Therefore we omit the proofs. 
So the object of maximisation for agent j is his share of the total seigniorage 
revenue, given the choice of the other n-l agents of his generation. We now find the 
optimal growth rate chosen by agent j in this situation by differentiating (*) with 
respect to the growth rate chosen by j, holding the n-l other agents actions fixed in 
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agent j' s optimisation (so j' s action is a best response to the action of the n-l other 
agents in a Nash sense). We then impose symmetry setting i--=j and solving for the 
equilibrium growth rate, which is a function of the total number of young fiat and 
state agent pairs in each generation (n). 
Proposition 7 
The growth rate chosen by agent j in a symmetric equilibrium with n young 
fiat agents is, 
T -b-.Jb 2 -4ac 
J...l = >1 where, 
2a 
-b ~ [~ C-)(n-l)(s~ -l)+(ns~ + s~ )(2n -1)], a ~ n(ns~ + s~), 
c = [M (-;)(1 + (n -1)(ss -1)) + (nss + sP )(n -1)] p w n n 
F or proof see Appendix F. 
We have now found an expression for the equilibrium growth rate chosen by 
all young fiat agents in a symmetric equilibrium. We can see how this growth rate is 
a function of the total number of young state and fiat agent pairs (n). The resulting 
equilibrium total growth rate of the money stock J.l II (n) is found by using equation 
(21) to be, 
J.l#(n) = n*(J.l T (n) -1) + 1 
dJ.l II (n) 
We have been unable to sign analytically, but in appendix G we show 
dn 
numerically that dJ.l /I (n) > 0 so the total growth rate of the money stock increases 
dn 
with the number of young state and fiat agent pairs and as a consequence so does 
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the level of inflation in the economy. Now we summarise the welfare implications of 
having more than 1 agent issuing fiat money each period. 
Proposition 8 
Private agent welfare falls as the number of state and fiat agent palrs 
Increases. 
The welfare of a state agent in a generation of n is larger in the situation 
where the fiat agents of his generation co-ordinate their money supply 
decisions and share the total revenue than in the situation where they issue fiat 
money de-centrally. 
F or proof see appendix H 
What proposition 8 says is that if there are several agents issuing fiat money 
each period, inflation will be higher and both private sector and state sector welfare 
will be lower, than in the case with one state and fiat agent only. The fact that state 
sector welfare is decreasing stems from the fact that too much inflation is created by 
n agents, reducing money demand excessively and thus reducing seigniorage 
revenue below the maximum attainable value. This is the same as saying that with 
n> 1 agents issuing money, the economy ends up on the "slippery" side of the 
Seigniorage Laffer Curve. 
The results in proposition 8 hold given assumption 2 on preferences and 
allocations is satisfied. That is, the analytical results hold only for allocations where 
state agent income is low or inflation is high. We now present a numerical 
simulation with no restrictions on allocations. In these simulations we allow private 
sector agents to have endowments both while young and while old. The simulations 
are done for Cobb-Douglas preferences with equal weights on consumption at both 
dates. 
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Table 3.3 reports the results of simulations of the n=l case, while table 3-+ 
contains the results from the n=2 case. w is the second period wealth of the priYate 
sector agents, ~ is the equilibrium growth rate of the money stock and 
consequently also the equilibrium inflation rate. MJP is total sa\ ings, seig is 
seigniorage revenue, cs(y), cs( 0) and us are consumptions of a young state agent, 
old state agent and the implied utility level respectively, cp(Y), cp( 0) and up are the 
same variables for the private sector agents. 
On the basis of these simulations we can now draw a few conclusions: the 
total seigniorage revenue declines as w approaches 1 from below. Since first period 
income for the household sector agents is nonnalised to 1, this reflects the fact that 
because of the preference structure of households, their desired savings are only 
positive if they have higher real endowments in the first period than in the second. 
As a consequence of this, household utility increases as w increases (both because 
the endowment gets bigger and because the effect of inflation on savings is 
reduced). Conversely, state agent utility declines as w approaches 1; for w = 1, the 
state agents will not be able to consume at all. 
Comparing the situation with one state agent with the situation with two state 
agents we observe the following; total money growth is higher in the case with two 
state-fiat agent pairs, but the total seigniorage revenue is lower. Obviously each 
state agent has lower utility than when there is a single state-fiat agent pair, but 
more importantly, each state agent has utility lower than if they had received half of 
the seigniorage a single state-fiat pair had extracted. These findings are illustrated in 
figures 3.2 and 3.3. Figure 3.2 shows the indirect utility function of a state agent as 
a function of the total money growth rate in the economy. The maximum utility is 
attained at a growth rate of the money stock l.78 (in this example w = 0.3). Figure 
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Table 3.3. The model with one new state-fiat pair each period 
w 11 MIP selg Cs(y) CS(O) us Cp(YI CP(O) up 
0.1 2.68 0.533 0.334 0.167 0.062 -4.56 0.634 0236 -1.90 
0.2 2.11 0.392 0.206 0.103 0.049 -5.29 0.710 0.338 -143 
0.3 1.78 0.300 0.131 0.065 0.037 -6.03 0.767 0..l31 -l.11 
0.4 1.56 0.229 0.082 0.041 0.026 -6.82 0.813 0.520 -0.86 
0.5 1.41 0.173 0.050 0.025 0.018 -7.71 0.852 0.605 -0.66 
0.6 1.29 0.128 0.029 0.014 0.011 -8.75 0.886 0.688 -0.49 
0.7 1.19 0.089 0.014 0.007 0.006 -10.02 0.918 0.769 -0.35 
0.8 1.12 0.056 0.006 0.0029 0.0026 -11.77 0.947 0.847 -0.22 
0.9 1.05 0.026 0.0014 0.0007 0.0006 -14.65 0.974 0.924 -0.10 
Table 3.4. The model with two new state-fiat pairs each period 
w 11 MIP selg cs(y) cs(o) us cp(y) cp(o) up 
0.1 5.3 0.395 0.321 0.080 0.015 -6.71 0.77 0.14 -2.20 
0.2 3.14 0.282 0.192 0.048 0.015 -7.21 0.81 0.26 -1.56 
0.3 2.32 0.212 0.121 0.030 0.013 -7.84 0.85 0.37 -1.17 
0.4 1.88 0.162 0.076 0.019 0.010 -8.56 0.88 0.47 -0.89 
0.5 1.62 0.117 0.045 0.011 0.007 -9.46 0.91 0.56 -0.68 
0.6 1.42 0.087 0.026 0.0064 0.0045 -10.45 0.93 0.65 -0.50 
0.7 1.28 0.058 0.013 0.0031 0.0025 -11.74 1l.95 0.74 -0.35 
0.8 1.16 0"')39 0.005 0.0013 0.0011 -13.38 0.96 0.83 -0.22 
0.9 1.08 0.014 0.001 0.0003 0.0002 -16.52 0.99 0.91 -0.11 
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Figure 3.2 Indirect Utility of State Agent 
1.5 2 2.5 3 
Figure 3.3 Seigniorage Laffer Curve 
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3.3 depicts the Seigniorage Laffer Curve, from which it can be seen that if the total 
growth rate of the money stock is 1. 78, which it will be if there is only one young 
state agent each period, we are on the left side of the Laffer Curve. Looking at table 
3.4, we see that the equilibrium money growth rate in the case with two state agents 
is 2.32 (again with w = 0.3 ), looking again at figure 3.3 we observe that this 
evidently is on the right - "slippery" - side of the Laffer Curve. Table 3.3 and 3.4 
also show us that the private sector agents are worse off in the case with two state-
fiat pairs than in the case with only one pair, for example the private sector utility 
(up) with one pair is -1.11, while it is -1. 17 when there are two pairs (w = 0.3 in 
both cases). The conclusions from the numerical simulations are thus consistent 
with our analytical results. 
The observation that the single state-fiat pair ends up on the left hand side of the 
Seigniorage Laffer Curve is explained by the fact that our simulation represents a 
case where the limiting condition in assumption 2 does not hold, thus the effect of 
inflation on state agent utility is non-negligible. Therefore the fiat agent will not go 
to the top of the Laffer Curve, but stay to the left where inflation is lower. The 
numerical example also shows that in the two agent case this concern with inflation 
is insufficient to keep the economy from ending on the slippery side of the 
Seigniorage Laffer Curve. 
3.3. Conclusion 
Economists have been puzzled by the fact that inflation rates in some 
countries have been consistently higher than an efficient use of the inflation tax 
would imply. In this paper we have sought to address this conundrum by starting 
from the observation that high inflation is often associated with weak governments. 
We have presented a model which explicitly models the institutional structure 
underlying the money creation process, and we reach the conclusion that 
inflationary equilibria that are sub-optimal, can be the result of having multiple 
agents issuing money in an un-coordinated way. This leads to welfare reductions for 
the household sector, but also for the credit issuers who actually extract fever 
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resources at a higher price due to the lack of co-ordination. While the paper does 
not address the desirability of redistributional policies implemented via inflation 
creation, it suggests that there are institutional reforms that can promote the 
efficiency with which the inflation tax is levied. Indeed in this paper co-ordination of 
monetary policies under a single agency constitutes a Pareto improvement on the 
situation with multiple money issuing agencies. In the light of this analysis, the 
creation of a credit commission in Russia to co-ordinate the issue of directed credits 
in the autumn of 1992, was a welfare improving policy. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Total differentiating the expression for savings market equilibrium 
we get, 
From which one can see that, 
d(~) 
d1t 
sP + SS 
1t; 1t; < 0 for Jl > 1 
l sI -s (1--) 
w J..L 
The numerator is always negative (see equations (4) and (8)), while the 
denominator is positive for Jl > 1, since the assumption that consumption at both 
dates are nonnal goods implies that 0 < s~ < 1 . 
Since s~ is positive (see equation (4)) and the same is true for s~ we see that 
It can also be seen from the total differentiation that 
s M 1 
sw pC-
----.:.....11_>0 for II >1 
I s 1 ~ -s 0--) 
w 11 
The numerator will always be positive, while the denominator again is positive for 
~>1. 
• 
Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Substituting the consumption functions (11) into the indirect utility function of the 
state agent gives, 
Differentiating the above expression with respect to inflation we get, 
From which it can be seen that 
d st 
_u_ = st st [( __ I )(~) ] + st+1 st+1 [( __ I )(~) ] + stct + st+ICt+1 U c C w 1 It U c C w 1 It U c It U c It d1t J.1, Pt J.1, Pt 
This expression cannot be signed unambiguously. The first two tenns and the last 
tenn are negative, while the third term is positive. We can use assumption 2, 
u
st 
_IT ~ 0 for low w or high 1t , to derive a limiting result. Given this assumption, 
u st w 
u: will dominate u ~I and the sign of the expression will be detennined by 
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sl 
U ...... 
which in the above expreSSIOn IS u:t c: [(I - ,~/ )( ~tt);r] +u:t-l C~-l [(I _ ~: )( ~:):: ] . 
From proposition 1 we know that (~1)r; < 0 for I-l > 1, we can combine this with 
the fact that u~t ,c: ,u:+1 ,c:+1 are all positive to get~ 
du sOC' 
-< lor I-l >1 
d1t 
Differentiating the indirect utility function with respect to the growth rate of the 
money stock we get, 
So noting the signs on the partials mentioned above once again, we get, 
du
S 
0 C' 1 
-> lor I-l > 
dl-l 
• 
Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Let I-l t = I-l t-I = I-l Vt, 
Note first that a constant money growth rate through time in our economy implies a 
constant inflation rate since all periods are completely identical. Call this inflation 
rate 1t * 
9:' 
We then need to prove that 1t * = Jl . The savings market equilibrium at time t in 
the economy with a constant growth rate of money is, 
Since neither the growth rate of the money stock, nor inflation is changing over 
time, we must also have, 
M t + 1 = spt+1 (w 1t *) + s5t+l (M t + 1 (It* "XI-..!..) 1t *) 
t+ I' t+ 1 ,,..,, ' 
P + - Pt+l ,..-t+1 
+ 
Since the savmgs functions for the agents at time t and t+ 1 are derived from 
identical preferences and endowments, it is apparent that the level of real money 
balances that satisfies the savings market equilibrium at time t is equal to the level 
that satisfies equilibrium at time t+ 1. Thus we get 
from which it is evident that 1t t+l = Jl t + 1 ; since the growth rate is constant we have 
proven that 
1t1 =1t =Jl '\It. 
• 
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Appendix D 
Proof of Proposition 4 
i) The indirect utility function of the state agent at time tis, 
Differentiation yields 
st 
Given assumption 2, namely that u: ~ 0 for low w or high 1t , the condition for an 
uw 
optimum reduces to 
which is the same as saying that the object of maximisation is total seigniorage 
M ( , I) 
- Il, 1l)(1 - - . 
P Il 
• 
F or the general case we know that with an endowment structure where the agent 
receives all income in the first period u~t is always negative. This fact combined 
with the fact that (u~t c~ + u:H C~l) is always positive shows us that the condition 
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~1 ~1 d(-, d-
for optimum in the general case will only be satisfied if {~).qli~+'J-I;_,_'_'_:'_]}>o, 
P Il- )J. aJ., d).1: 
which is the same as saying that the economy must be on the upward sloping part of 
the Seigniorage Laffer-Curve. 
Appendix E 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
Let Jl! > 1 Vi 
Differentiation of (19) yields, 
n 
d(~) = s~d1t + s~d1t + + L s~d1t + s~dw + 
j~j 
n 
+L 
From which it can be seen that 
d1t 
where 
_____ i~..;;..j_ < 0 for Jl > 1 
~ 
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• 
which is positive for ~~ > 1 Vi . The sign of the derivative with respect to inflation 
then follows from the fact that s~, s: Vi all are negative. 
d2 (2) 
Just as in the single state agent case one can show that __ ..,.....;;.pt _ > 0 Vt 
d1t ~+I 
Similarly one can show that, 
n 
+I 
which is positive for ~ ~ > 1 Vi . 
r .' ,. 
Thus we have, 
d(~) 
__ p...;...t _ < 0 Vt, 
d1t t+1 
Vt, 
d(~) 
_.....;;.Pl_>O Vt 
d~~ 
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Appendix F 
Proof of Proposition 7 
Given the assumptions in proposition 6 
is the Il J which maximises the indirect utility function of young state agent j. 
Expanding the above expression we get, 
(ii) 
M M 
d(-) d(-) 
P d1t. and-P are both derived in appendix E, if we keep in mind that 
d1t d~J d~J (see 
equation (21)), and drJ8 J can be found using the definitions of r j and 8 j in the main 
d~J 
text, 
n . 
1+ L(~1_1) 
i;tj 
U sing this information, we may rewrite (ii) as, 
(iii) 
Now we impose symmetry, ie. Il J = III = Il T which implies that, 
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(iv) l:Clli-l)=(n-l)CIl T -I) and l:Clli -l)+ll j =nCIl T -1)+1 
i~j i~ 
M M d(-) d(-) 
We use these expressions in the expressions for p d1t. and-Po in Appendix E and 
d7t dll J dIJ. J 
get, 
(v) 
Now we substitute (iv) and (v) into (iii) and rearrange to get an expression for the 
Jl T that maximises the symmetric equilibrium version of (i). We get, 
(vi) 
This expression forms a quadratic in Jl T , which we can solve. We get, 
(vii) T=obo~ where Il 2a ' 
-b.[~c ... xnolXS!..-l)+Cns:: +s~ Xlnol)], a=nC~ +~), c=[~C ... Xl+cnolXs!.. -1»+Cns~ +s~ Xnol)] 
You can convince yourself that the largest of the two roots of the polynomial is the 
one associated with a maximum by recognizing that (v) is a inverted paraboloid 
(since a<O). The small root will have the signs (-, 0, +) in its neighbourhood while 
the largest root will have the signs (+, 0,-). The sign sequences for a first order 
derivative associated with a maximum is (+,0,-) so the largest root represents the 
maximum, while the smallest root represents a minimum. 
• 
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Appendix G 
Simulation to sign the derivative of the total money growth rate as a function of the 
number of state-fiat pairs (n). 
We are performing the simulations on the expression reported in proposition 7. 
The a, band c terms match those in the expression in proposition 7. 
b[n~:=-(m*(n-l)*(w-l )+(n*s+p )*(2*n-I)) 
a[n~:= n*(n*s+p) 
c[n~:= m*(l +(n-l)*(w-l))+(n*s+p)*(n-l) 
y[ n] is the growth rate chosen by a representative fiat agent. 
y[ n ~:= (-b[ n]-(((b[ n ]Y'2)-4*a[n] *c[n])I\(O. 5))/(2 *a[n]) 
z[n] is the total money growth rate in an economy with n identical fiat agents. 
z[n~:= n*(y[n]-l)+l 
We have tried many different parameter values for the money stock, and the 
respective elasticities. We find that in all cases the sign of the derivative is positive. 
Changes in parameter values do not affect the shape of the graphs, only the absolute 
values. 
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Below we show one simulation for the following parameter values. 
m=O.4 (money demand) 
w=0.7 (income elasticity of savings for state agent) 
s=-0.2 (price elasticity of savings for state agent) 
p=-0.2 (price elasticity of savings for private agent) 
We plot the graph of the simulation results for dz(n)/dn for n ranging from 1 to 20. 
As can be seen it is positive everywhere. The result of the full simulation is available 
from the author upon request. 
. dz(n) FIgure 3.4. Plot of-~ 
dz(n) 
dn 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
dn 
5 10 15 20 n 
103 
Appendix H 
Proof of proposition 8 
The private sector welfare implications of having more than one state and fiat agent 
pairs are straightforward. Inflation is increasing in n and the consumption set of the 
private agent is decreasing in inflation as can be seen from the agents indirect utility 
function (5). Thus the larger the number of fiat agents with access to money issue, 
the lower the welfare of the private sector. 
We showed in the single state and fiat agent pair case that there was one unique 
optimum rate of money growth call it ~ (see equation (15)). Aggregating the 
actions of the n fiat agents in a generation we get a growth rate ~ # (n). This growth 
rate is increasing in the number of agents (n). Since ~ maximises the expression, 
M CJ.1,J.1)(I-I) (i.e. total seigniorage revenue), and since this maximum is unique, total 
p J.1 
seigniorage at the growth rate ~ # (n) which is ~J.1#cn),J.1#(n)Xl-#I_) must be smaller 
p J.1 (n) 
than total seigniorage at ~. Since a young state agent in both cases would get .!. 
n 
times the total, he would get less in the case where money issuance is decentralised, 
than in the case where it is centralised. Since ~ was proven to be the unique value 
for the growth rate of money that maximised the state agent indirect utility function, 
J..l # (n) can not also maximise this, and thus the welfare of the young state agents is 
lower in the case where issuance is de-central. 
• 
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Chapter 4 
Inequality and Financial Development l 
This paper investigates the link between inequality and financial development. A 
branch of models in economic development uses the financial sector as the 
transmission channel linking the income distribution with the real rate of economic 
growth. In this paper we investigate the first part of this channel, namely the link 
between inequality and financial development. We present a simple theoretical 
model, based on the other financial sector models, which uses a moral hazard 
argument to explain why poor agents are excluded from the financial sector. This 
model predicts that there exists a non-linear relationship between inequality and 
financial development, which is conditional on the level of per capita national 
mcome. In poor economies increased inequality increases the volume of 
intermediation, while in rich economies it reduces the volume. Using a new World 
Bank data set on inequality we test the predictions of the model which we find hold 
only partially. 
1 Charlie Bean supervised my work on this paper and prmided invaluable ad'ice. I thank Peter 
Boone. Helene Rey and Tommaso Valletti for useful ctiscussions. 
105 
4. 1 Introduction 
In this paper we study the link between the level of inequality in the economy 
and the level of financial development. The purpose of the paper is twofold. First 
we want to, illustrate how some recent models of economic development by 
Piketty(1997) and Aghion and Bolton (1997)2 implicitly assume that there is a 
particular relationship between these two variables, and secondly we want to test 
whether this relationship holds using a new W orId Bank data set on income 
inequality. If the findings of the models are supported by the data it is not only 
important for the validity of the theoretical models, it may also help us in our design 
of economic policies for developing countries. 
The emergence of the endogenous growth models (Romer (1986)) helped 
economists explain long run growth in rigorous theoretical frameworks. Separately 
the introduction of heterogenous agents into dynamic general equilibrium models 
has allowed the inclusion of distributional issues in these studies, notably the study 
of how inequality can affect economic growth rates. One branch of models3, 
represented by the work of Piketty and Aghion and Bolton has relied on the 
financial sector as the transmission mechanism linking the income or wealth 
distribution of the economy with the rate of real economic growth. The link works 
through a moral hazard argument that excludes poor agents from access to 
intennediation and therefore to investment. The inability of some agents to invest 
optimally in tum affects the growth rate of the economy. In this study we focus on 
one of the two parts of this transmission channel, namely the link from inequality to 
2 The analysis in this paper is based on working paper versions of the Piketty and Aghion and 
Bolton papers that the author read while at University of Chicago. 
3 There are several related papers: Townsend(l983) proxies intermediation \\ith the degree of 
centralisation of exchange in the economy. He shows how this can affect the level of economic 
activity in the economy, but he does not study a growing economy. Galor and Zeira(1993) describe 
the distributional consequences of a financial sector that only allows agents to borrow a multiple of 
their o\\n wealth. Greenwood and Jo\'anovic (1990) study how different initial wealth levels affect 
the optimal time for agents to enter a financial sector that through information gathenng can 
provide higher returns on savings. In their paper special attention is given to the d~namic 
distributional consequences. Bencivenga and Smith(l991) embeds the technology used by 
Diamond and Dybvig(l983) into an endogenous grO\\th model. Intermediation reduces liquidity 
holdings and thus increases the amount of the economy's portfolio invested in producu\'e 
technology. In an endogenous grO\\th setting. this increases the grO\\th rate of the economy. 
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financial development. We are not attempting a full test of the moral hazard based 
models of growth, since this would imply that we included the second part of the 
transmission mechanism linking financial development and economic gro\\th rates 
in the empirical investigation as well as the feed back from growth rates to the 
income distribution. What we are doing is to take the basic moral hazard mechanism 
from the Piketty model and exogenously vary the income distribution to derive 
predictions on the consequences of changes in inequality for the volume of financial 
intermediation in the economy. 
The moral hazard based models suggest that there is a non-linear relationship 
between the degree of inequality and the volume of financial intermediation and that 
this relationship is contingent on the level of economic development in the economy 
(measured by the level of per capita national income). In a poor economy more 
inequality increases the volume of financial intermediation, while in a rich economy 
increased inequality reduces it. The effect of inequality on intermediation is 
particularly interesting for the poor economy. Embedding the positive effect of 
inequality on intermediation within a framework where increased intermediation 
leads to increased real investments and increased long run economic growth, as is 
the case in a branch of the endogenous growth literature, suggests that inequality in 
the earlier stages of development might help countries grow richer faster. 
There has not yet been a full empirical investigation of a model like the one 
outlined above, but many empirical studies have documented the linkages between 
inequality and real development and between real and financial development 
separately. The seminal study of the role of inequality is Kuznets' finding that 
income inequality first rose and then declined with economic development 
(measured as the level of per capita national income)'+, and the Kuznets curve has 
been omnipresent in development economics. The role of the financial sector in 
development has also been the subject of many studies. Goldsmith (1969) noted 
how the ratio of financial institutions' assets to GNP rose with the level of Gi\'P 
4 See lWilliamson(l99 1) chapter 1 for a summ~· of Kuznets findings and references to further 
empirical evidence testing the Kuznets relationship. See also Kuznets (1971). 
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using data from 1860 to 1963 covering both developing and developed economies. 
McKinnon (1973) in a cross-country study showed how the ratio of private credit 
to national income per capita increased with the level of national income. while the 
ratio of currency to income showed no systematic pattern of correlation with the 
level of income, suggesting that it was financial intermediation rather than nominal 
variables in general that were important for development. All these studies are 
relevant for the first part of the transmission channel in the moral hazard model. :\ 
combination of the fact that financial development is positively correlated with the 
level of per capita national income with the Kuznets curve is consistent with a 
model of a transmissions mechanism of the moral hazard type in a heterogenous 
agent model. For poor economies an increase in national income is positively 
correlated with increased inequality (Kuznets) and with increased volumes of 
financial intermediation (Goldsmith), thus suggesting a positive partial correlation 
between the inequality and financial development. For richer economies an increase 
in national income is positively correlated with a reduction in the level of inequality 
(Kuznets) and positively correlated with increased volumes of financial 
intermediation (Goldsmith), thus suggesting a negative partial correlation between 
inequality and financial development. These correlation patterns are consistent with 
several directions of causation. When the theorist suggests an economic model he is 
also suggesting a direction of causation between the variables. In the case of the 
moral hazard model of the first part of the transmission mechanism, the causation 
runs from distribution to the level of financial development, since changes in the 
wealth distribution determines who has access to the financial sector. What we do 
in the empirical part of this paper is 'to test this relationship directly using a newly 
published World Bank data set on inequality. 
The second part of the transmission mechanism linking financial development 
and economic growth has already been tested empirically. In cross-country studies 
covering 80 countries from 1960-89, King and Levine(l993a, 1993b) find that 
financial development is positively correlated with long run real growthS, They also 
s TO\\nsend(l983) has emphasised the distinction between inside money and outside money in 
affecting economic activity. His thesis is that it is inside money (or credit) more than outSide 
money (fiat currency) that affects economic acti\ity. This thesis is supported by the empincal 
108 
find that initial values of the financial variables help in explaining subsequent ten 
year averages of growth rates. These findings thus support the Schumpeterian \'iew 
that financial development leads real development (Schumpeter( 1969)) against 
Robinson's suggestion (Robinson(l952)) that economies with good real prospects 
would have high demand for financial services which would lead to development of 
the financial sector6. 
In the first part of this paper we present a simple model of the link between 
inequality and financial development. The model is based on the moral hazard 
mechanism used in Piketty(l997). By varying the level of inequality, which in our 
model is equivalent to introducing a mean preserving spread on the wealth 
distribution, we can derive an empirically testable hypothesis linking inequality and 
financial development. In the second part of the paper we test this hypothesis using 
World Bank data on inequality. 
4.2 The Model7 
The economy consists of two types of agents: entrepreneurs and investors. 
There is an equal number of each type represented by a continuum of agents 
normalised to size 1. Agents live for two periods. We will analyse a simple two 
period model but the results will carry over into an infinite horizon overlapping 
generations model. Investors have endowments (el' et+)) = (zl'0) and standard 
preferences U ( C t ,c t+ 1) which are continuous and concave. They have access to a 
studies of Goldsmith(l969) and McKinnon(l973). As mentioned above Townsend's paper deals 
with the level of economic activity and the empirical studies he quotes are on levels data. However 
recently related findings have emerged in the empirical growth literature. King and Levine' s 
analysis suggests that inside money can affect economic growth rates. McCandless and 
Weber's( 1995) study suggests that there is little or no role for money in explaining economic 
growth. They also quote a number of other studies (their table ~, p.9) each with different 
conclusions on the matter. 
6 Lucas (1988) seems to support this \lew (p.6): "r \\ill also be abstracting from all monetaJ)' 
matters. treating all exchange as though it involved goods-for-goods. In general. I believe that the 
importance of financial matters is ver)" badly over-stressed in popular and even much professional 
discussion and so am not inclined to be apologetic for going to the other extreme." 
7 The derivation of the cutoff levcl of wealth. which determines who has access to intermediation 
follows Pikctty( 1997). 
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savings technology yielding a safe return of 1 + r t . The optimisation problem of an 
investor is 
(1) 
We assume that consumption at the two dates are gross substitutes so that 
savings are increasing in the rate of return on storage between period t and t+ 1. 
Thus the savings function of a representative investor is 
(2) 51 = St (zu rt ) 
+ + 
We will think of 1 + r t as being the return on deposits placed at an 
intermediary. We assume that there is perfect competition in intermediation so that 
the rate of return on a deposit equals the rate of return on the assets of the 
intermediary. The intermediary lends to entrepreneurs who have access to a 
constant returns to scale production technology for a homogeneous good 
t:+l = F(Kt, L t ) where K t is capital and L t is labour. Entrepreneur i has an 
endowment of one unit of inelastically supplied labour, one unit of labour effort and 
w it endowment units of the consumption good at date t and nothing at date t+ 1. 
wit - G(w) and the support of G is [wi, w h ]. Output depends on labour effort 
which is chosen by the entrepreneur and is either 0 or 1. The supply of labour effort 
is private information to the entrepreneur. Since the technology is CRS we can re-
normalise by the size of labour input to get k = K and f (k) = Y . The distribution 
L L 
of output per labour unit <1>( k) depends on the supply of labour effort in a 
particular way~ 
(3) if labour effort is 1 
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<l>(k) = f(k) with probability p 
= 0 with probability 1- p 
if labour effort is 0 
<l>(k) = f(k) with probability q 
= 0 with probability 1- q 
O<q<p<1 
This set up is standard for moral hazard models. With this type of technology 
the good and the bad outcomes can occur both when the entrepreneur supplies high 
and low effort. Thus the lender cannot determine the effort level of the borrower by 
observing output. Since we assume that the lender cannot directly monitor 
borrower behaviour it seems that the lender will always face moral hazard when 
lending to an entrepreneur: The entrepreneur will promise to supply high effort and 
borrow accordingly. After receiving the loan he will supply low effort. 
Consequently the probability of a bad outcome increases compared to the 
conditions under which the loan was given. However if a bad outcome is realised 
the lender will be unable to deduce whether it was chance or low effort that caused 
it. Under these circumstances lender profits are reduced compared to the full 
information case where promises can be enforced. To get around this moral hazard 
problem the lender designs an incentive compatible contract that will induce the 
borrower to supply high effort. In our set up incentive compatibility will be tied to 
the amount of collateral the borrower has tied up in the project himself An 
entrepreneur with a lot of his own wealth invested in a project will want to pay the 
cost of high effort in return for a reduction in the probability of a bad outcome 
which would eliminate his savings. The lender will be able to lend profitably to 
entrepreneurs of this type. Thus the incentive compatibility ~onstraint determines a 
cut off level of wealth. Entrepreneurs with wealth below this level will be unable to 
borrow. We now proceed to derive this cut offlevel of wealth. 
III 
There are two possible choices of capital good input depending on whether 
labour effort is supplied or not. If labour effort is 1. the entrepreneur will inyest 
kl =k:pf'(k)=l+rt . If labour effort is 0 he will invest k2 =k:qf'(k)=l+rt . 
Since f has the standard neo-classical properties k 1 > k 2. \Ve assume that 
k2 < wi and kl > w h which is equivalent to assuming that high effort entrepreneurs 
will wish to borrow while low effort entrepreneurs will have sufficient endowment 
of the consumption good to self finance their project. Entrepreneurs do not have 
access to the deposit technology at the intermediary who lends to entrepreneurs8. 
Entrepreneurs are born at time t and given their endowment, they invest and receive 
the returns at time t+ 1 where they consume. The optimisation problem of the ith 
entrepreneur is, 
Entrepreneurs are maximising their expectation at time t of consumption at 
time t+ 1 This maximisation problem reduces to maximising the expected return 
from the investment project net of the cost of effort. Given our analysis of the 
production process, expected consumption can take two values depending on the 
choice of effort; 
(5) 
We assume that 
8 This assumption is made to simplify the description of equilibrium. If entrepreneurs could save at 
the same intermediary. changes in the income distribution would affect both the amount of funds 
allocated and the amount of funds saved in the intermediary at a given interest rate. The 
assumption made eliminates the second effect. Nothing substantial would change in the analysis if 
the supply of funds effect was included except that the interest rate would have to change less to 
equilibrate supply and demand of funds after a change in income inequality because there are 
additional savers in this economy. While entrepreneurs cannot save at the intermediary which 
lends to high effort entrepreneurs they still have access to a return of 1 +r so their investment 
decision is identical to the one analysed in Piketty. 
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i) EtC,t+l (e = 1, k, Wi ,0) - 1> Etc,:_: (e = 0, k, Wi ,0) 'v"W, 
ii) EtCit+l(e=1,k,wpr)-1>Etcit+l(e=0,k,1i'"r) for r<r*, 'v"Wj 
Assumption (i) implies that if the rate at which the entrepreneur can borrow is 
zero, he will supply high effort and undertake the high investment. Assumption (ii) 
says that as long as the interest rate in the economy is below r* entrepreneurs will 
supply full effort and undertake the high investment. This is, of course, the 
interesting case as there are no high effort entrepreneurs in the high interest rate 
economy. In the following we restrict our analysis to that case. 
The intermediary has to decide how much to lend to an entrepreneur. In the 
economy where the intermediary can only observe project outcomes and not effort 
(which is private information), the intermediary must ensure that incentive 
compatibility holds. The intermediary will therefore only lend an amount to the 
entrepreneur that ensures it will be optimal for him to supply the effort he promised 
ex ante when he borrowed. The intermediary offers the contract based on the 
observed project outcome; 
In case of project failure the borrower pays nothing to the intermediary, in 
case of project success he pays (1 + rt ) / p. With this contract the intermediary 
breaks even since expected return on its lending portfolio is 1 + rt . 
The incentive compatibility constraint for a borrower with wealth wit is 
(7) p[J ( k} ) - d s] - 1 > q[J ( k}) - d s ] 
The intermediary will only lend to an agent if the above holds. If the 
constraint is violated it will be optimal for the agent to promise to supply high 
effort, invest k} and then supply low effort. 
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The incentive compatibility constraint implies that agents with wealth below a 
certain level will not be able to borrow the amount necessary to finance investment 
in the optimal high effort project. The other option available to them is to invest k, 
and to supply low effort. This project they can self finance. The cut off wealth level 
IS 
Agents with wealth below this level will not be allowed to borrow sufficient 
funds to finance the high effort project. If we view the desired lending volume of 
the intermediary as the demand for loanable funds, we can describe loan demand 
l(r) as 
wit 
(9) l(r) = J [k] (r) - w JtG(w) 
w*Cr) 
l(r) depends on both the distribution of entrepreneurial wealth G(w) , the 
production function since this is important for detennining k] and the interest rate, 
both through its effect on k) and on w * (r) . 
Equilibrium is the situation in which the saVIngs market clears given the 
wealth distribution for entrepreneurs G( w), the information structure, the 
production function f (k ) and wealth levels for savers z. The equilibrium rate of 
interest is the interest rate that solves: 
(10) s(=,r)=l(r) 
1 I 1 
We have already described the supply of loanable funds above9, and we saw 
that s = s(z, r). We now describe the properties of the loan demand schedule \Ye 
+ + 
pay particular attention to how it depends on the interest rate so that we can plot 
the loanable fimds market in a diagram and how changes in the distribution of 
entrepreneurial wealth affects the demand schedule. This last relationship is at the 
core of our subsequent empirical analysis. 
dl 
We can find dr by applying Leibniz's rule lO to equation (9). We get, 
h 
dl dw * w , 
-d =-[k1(r)-w*}g(w*(r))-+ 5 kdr)g(w)dw 
r dr 
w*(r) 
dw* 
= -[k] (r) - w *]g(w * (r»- + k; (r)[1- G(w * (r»] 
dr 
This implies that 
dl (11) -<0 
dr 
since [k](r)-w*]>O by assumption, g(w*(r»>O, k;(r)<O by the 
standard neoclassical assumption on the production function, [1 - G( w * (r» ] > 0 
and as is proved in Piketty( 1997) dw * > 0 for r < r * which is the case we are 
dr 
studying. Figure 4. 1 shows the market for loanable funds. Given (11) the loan 
demand schedule is downward sloping. 
9 By assuming that entrepreneurs with excess capital i.e. low effort entrepreneurs with surplus 
capital do not place their funds with the intermediary who lends to high effort entrepreneurs. we 
are abstracting from the situation where the supply schedule for loanable funds is also dependent 
on G(w). 
10 See Bartle( 1976) p.24:'. 
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Figure 4.1 The Market for Loanable Funds 
r 
s(z,r) 
I(r) 
I, s 
116 
We are interested in what the predictions are of this model concerning the link 
between inequality and the volume of intermediatioI\ since this is the relationship 
we want to base our test of the model on. We want to separate out the effect from 
changes in the level of national income per capita from the analysis since this 
variable previously has been shown to affect the volume of intermediation. To do so 
we can model an increase in inequality as a mean preserving spread on the 
distribution of entrepreneurial wealth. A mean preserving spread places more 
weight on the tails of the distribution without changing the mean. Thus a mean 
preserving spread on a wealth distribution increases the variance of the distribution. 
Formally a mean preserving spread can be defined in the following way 11 : 
For two distributions GU (w) and G~ (w) with support [Wi, w h l G~ (li') is 
said to be a mean preserving spread on GU (w) (or equivalently GU (w) second 
order stochastically dominates G~ (w)) if the following conditions are satisfied: 
wh 
i) f [Gu (w) - G~ (w)] dw = 0 (Identical means)12 and, 
wi 
w· 
ii) f[G~(w)-GU(w)]dw~O Wi sw# sw h 
wi 
This is the definition of a mean preserving spread given by Rothschild and 
Stiglitz(1970,1971). We will also assume that the two distributions we study satisfy 
the single crossing property, namely 
iii) GP (w) - GU (w) s 0 (~ 0) when w ~ (spy 
11 See Sargent(l987) pp. 64-65. and Mas-CoIeIL Whinston and Green(1995) pp.I97-I99. 
I: See Sargent(l987) p.58 for the derivation of the mean of a non-negati\"e random \"ariable. 
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Figure 4.2 Mean Preserving Spread SatisfYing the Single Crossing Property!:3 
1 II--------------------~~------
~----______ +_------------l 
\iv" ~ w h1 
Figure 4.3 Mean Preserving Spread Violating the Single Crossing Propert\ 
A,1foO. ,.\ \ A.~ g 
~\ (A~(.l ~ /~~(~d») 
13 Sources: ~2.: Sargent( 1987). ~.3.: Mas-Colcl!. \\'hlllston and Grcen(l995) 
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This is a type of mean preserving spread illustrated in figure 4.2. A mean 
preserving spread that does not satisfy condition (iii) is illustrated in figure 4.3. This 
assumption greatly simplifies the subsequent analysis. Given that we in our data 
work study changes only at top and bottom quintile of the wealth distribution this is 
also a sensible assumption. 
Given the above definition we can describe what happens to the loan demand 
curve when there is a mean preserving spread of the distribution of entrepreneurial 
wealth. 
Loan demand is given by, 
wh 
(9) I(r) = f [k} (r) - w}iG(w) 
w*(r) 
This can also be written 
w*(r) 
I(r) = 1- f [k} (r) - w}iG(w) 
wi 
U sing the integration by parts rule (f vdu = uv - f udv) on the above 
expression, we get 
w* 
I(r) = 1- [k} (r) - w]G(w)I:; - f G(w)dw 
wi 
w* 
(12) = 1- [k} (r) - w *]G(w*) - f G(w)dw 
wi 
We can use (12) to describe the effects of a mean preserving spread on the 
loan demand schedule holding the interest rate constant. Index the loan demand 
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function by the spread ranking of the distribution so that la (r) is the loan demand 
function associated with Ga (w), and I~ (r) is associated with G~ (w) . Then., 
".* 
(13) r (r) -/~ (r) = [Ga (w*) - G~ (w*) ~w * -k1 (r))+ f [G~ (w) - Ga (w) lru. 
"/ 
We can use the definition of a mean preserving spread satisfying the single 
crossing property to sign la (r) -/~ (r) . By condition (ii) f [G~ (11') - Ga (w)}tw is 
wI 
always positive. The sign of [Ga (w*) - G~ (w*) Xw * -k1 (f)) is ambiguous. 
(w * -k] (r)) is always negative, but as can be seen from condition (iii) the sign of 
[Ga (w*) - G~ (w*)] changes as w * changes relative to w. If w* ~ w then 
[Ga(w*)-G~(w*)];:::O. This implies that [Ga(w*)- G~(w*)Xw*-k1(r))is 
negative and hence la (r) -/~ (f) can be negative. If on the other hand w* ~ w , 
then [G a (w*) - G~ (w*) Xw * -k1 (f)) is positive and thus la (f) -l~ (f) is 
positive. 
This ambiguity arises because a mean preserving spread has two effects. It 
affects the average wealth of agents with access to the intermediated sector, and it 
affects the total number of these agents. A mean preserving spread will always 
increase the average wealth of the agents with access to intermediation, since only 
the wealth levels above the cut off point w * affects this average. Since we are 
investigating the effects of a mean preserving spread holding the interest rate 
constant, the size of the optimal investment project does not change in our analysis, 
therefore the aVerage amount each entrepreneur needs to borrow is reduced by the 
average wealth effect of a mean preserving spread. This effect thus suggests that 
increased inequality should reduce the amount of intermediation. However this need 
not be the case, because the mean preserving spread also changes the number of 
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Figure 44a Mean preserving Spread in a Relativeh' Poor Economy 
Figure 44b Mean Preserving Spread in a Relatively Rich Economy 
~'~J r 
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entrepreneurs with access to intermediation. When one performs a mean preserving 
spread one shifts mass from the centre of the distribution towards the tails. Assume 
that this is done in a way so that equal probability mass is shifted to the top and 
bottom tails of the distribution. If the cut off point for borrowing lies at a relati\·e 
high point in the support, more mass is shifted above the cut off point by a mean 
preserving spread, and thus there will be more borrowers in this economy, this is 
illustrated in figure 4. 4a. If on the other hand the cut off point for borrowing lies at 
a relatively low point in the support, then more mass is shifted below the cut off 
point, and there will be fewer borrowers in the economy, this is illustrated in figure 
4.4b. 
Since w is a given point in the support, one can say that the dependence of 
the sign of fa. (f) -f~ (f) on the location of w * implies a conditionality on the 
level of national income of the relationship between inequality and the volume of 
financial intermediation. An economy with a high w * is on average poorer than an 
economy with a low w * , thus the result above can be interpreted as saying that for 
a poor economy increased inequality will increase the volume of financial 
intermediation if the numbers effect dominates the average effect, while for a rich 
economy more inequality will unambiguously reduce the volume of intermediation 
since both effects work in the same direction. 
To sum up: In a poor economy increased inequality shifts the loan demand 
schedule (figure 4.1) to the right for a given interest rate. In a rich economy the 
curve shifts to the left. 
To illustrate this point we have performed simulations of the effects of a mean 
preserving spread on the volume of loans demanded. The simulation is performed 
using a normal distribution 14. We hold the mean constant and look at the effects of 
changing the variance of the distribution. The simulated economy has a population 
14 This simulation is strictly speaking not a true representation of our problem since the support of 
a nonnal distribution is (-00,00), howeyer as long as we make sure that the k \ we choose is 
larger than any actual realisation. we can still use a simulation based on a nonnal to illustrate our 
point. 
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of size 100, kl equals 30 and the average per capita income is 15. An increase in 
the variance of income is equivalent to an increase in the degree of inequality in the 
economy. As figure 4.5 illustrates: For values of w* above the mean (v.;>15) 
increased inequality increases the volume of loans demanded. That is, a poor 
economy with a more egalitarian income distribution will have less satisfied loan 
demand than an economy with the same mean income, but a higher degree of 
inequality. The reverse is true for economies where w* is below the mean (w<15) 
i. e. relatively rich economies. These results are identical to the predictions of the 
theoretical model above. 
So given the upwards sloping savings supply schedule the equilibrium effects 
of a mean preserving spread of the wealth distribution depends on the level of per 
capita income in the economy. For a poor economy, a mean preserving spread will 
shift the I curve in figure 4.1 to the right, thus increasing the equilibrium volume of 
financial intermediation, while for a richer economy it will shift it to the left, 
reducing the volume of financial intermediation. We summarise the hypothesis that 
can be derived from the above analysis concerning the transmission mechanism 
between inequality and financial development. 
Hypothesis: The relationship between inequality and financial development is 
conditional on the level of per capita national income in the following way: for low 
income countries higher inequality increases the amount of intermediation; for high 
income countries it decreases the amount of intermediation. 
Figure 4.5 Simulations ofInequaEty and Intermediation. 
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spread on the wealth distribution. 
- Each set of points traces the change in intermediation as inequality changes for an economy with 
a given cut-off level of wealth. 
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4.3 Empirical evidence. 
4.3.1 Data 
To examine the links between financial development and income inequality, 
we look at cross-sectional evidence for 50 countries15 . The data on income 
inequality comes from the Deininger and Squire (1996) data set. This data set is a 
compilation of the findings of a large number of inequality studies and was put 
together to facilitate cross-sectional analysis. Only observations based on household 
surveys, a comprehensive coverage of the population and a comprehensive 
coverage of income sources has been included. The data set is the largest available 
and contains 682 "high quality" observations covering 108 countries. There are still 
substantial problems with the data set. The most pertinent problems related to the 
cross-country analysis are firstly that the data set varies in its coverage of different 
countries, therefore we cannot be sure to have observations for the same year for all 
the countries in our sample. We have chosen yearly observations as close as 
possible to each other. Our data set contains countries with observations in the 
1986-1994 range. The second problem is that the definitions used in different 
studies are not identical. These differences arise from: (i) Whether the recipient unit 
is the household or the individual; (ii) Whether income or expenditure is used for 
measurement; :(iii) Whether income is measured gross or ne~ of taxes; The first two 
differences are the most serious since the difference between gross income and net 
of tax income is most significant for inequality studies in economies where the tax 
system is used for re-distributive purposes. This is mostly the case in highly 
developed economies that are not part of our sample. Deininger and Squire have 
analysed the importance of the differences in definition of the recipient unit and the 
difference between income and expenditure studies. They find that only the income 
expenditure difference has significant effect on the data analysis. In spite of these 
problems we have chosen to conduct the empirical investigation. The Deininger and 
15 The constraint on the size of the sample comes from the inequalit) data set. Financial data is 
available for a large group of countries through the IFS and standard cross-sectional controls are 
available for more than 100 countries. The King and Levine data set for the investigation on the 
link between financial development and growth thus consists of 119 countries. 
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Squire data base is the best available and can help shed some light on an important 
question. Furthennore we have where possible addressed the problems of data 
definition. The conclusions of our empirical investigation should however be read 
with the above problems in mind. 
The Deininger and Squire data set contains two types of measures of 
inequality; Gini coefficients and cumulative quintile shares of income. The data set 
has the widest coverage for Gini coefficients, but this measure is not directly related 
to our model since redistribution of income anywhere in the income distribution 
affects the Gini coefficient, while we are interested in agents crossing a cut off 
point. Therefore we rely on quintile income shares to measure inequality. We use 
the ratio of the income share of the top 20 percent of the population to the income 
share of the bottom 20 percent of the population. We call this variable Inequality 
This is a relative measure of inequality and gives us infonnation of how poor the 
least well off members of the society are relative to the richest members. An 
increase in Inequality is equivalent to introducing a mean preserving spread on the 
wealth distribution in our model. Alternatively one can think of capturing the 
fraction of agents below the cut off point. This is done through the variable Poverty 
which measures the income share of the lowest quintile of the population. In using 
income shares for the entire population to test the hypothesis on the link between 
inequality and financial development, we are implicitly assuming that this variable is 
a good instrument for the key variable in our theoretical model which is the wealth 
of agents in the entrepreneurial sector. It is not unrealistic to assume that income 
and wealth are highly correlated especially since some income is flow income from 
the agent's stock of wealth. Further, if the entrepreneurial sector covers a 
significant share of the total economy one would expect the distribution covering 
the economy to be a good proxy for the distribution of the entrepreneurial sector. 
However the fact that a one to one mapping does not exist between the variable in 
our theoretical model and the instrument, induces us to urge further caution when 
interpreting the empirical results. 
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To measure the degree of financial development, we use the ratio of financial 
sector claims on non-bank private sector16 to GDP. We call this variable 
Intermediation. This measure of financial depth is also used by Townsend(l983) 
and King and Levine (l993a,b). 
Our model suggests that the sign of the effect of changes in inequality on the 
level of financial development is conditional on the level of economic development 
in the economy (measured as per capita national income). For low income countries 
there should be a positive correlation between inequality and financial depth, for 
high income countries the correlation should be negative. We use GDP per capita 
reported in US$ as a measure of the level of economic development 17. We call this 
variable Income. 
4.3.2 Preliminary Investigation 
Figure 4.6 shows a scatter plot of pairs of Intermediation and Inequality for 
the entire sample. As is evident from the plot there is no obvious linear relationship 
between the variables. The correlation matrix in table 4.1 shows a small negative 
relation between the two variables. Likewise there is no obvious relationship 
between Poverty and Intermediation as can be seen from figure 4.7. The correlation 
matrix in table 4.2 shows a small positive relation. Figure 4.8 shows that after 
conditioning on Income there is still no obvious relationship between 
Intermediation and Inequality. 
4.3.3 Regressions 
Our model pays particular attention to the demand side in the financial sector. 
We have ignored potentially interesting features on the loan supply side. In the 
empirical section we compensate for this by introducing various controls which 
might affect the supply of funds. Political stability is important for savers' reliance 
16 Claims on non-bank private sector is the IFS 32.d. series. GDP is the IFS series (99.b). 
17 Population is IFS series 99.2, We use annual averages of the exchange rate of the national 
currency to USS to convert our GDP measure into USS (IFS country exchange rate series ... af). 
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Figure 4.6 Plot of Intermediation and Inequality 
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Figure 4.7 Plot of Intennediation and Poverty 
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Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix 
Poverty Intennediation 
Poverty 1.0 0.057 
Intennediation 0.057 1.0 
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Figure 4.8 Plot of Intennediation and Inequality after Conditioning on Income 
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on the financial sector. The governments share in GDP might play a role too, the 
infrastructure of the economy such as the size of the agricultural sector and 
population density could be important, and the openness of the economy might 
affect the interest elasticity of savings supplies. 
To test our hypothesis we ran the following OLS regression. 
(14) 
Intermediation = Po + p/ncome + P2Income x Inequality 
+ P 3 Income 2 x Inequality + ~ 4 Inequality 
+ psIncome2 + Controls 
The Income term and interaction terms between Income and Inequality are 
directly derived from our theoretical analysis. These terms contain the non-linear 
relationship between Intermediation and Inequality conditional on the level of 
Income. This can be seen when we differentiate the expression with respect to 
Inequality. We get; 
a Intermediation A 1 A 1 ., A (15) =""21ncome+""31ncome- +""4 a Inequality 
We expect to find a positive relationship between Intermediation and 
Inequality for low income countries, while we expect to find a negative relationship 
for high income countries. Equation (15) describes a second order polynomial in 
Income. The sign switches will take place at the income levels which are the zeros 
of this polynomial and these can be found using the standard formula 
As is normal procedure in regressions with interaction terms we include all 
the terms used in interaction separately, i.e. Income, Income2 and Inequality even 
though our model does not hold any predictions on the coefficients of these 
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variables. We add a number of controls to the regression. Open defined as the sum 
of exports and imports as a proportion of nominal GDP, measures the degree of 
openness of the economy. This variable is taken from the Summers and 
Heston(l991) data set. Govt is defined as the real government share of GD P 
expressed in percent and is also taken from Summers and Heston(1991). Ch' and 
Pol are the Gastil indicies of civil and political liberties. The Civil Liberties index 
runs from 1 which is a ranking given to the most free countries to 7 which is Qiven 
~ 
to the least free. The ranking is done by a research team at Freedom House18 . Rev 
measures the average number of revolutions and coups per year and is taken from 
King and Levine(l993a). Latin and Africa are dummy variables controlling for 
countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa respectively. We use the same 
categories as King and Levine(1993). Popden is populatiGn density measured as 
total population divided by area in square kilometres. Agriculture is the share of the 
agricultural sector in value added as a share of GDP at market prices. Both these 
are calculated from the World Bank 1995 data set available on-line at the LSE. 
Table 4.3 contains the coefficient estimates of regression (14). ~3 and fu are 
both significant at the 5-percent level while ~4 is only significant at the 20 percent 
level. We calculate the roots of the above polynomial on the basis of these 
coefficients; they are (z} ,Z2) = (613, 3835). These roots are calculated as a non-
linear combination of our OLS coefficient estimates. We use the Wald test to test 
the significance of these roots; z} is greater than zero with probability 0.8, and 
(z}, Z2) are different from each other with probability 0.93. The roots imply that in 
countries with a GDP per capita between US$ 613 and 3835 there is a positive 
relationship between Inequality and Intermediation while the relationship is 
negative for income levels above US$ 3835 and below US$ 613. The positive effect 
18 See J.E.Ryan (1994) litt: The Comparative Sun'ey of Freedom 1993-1994 Survey Methodology 
pp.671-695 in: Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights And Ci\11 Liberties 
Freedom House. New York. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political 
process (the checklist on which the ranking is based includes amongst other things: elections. 
parties. opposition rights access to office. political decentralisation.) Ci\il liberties are the 
freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state (the checklist 
includes: free media, freedom of assembly. equality under the law. absence of political terror. free 
business organisation. free religion. personal freedoms. freedom from government corruption.) 
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is largest at the top point of the polynomial located at -~ which is equal to USS 
2~ 
2224. Notably both sign switches take place at income levels contained in our 
sample. The first root is the income level where the effect of increased inequality on 
intermediation goes from negative to positive and the second root is the level where 
the switch is from positive to negative. The data suggests that the model predicting 
a sign switch when one goes from poor to rich countries is only partially right. For 
very poor countries the effect of increased inequality on intermediation is negative, 
which is contrary to the predictions of the theoretical model. A calculation using 
our regression coefficient values suggest that Intermediation (measured as claims 
on non-bank private sector as a percentage of GDP) in a country with a GDP per 
capita ofUS$ 1000 will increase by 0.3 percent if Inequality is increased by 1 (i.e. if 
the ratio of the income share of the top quintile to the bottom quintile goes up by 
1). In our sample Inequality takes on values between 4.06 (in Bangladesh with per 
capita GDP ofUS$ of 191) and 32.11 (in South Africa with GDP per capita ofUS$ 
of 2960), so a change of Inequality by 1 is realistic. However the conclusion on the 
impact on I~termediation rests on a cross-country regression and is therefore 
merely suggestive. Taking this analysis one step further one is tempted to use the 
results from King and Levine ( 1993 a) (see specifically their table IX on p. 73 3) 
which suggest that a 0.3 percent change in Intermediation19 will increase the 
average growth rate of the economy in the subsequent decade by less than 0.01 
percent. Thus the implied effects of changes in inequality on real GDP growth are 
quantitatively small. If these results are to be taken at face value, changing 
inequality would therefore not seem to be the policy variable one should focus on if 
one wishes to increase real GDP growth in an economy. 
19 Our variable Intermediation is equivalent to King and Levine' s Pri\~v 1. According to King and 
Le\ine table IX a change in Pri\y1 by 1 percent will increase the average annual grO\\th rate of 
the economy in the subsequent decade by 0.037 percent. 
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Table 4.3 Intermediation and Inequality. 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable is InteITIlediation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Afiica -0.111768 0.059917 
-1.865369 0.0705 
Agriculture -0.442560 0.264718 
-1.671815 0.1035 
Civ 0.000675 0.033478 0.020168 0.9840 
Govt 0.000543 0.002548 0.212990 0.8326 
Income -3.70E-05 4.88E-05 
-0.759190 0.4528 
IncomeInequality 1.33E-05 5.89E-06 2.256279 0.0304 
Income2 1.49E-08 7.44E-09 1.998278 0.0535 
Income2Inequality -2. 99E-09 1.43E-09 
-2.094445 0.0435 
Inequality -0.007033 0.005479 -1.283686 0.2077 
Latin -0.122272 0.064822 -1.886292 0.0676 
Open 0.001266 0.000858 1.475728 0.1490 
Pol 0.025964 0.022937 1.131973 0.2653 
Popden 2.36E-05 7.49E-05 0.315472 0.7543 
Rev 0.074272 0.093013 0.798513 0.4300 
C 0.208794 0.160509 1.300824 0.2018 
R-squared 0.669804 Mean dependent var 0.282949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.537726 S.D. dependent var 0.192654 
S.E. of regression 0.130987 Akaike info criterion -3.821992 
Sum squared resid 0.600514 Schwarz criterion -3.248385 
Log likelihood 39.60286 F -statistic 5.071266 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.660729 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000047 
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Of the interaction terms neither Inequality nor Income per se have significant 
coefficients while this is the case for Income2. This suggest that there is a non-linear 
relationship between Intermediation and Income. Of the controls only Agriculture 
and the two regional dummies Latin and Africa are significant at the 10-percent 
level. Agriculture has a negative coefficient which indicates a negati\'e relationship 
between the share of agriculture in the economy and the degree of intermediation. 
This seems sensible as one would expect agricultural economies to have a less 
developed infrastructure overall than an economy with large industrial and service 
sectors. Open, though only significant at the 85 percent level, has a positive 
coefficient which is in accordance with what we expect given our model. A more 
open economy is likely to have a higher interest elasticity C'f savings supply~ the s-
curve in figure 4.1 is therefore flatter and when loan demand goes up, equilibrium 
intermediation goes up more than in a closed economy. The negative coefficients on 
the two regional dummies suggest that countries located in Latin America or Sub 
Saharan Africa have smaller financial sectors than other countries. This result is in 
line with other studies which also find negative effects from a location in these two 
areas. 
Govt, Civ and Pol also have positive coefficients but neither are significant. 
Rev surprisingly has a positive coefficient, even though one would expect agents in 
politically unstable countries to save outside the formal financial sector which is an 
easy target for a dictator in need of funding. However the coefficient is not 
significant so we should not pay too much attention to this result. The structural 
control Popd~n is also non significant. There are no obvio"J'J ~utliers as can be seen 
in figure 4.9 which plots the regression residuals. In table 4.4 we report the result of 
regression (14) after dropping the insignificant controls. This does not change the 
prevIOUS results significantly, the relationship between Inequality and 
Intermediation now takes on positive values at a per capita GDP between US$ 548 
and 4418 with a peak at 2483 . For these coefficient estimates the Wald test shows 
that ZI is greater than zero with probability 0.85, and (ZI' =:) are different from 
each other with probability 0.98. 
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Figure 4.9 Residuals From Inequalitv Regression (Table 4.3) 
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Table 44 Intermediation and Inequalitv (excluding some controls) 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable is Intermediation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Afiica -0.125966 0.053690 
-2.346158 0.0240 
Agriculture -0.223693 0.215414 
-1.038435 0.3053 
Income -5.65E-05 4.43E-05 
-1.274992 0.2097 
IncomeInequality 1.44E-05 5. 36E-06 2.681182 0.0106 
Income2 1.53E-08 6. 84E-09 2.241482 0.0306 
Income2Inequality -2.90E-09 l.27E-09 
-2.290338 0.0274 
Inequality -0.007017 0.005200 
-l.349295 0.1848 
Latin -0.162801 0.055526 -2.931984 0.0055 
Open 0.001605 0.000564 2.844221 0.0070 
C 0.287522 0.097120 2.960477 0.0051 
R-squared 0.637612 Mean dependent var 0.282949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.556075 S.D. dependent var 0.192654 
S.E. of regression 0.128361 Akaike info criterion -3.928963 
Swn squared resid 0.659060 Schwarz criterion -3.546558 
Log likelihood 37.27715 F -statistic 7.819895 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.816469 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000002 
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We also tried running regression (14) substituting the Inequality variable \\lith 
Poverty. The regression coefficients are reported in table 4.5. The results are ver\" 
different from the regression using Inequality: even though the roots are estimated 
to be located at VS$ 433 and 4393 and thus are similar to the previous findings, the 
sign of the coefficient on Income2Poverty is positive implying that the estimated 
polynomial has a V-shape rather than an inverted V-shape. The sign switches are 
therefore the opposite of what was the case for the Inequality regression. Increases 
in Poverty increases the amount of Intermediation for poor countries with GDP per 
capita below VS$ 433 and for rich countries with GDP per capita above US$ 4393. 
F or countries with per capita income between these two values increased Poverty 
reduces Intermediation. Z1 is greater than zero with probability 0.5, and (Z1' =2) 
are different from each other with probability 0.77. The signs and significance of the 
controls are very similar to the earlier results using Inequality. However Poverty is 
only significant at the 40 percent level making the conclusions here weaker than 
when using the Inequality variable. Figure 4. 10 plots the residuals from this 
regression, again there are no obvious outliers. 
Table 4.6 reports the Poverty regression excluding insignificant controls. In 
this regression the Poverty-Intermediation relationship is negative for income levels 
between US$ 509 and 4567. In this regression Z1 is greater than zero with 
probability 0.6 and (Z1 ,Z2) are different from each other with probability 0.77. 
The sign switches found using the Poverty are completely contrary to the 
predictions of our theoretical model. However the hypothesis we derived in the 
theoretical section is based on changes both at the top and at the bottom of the 
income distribution, this is captured better by our Inequality variable than by our 
Poverty variable, which only contains information about income of the bottom 
quintile. 
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Table 4.5 Intermediation and Poverty. 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable is Intermediation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Africa 
-0.117769 0.065176 
-1.806931 0.0794 
Agriculture 
-0.454761 0.269512 
-1.687351 0.1004 
Civ -0.003190 0.033866 
-0.094191 0.9255 
Govt 0.001139 0.002538 0.448960 0.6562 
Income 0.000251 0.000133 1.882797 0.0681 
Income2 -4.45E-08 1.98E-08 
-2.253734 0.0306 
IncomePoverty -0.002698 0.001838 
-1.467538 0.1512 
Income2Poverty 5.59E-07 2.60E-07 2.147786 0.0387 
Latin -0.120947 0.072284 -1.673223 0.1032 
Open 0.001137 0.000863 1.317403 0.1963 
Pol 0.030787 0.023084 1.333675 0.1909 
Popden 3.38E-05 7.12£-05 0.475201 0.6376 
Poverty 1.065360 1.861116 0.572431 0.5707 
Rev 0.081135 0.093347 0.869174 0.3907 
C 0.068312 0.234200 0.291684 0.7723 
R-squared 0.672753 Mean dependent var 0.282949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.541854 S.D. dependent var 0.192654 
S.E. of regression 0.130401 Akaike info criterion -3.830962 
Sum squared resid 0.595152 Schwarz criterion -3.257355 
Log likelihood 39.82712 F -statistic 5.139487 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.712743 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000041 
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Figure 4.10 Residuals From Poverty Regression (Table 4.5) 
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Table 4.6 Intermediation and Poverty (excluding some controls). 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable is Intermediation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Africa -0.124087 0.058865 
-2.107988 0.0415 
Agriculture -0.402287 0.241940 
-1.662756 0.1044 
Income 0.000243 0.000116 2.090351 0.0432 
Income2 4.l4E-08 1.77E-08 -2.331044 0.0250 
IncomePoverty -0.002660 0.001653 -1.609317 0.1156 
Income2Poverty 5.24E-07 2.36E-07 2.217275 0.0325 
Latin -0.120023 0.066793 -1.796952 0.0801 
Open 0.001333 0.000544 2.451486 0.0188 
Pol 0.027543 0.013901 1.981422 0.0546 
Poverty l.218290 1.640385 0.742686 0.4621 
C 0.087741 0.151982 0.577310 0.5670 
R-squared 0.661369 Mean dependent var 0.282949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.574540 S.D. dependent var 0.192654 
S.E. of regression 0.125663 Akaike info criterion -3.956766 
Sum squared resid 0.615855 Schwarz criterion -3.536121 
Log likelihood 38.97223 F -statistic 7.616958 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.744376 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000001 
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As mentioned earlier the Deininger and Squire data set contains observations 
using different data definitions of income levels; some observations are income 
based and some are expenditure based. Some observations· are of household units 
some are of individuals. To control for the income/expenditure difference we split 
the sample into two sub-samples; one contains the income based observations and 
one contains the expenditure based observations. We then run regression (16) 
estimating (Z1' Z2) separately in the two sub-samples. Next we control for the 
difference between household based and individual based observations in the same 
way in regression (17). 
Intermediation = ~ 0 
+~ 1 D1 Income + ~ 2 D1 Income X Inequality + ~ 3D1 Income 2 X Inequality 
(16) +~4DJnequality + ~sDJncome2 
+~ 6D2Income + ~ 7D2Income x Inequality + ~ sD2Income 2 x Inequality 
+~9D2Inequality + ~IOD2Income2 + Controls 
Intermediation = ~ 0 
+~ I D3Income + ~ 2D3Income x Inequality + ~ 3D3 Income 2 X Inequality 
(17) +~ 4D3Inequality + ~ SD3Income2 
+~ 6D4Income + ~ 7D4Income x Inequality + ~ sD4Income2 x Inequality 
+~ 9D4Inequality + ~ IOD4Income2 + Controls 
In regressIOn (16) we pay attention to the fact that some countries (17 
countries) in our sample use income based measures while others (33 countries) use 
expenditure based measures. We allow the sign switch point to be estimated 
separately for these different definitions by introducing two dummy variables. D) 
takes the value 1 when the data is income based and zero otheIWise. D.. takes the 
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value 1 when data is expenditure based and zero otherwise. The sign switch points 
for the income based data are 
and for the expenditure based data the switch points are 
Table 4.7 reports the regression coefficients for regression (16). While both 
types of data definitions still estimate a positive sign switch point, the point varies 
significantly. For the expenditure measure the sign is positive for income levels 
between US$ -3006 and 327 while it is positive for levels between US$ 152 and 
6496 for the income based measure. For the expenditure based observations Z I is 
different from zero with probability 0.63 and (Zl' Z2) different from each other with 
probability 0.66. For the income based observations ZI is different from zero with 
probability 0.1 and (ZI ,Z2) are different from each other with probability 0.69. The 
Zl estimated from expenditure based data is more significanc than the ZI estimated 
from income based data. This is not too surprising given that the share of 
expenditure based observations in the sample is largest (33 against income based 
data 17). The two ZI 's estimated using the two sub-samples are different from each 
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Table 4.7 Intermediation and Inequality (Income and Expenditure Data) 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable is Intermediation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Africa -0.129996 0.062589 
-2.076964 0.0465 
Agriculture -0.375299 0.277041 
-1.354671 0.1856 
Civ -0.016372 0.032658 
-0.501310 0.6198 
D2Income 0.000265 0.000136 1.956748 0.0597 
D2IncomeInequality -1.38E-05 1.66E-05 -0.832392 0.4118 
D2Income2 5.41E-09 1.32E-08 0.410800 0.6841 
D~come2Inequality -5.15E-09 2.74E-09 -1.88lO44 0.0697 
D2Inequality 0.005054 0.007378 0.685080 0.4986 
Govt 0.000322 0.002662 0.120864 0.9046 
D1Income -4. 78E-06 5.76E-05 -0.082857 0.9345 
DIIncomeInequality 8. 11E-06 9.71E-06 0.835613 0.4100 
D1Income2 5.42E-09 1.16E-08 0.466438 0.6443 
D1Income2Inequality -1.22E-09 2.43E-09 -0.501467 0.6197 
DIInequality -0.001204 0.009148 -0.131646 0.8961 
Latin -0.130277 0.063053 -2.066146 0.0475 
Open 0.001200 0.000819 1.465506 0.1532 
Pol 0.020604 0.022699 0.907699 0.3713 
Popden -1. 12E-05 8.02E-05 -0.140110 0.8895 
Rev 0.094094 0.088715 1.060630 0.2973 
C 0.181658 0.164822 1.102145 0.2792 
R-squared 0.747809 Mean dependent var 0.282949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.588087 S.D. dependent var 0.192654 
S.E. of regression 0.123646 Akaike info criterion -3.891489 
Sum squared resid 0.458651 Schwarz criterion -3.126680 
Log likelihood 46.34030 F -statistic 4.681961 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.437849 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000088 
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Table 4.8 Intermediation and Inequality (Household and Indi\idual Data) 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable is Intermediation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Africa -0.147815 0.065471 
-2.257697 0.0314 
Agriculture 
-0.374445 0.301189 
-1.243225 0.2234 
Civ 
-0.009769 0.036562 
-0.267184 0.7912 
Govt 0.000745 0.002633 0.282912 0.7792 
DJlncomeInequality 2.04E-05 1.12E-05 1.815683 0.0794 
DJlncome -7.83E-05 6.36E-05 
-1.231575 0.2277 
DJlncome2 2.09E-08 8.75E-09 2.388728 0.0234 
DJlncome2Inequality -3.92E-09 2.26E-09 
-1.735104 0.0930 
DJlnequality -0.011551 0.016039 -0.720176 0.4770 
Latin -0.132549 0.079934 -1.658240 0.1077 
Open 0.001346 0.000885 1.521901 0.1385 
DJncomeInequality 6. 82E-06 1.81E-05 0.376563 0.7091 
DJncome 4.39E-05 0.000119 0.368497 0.7151 
DJncome2 9.21E-09 3.46E-08 0.265983 0.7921 
DJncome2Inequality -2.63E-09 6. 64E-09 -0.3963l3 0.6947 
DJnequality -0.002320 0.008841 -0.262447 0.7948 
Pol 0.027505 0.025936 1.060492 0.2974 
Popden 3.04E-05 9.69E-05 0.313367 0.7562 
Rev 0.082552 0.099794 0.827225 0.4146 
C 0.185086 0.182280 1.015396 0.3180 
R-squared 0.706298 Mean dependent var 0.282949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.520287 S.D. dependent var 0.192654 
S.E. of regression 0.133435 Akaike info criterion -3.739111 
Sum squared resid 0.534145 Schwarz criterion -2.974302 
Log likelihood 42.53086 F -statistic 3.797069 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.657451 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000556 
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other with probability 0.62. The results highlight the fact that the exact location of 
the income interval where the effect is positive is sensitive to data definitions used 
in the regression. 
Similarly regression (17) checks for the importance of differences between 
Household based data (11 countries) and Individually based (39 countries). D3 
takes the value 1 when the data is based on household units and zero otherwise. D-l 
takes the value 1 when data is based on individual units and zero otherwise. Table 
4.8 reports the coefficients of regression (17). The positive intervals lies between 
income levels ofUS$ 646 and 4557 for household based data, while the interval is 
between US$ 403 and 2190 for individually based data. The = I estimated using 
household data is different from zero with probability 0.57 and (ZI ,=:) are different 
from each other with probability 0.96. For the individual based sub-sample =1 is 
different from zero with probability 0.21 and (ZI' Z2) are different from each other 
with probability 0.28. The two =1 's estimated using the two sub-samples are 
different from each other with probability 0.15. These findings again support the 
conclusion that the non-linear relationship between measures of inequality in the 
economy and the volume of intermediation exists and is conditional on the level of 
per capita GDP. However the data suggests that there are two sign switches; one at 
very low per capita income levels (around US$ 500) from negative to positive and 
one (around US$ 4000) from positive to negative. The negative effect at very low 
income levels is contrary to the predictions of our model. Also the exact location of 
the income interval where the effect of inequality is positive varies across different 
data definitions. 
4.4 Conclusion 
We set out to investigate the link between inequality and financial 
development. Our investigation is based on a simple model linking these two 
variables. The model relies on moral hazard in cutting off poorer agents from 
intermediation. This is the same mechanism as is used other recent theoretical 
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models like Plketty(1997) and Aghion and Bolton (1997). We exogenously change 
the degree of inequality by looking at a mean preserving spread to the wealth 
distribution of entrepreneurs. The experiment suggests that one should expect to 
find increased intermediation in poor economies as inequality is increased. In rich 
economies one should expect to find that increased inequality reduces the amount 
of intermediation. This difference arises because there are two effects on 
intermediation of a mean preserving spread: first it increases the average wealth of 
the entrepreneurs in the intermediated sector, which given the size of the optimal 
investment project reduces the amount of borrowing in the economy. Second it 
changes the number of people in the intermediated sector. In the poor economy it 
increases the number of agents with access to intermediation, in the rich economy it 
reduces this number. 
In the poor economy the average effect and the numbers effect work in 
opposite directions. Thus, if the numbers effect dominates the average effect, which 
we assume it does, inequality increases intermediation. In the rich economy both 
effects of a mean preserving spread work in the same direction: there will be fewer 
agents with access to intermediation, and they will on average be richer. For a given 
size of investment project in the economy, this reduces the amount of borrowing. 
Thus increased inequality will unambiguously reduce intermediation in a rich 
economy_ 
Next we go on to test the hypothesis that the relationship between inequality 
and intermediation is conditional on the level of national income in a non-linear way 
as described above. We use data from a new Wodd Bank data base covering a 
cross-section of countries. The data set is the best available but there are still 
definitional problems reducing the cross-country compatibility of the inequality 
indicator. With this qualification in mind we find the predictions of the theoretical 
model to be only partially borne out by the data. The analysis shows that increased 
inequality increases intermediation in poor economies with income levels between 
US$ 500 and US$ 4000. For income levels above US$ 4000 increased inequality 
reduces intermediation as is predicted by our model. However in \'ery poor 
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economies (with GDP per capita below VSS 500) increased inequality reduces 
intennediation. This is contrary to the predictions of our model. The exact location 
of these switching points vary across different data definitions. However for both 
the full sample regressions that use the Inequality variable the estimated roots (=: 
around 500, Zj around 4000) are significant. The specific location of the interyal is 
sensitive to the data definitions used as regression (16) and (17), using sub-samples 
with more homogeneous observations, show. Thus the numbers above are merely 
suggestive. The regressions run using the Poverty variable instead of Inequality find 
similar roots. However the polynomial estimated has a V-shape rather than an 
inverted V-shape as is the case for all the inequality regressions and indeed is 
suggested by the theoretical model. Therefore the sign switches found using the 
Poverty variable are the opposite of the ones described above. Poverty however 
only contains infonnation about the bottom quintile of the income distribution and 
is thus a poorer instrument than Inequality for capturing the effects of a mean 
preserving spread. Therefore the Poverty findings do not falsify the theoretical 
model given the findings of the Inequality regressions. 
In the endogenous growth literature the models predict that increased 
intennediation increases the real growth rate of the economy. This is the second 
part of the channel from inequality to growth which we do not investigate in this 
paper. However we can rely on King and Levine's (l993a) findings to get a grip on 
the overall effect of inequality on real growth. When we do so, we find that the real 
effect of increased inequality are very small for a model transmitting the effect 
through the financial sector, so perhaps Lucas(l988) was right when he suggested 
that financial variables had been overemphasised in the growth literature. 
All in all we find support for the existence of the first part of the financial 
transmissions mechanism linking inequality and growth, namely the inequality 
intennediation link. But the sign effects derived from the data are only partially 
consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. Furthermore the scale of 
the effects is very small suggesting that one should look for other channels linking 
inequality and real growth before giving policy prescriptions on this issue. 
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Table 4.9 Data set 
Income Intennediation Inequality Poverty Popden Agriculture 
1 Algeria 1988 2279.68 0.60 6.85 0.0680 9.937 0.11 
2 Banglades 1989 191.91 0.22 4.06 0.0950 737.042 0.37 
3 Bolivia 1990 657.78 0.22 8.58 0.0562 6.032 0.32 
4 Botswana 1986 1139.95 0.09 16.36 0.0360 1.915 0.05 
5 Chile 1989 2174.63 0.47 17.03 0.0370 17.082 0.08 
6 Colombia 1988 1296.70 0.14 15.11 0.0370 27.952 0.17 
7 Costa Rica 1989 1789.60 0.16 12.68 0.0400 57.768 0.17 
800M 1989 953.86 0.16 13.26 0.0420 142.760 0.18 
9 Ecuador 1994 1480.02 0.23 9.82 0.0536 37.828 0.12 
10 Egypt 1991 657.20 0.22 4.72 0.0871 54.187 0.17 
11 Ghana 1989 360.26 0.06 6.33 0.0697 61.021 0.49 
12 Greece 1988 6407.59 0.19 6.65 0.0619 76.636 0.14 
13 Guatemala 1989 940.76 0.14 30.00 0.0210 82.062 0.26 
14 Guinea 1991 238.46 0.14 28.57 0.0206 27.266 044 
Bissau 
15 Guyana 1993 568.94 0.17 7.48 0.0627 3.774 0.35 
16 Honduras 1992 630.90 0.23 14.67 0.0384 46.171 0.17 
17 India 1989 346.81 0.29 4.36 0.0910 251.788 0.28 
18 Indonesia 1990 590.23 0.50 4.56 0.0920 93.509 0.21 
19 Israel 1992 12636.80 0.58 5.25 0.0763 238.641 0.02 
20 Jamaica 1989 1700.98 0.31 9.61 0.0510 216.105 0.07 
21 Jordan 1991 944.45 0.64 7.37 0.0647 4l.071 0.07 
22 Kenya 1992 309.36 0.23 18.24 0.0339 42.524 0.23 
23 Korea, R. 1988 4330.45 0.45 5.72 0.0739 424.475 0.1 
24 Laos 1992 263.68 0.04 4.21 0.0955 18.842 0.58 
25 Lesotho 1987 228.35 0.15 20.90 0.0287 54.394 0.16 
26 Madagascar 1993 243.38 0.16 8.52 0.0585 21.065 0.32 
27 Mauritania 1988 503.88 0.29 13.12 0.0353 l.857 0.29 
28 Mauritius 1991 2558.76 0.36 6.48 0.0670 529.707 0.1 
29 Mexico 1989 2464.80 0.16 18.53 0.0320 42.198 0.08 
30 Morocco 1991 1105.23 0.20 7.05 0.0657 55.649 0.2 
31 Nicaragua 1993 462.24 0.28 13.12 0.0420 30.476 0.3 
32 Niger 1992 299.22 0.11 5.90 0.0748 6.527 0.39 
33 Nigeria 1992 311.21 0.07 7.32 0.0660 110.308 0.26 
34 Pakistan 1988 355.89 0.27 4.69 0.0861 134.081 0.23 
35 Panama 1989 2116.09 0.44 29.90 0.0200 31.116 0.12 
36 Philippines 1988 645.19 0.16 10.10 0.0520 194.188 0.23 
37 Portugal 1990 6805.47 0.42 7.44 0.0570 106.808 0.06 
38 Senegal 1991 730.59 0.26 16.75 0.0350 37.245 0.2 
39 Singapore 1988 9762.81 0.80 7.15 0.0652 4266.471 0.005 
40 South Africa 1993 2960.64 0.61 32.11 0.0202 32.567 0.04 
41 Spain 1989 9814.55 0.72 4.21 0.0839 77.481 0.05 
42 Sri Lanka 1990 472.75 0.20 4.41 0.0892 262.536 0.23 
43 Tanzania 1993 123.67 0.13 6.64 0.0685 28.739 0.49 
44 Thailand 1990 1527.08 0.64 13.80 0.0400 107.621 0.13 
45 Tunisia 1990 1525.88 0.55 7.91 0.0586 49.318 0.16 
46 Turkey 1987 1651.66 0.19 9.53 0.0524 67.447 0.17 
47 Uganda 1989 303.95 0.03 4.92 0.0852 69.303 0.54 
48 Venezuela 1989 2269.94 0.20 10.29 0.0480 20.837 0.06 
49 Zambia 1991 403.50 0.10 8.92 0.0557 11.155 0.16 
50 Zimbabwe 1990 660.52 0.16 15.66 0.0398 25.342 0.14 
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Table 4.9 (cont.) 
pol CIV Rev Africa Latin govt Open 
1 Algeria 1988 6 6 0.10000 0.0000 0.0000 25.8 38.43 
2 Bangladesh 1989 4 4 0.62000 0.0000 0.0000 42.1 25.83 
3 Bolivia 1990 2 3 1.1500 0.0000 1.0000 19.3 46.87 
4 Botswana 1986 2 3 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 40.1 119.05 
5 Chile 1989 4 3 0.19000 0.0000 1.0000 16.1 65.78 
6 Colombia 1988 2 3 0.04000 0.0000 1.0000 11 30.15 
7 Costa Rica 1989 1 1 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 19.2 73.49 
800M 1989 1 3 0.36000 0.0000 1.0000 9.3 6728 
9 Ecuador 1994 2 3 0.57000 0.0000 1.0000 14.1 58.9 
10 Egypt 1991 5 5 0.16000 0.0000 0.0000 31.1 74.22 
11 Ghana 1989 6 5 0.53000 1.0000 0.0000 20.8 41.48 
12 Greece 1988 2 2 0.19000 0.0000 0.0000 13.9 54.36 
13 Guatemala 1989 3 3 0.47000 0.0000 1.0000 11.4 39.78 
14 Guinea Bissau 1991 6 5 0.19000 1.0000 0.0000 26.8 61.77 
15 Guyana 1993 3 3 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 25.9 52.52 
16 Honduras 1992 2 3 0.32000 0.0000 1.0000 14.4 65.49 
17 India 1989 2 3 0.12000 0.0000 0.0000 30.1 18.04 
18 Indonesia 1990 6 5 0.27000 0.0000 0.0000 14.6 52.61 
19 Israel 1992 2 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 24.7 64.41 
20 Jamaica 1989 2 2 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 13.4 113.58 
21 Jordan 1991 4 4 0.15000 0.0000 0.0000 28.4 144.21 
22 Kenya 1992 4 5 0.05000 1.0000 0.0000 24 55.22 
23 Korea, R. 1988 2 3 0.40000 0.0000 0.0000 8.3 71.64 
24 Laos 1992 7 6 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000 10.7 31.'1 
25 Lesotho 1987 5 6 0.05000 1.0000 0.0000 30.2 148.06 
26 Madagascar 1993 2 4 0.08000 1.0000 0.0000 18.5 41.84 
27 Mauritania 1988 6 6 0.19000 1.0000 0.0000 16.1 114.08 
28 Mauritius 1991 1 2 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 14.8 133.96 
29 Mexico 1989 4 3 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 9.3 32.15 
30 Morocco 1991 5 5 0.08000 0.0000 0.0000 22.4 49.93 
31 Nicaragua 1993 4 5 0.23000 0.0000 1.0000 34 68.59 
32 Niger 1992 5 4 0.16000 1.0000 0.0000 26.5 40.49 
33 Nigeria 1992 5 5 0.55000 1.0000 0.0000 14.4 73.74 
34 Pakistan 1988 3 3 0.32000 0.0000 0.0000 19.2 36.05 
35 Panama 1989 4 3 0.16000 0.0000 1.0000 29.8 63.8 
36 Philippines 1988 2 3 0.46000 0.0000 0.0000 15.1 55.04 
37 Portugal 1990 1 2 0.27000 0.0000 0.0000 22 75.2 
38 Senegal 1991 4 3 0.04000 1.0000 0.0000 23.1 54.f7 
39 Singapore 1988 4 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 8.4 378.75 
40 South Africa 1993 5 4 0.04000 1.0000 0.0000 25.5 43.83 
41 Spain 1989 1 1 0.08000 0.0000 0.0000 12.1 39.45 
42 Sri Lanka 1990 4 5 0.08000 0.0000 0.0000 18.5 67.37 
43 Tanzania 1993 6 5 0.21000 1.0000 0.0000 40.4 62.93 
44 Thailand 1990 2 3 0.48000 0.0000 0.0000 13.9 75.83 
45 Tunisia 1990 5 4 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 18.6 89.33 
46 Turkey 1987 2 4 0.32000 0.0000 0.0000 11.2 42.74 
47 Uganda 1989 6 4 0.52000 1.0000 0.0000 15 18.42 
48 Venezuela 1989 1 3 0.31000 0.0000 1.0000 16 55.21 
49 Zambia 1991 2 3 0.05000 1.0000 0.0000 31.5 59.4'1 
50 Zimbabwe 1990 6 4 0.32000 1.0000 0.0000 34.9 59 
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Chapter 5 
Search in Financial Markets l 
This paper uses a random matching framework to study an economy without 
intermediaries in the financial market. Investors search for investment projects that 
are held by entrepreneurs. Projects have different returns and a reservation return 
rule is derived. An endogenous growth setting is used to describe the effect the 
absence of the intermediary has on the economy's growth rate. 
1 Charlie Bean supervised my work on this paper and provided invaluable advice. I thank Peter 
Boone for valuable conunents. 
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5. 1 Introduction 
In this paper we set out to describe an economy without intennediation and 
analyse what the consequences are of the absence of this institution. This type of 
analysis is relevant for some emerging economies that to a large extent rely on 
(foreign) venture capital to finance the restructuring of the economy. and for the 
general analysis of economies where a financial sector has not yet been developed. 
It also captures the situation where disintennediation takes place by choice and 
agents meet directly in the market place rather than through intennediaries as is 
increasingly the case in the market for large scale corporate loans. 
An intennediary can be viewed as a trading post for investment projects 
where potential investors with placement needs meet potential entrepreneurs with 
financing needs2. One way of studying the importance of such an institution is to 
compare the situation where it exists with the situation where it is absent. This 
approach is the most primitive way of studying the importance of institutions since 
one does not address the question of how the institution emerges; all institutional 
features are exogenously imposed by the economist. This simplistic comparative 
statics approach however has the advantage of helping one to address interesting 
questions relatively easily compared to literature where financial institutions are 
derived endogenousll. When analysing intennediation the obvious institutional 
alternative is autarchy where agents' consumption is entirely determined by their 
endowment stream4. However this pure Robinson Crusoe set up is not the only 
viable alternative to the situation where the institution exists. Diamond (1982) 
suggests that one uses the random matching framework as the benchmark. In this 
set up agents do not passively accept their fates as Robinson Crusoes but set out to 
look for counterparties. In the case of financial markets these agents could be 
investors and entrepreneurs looking for suitable matches. The entrepreneur would 
2 See Gertler (1988) for a swvey of the models of intennediaries that have been most influential 
recently. 
3 Townsend who is a proponent of the endogeneity approach uses this more simplistic approach as 
a first step to getting a handle on the importance of intennediation for grO\\th (see 
Townsend(1983». 
4 Alvarez and Jennann(l996), Kehoe and Levine(1996) and Kocherlakota(l995) are all examples 
where autarchy is the alternative to intennediation. 
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be looking for an investor to finance a project, and the investor would be looking 
for a good project to place his savings inS. In this paper we use this search and 
matching approach as our benchmark. To describe the situation without 
intermediation, we adapt the random matching model known from labour 
econonucs as was first described by Jovanovic (1979) and in particular the 
reservation rule set up derived for example in Sargent (1987). We embed the 
analysis in a standard endogenous growth set up taken from Romer(1986). In this 
setting we contrast the outcome of the search economy with the outcome in an 
economy with intermediation between investors and entrepreneurs. 
Search models have been used in several other fields of economics. Stigler 
(1961) and McCall(1970) are among the first papers in the literature. Diamond 
(1982) studies aggregate issues, while Kiyotaki and Wright(1989) applies the set up 
to the study of monetary theory6. The search framework has also been used 
previously to describe financial markets. Bester(l995) uses the set up to describe 
the emergence of intermediators. He assumes that an intermediary can commit ex 
ante to handing over a certain return to an investor. This helps the intermediary 
extract a larger fraction of the surplus in a bargaining situation with the 
entrepreneur than the investor could himself in direct bargaining. On the other hand 
the investor cannot monitor the search behaviour of the intermediary7, therefore he 
might choose to search for an entrepreneur himself to avoid ending up in the 
I' 
situation where the intermediary accepts excessively risky projects. 
In our set up there are two types of agents, investors and entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs are agents endowed with a technology that can transform the 
endowment the investor invests today into consumable output in the future. The 
entrepreneurs have only a passive role in the market for investment funds~ they 
accept funding from any investor. This seems a reasonable assumption given that all 
5 Autarchy might still be the equilibrium outcome of a search process. This would happen if e.g. 
the information structure was such that moral hazard problems would rule out a \ iable financial 
contract between the matched agents. 
6 See Wallace (1997) for a survey of search models of money. 
" This problem is related to the criticism facing Diamond' s( 198.t) model of intennediation as a set 
up which exploits economies of scale in monitoring. The question asked in response to Diamond' s 
model is. who monitors the monitor? 
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investors are identical. We also assume that entrepreneurs consume all returns from 
production and hence face no intertemporal allocation decisions. This allows us to 
focus on the actions of the investor in the analysis. 
Investors have an initial endowment of the consumption good. They face a 
decision on how much to invest over time and how much to consume, that is they 
are choosing optimal savings and consumption plans over an infinite horizon. The 
return from investing is the key variable affecting this decision. \Ye describe two 
settings with different returns, the search economy and the intermediated economy, 
and detennine the equilibrium paths of consumption and savings in both. The 
institutional analysis in this simple setting boils down to a comparison of these two 
sets of paths for the variables of the economy. 
In the search economy the investor is paired randomly with an entrepreneur at 
a given rate. If the investor decides to accept the match with a given entrepreneur, 
production begins. The production process yields a flow of output that is divided 
among the investor and the entrepreneur at a predetennined rate. Production 
continues until the project is hit by an adverse shock~ these shocks hit projects at a 
given rate. 
Investors that have their endowment tied up in production cannot 
simultaneously engage in search, thus there are two separate states an investor can 
be in: search or production. Entrepreneurs differ in the productivity of their 
technology. Each investor knows the distribution of returns of the technologies in 
the economy. When an investor meets an entrepreneur he is informed of the return 
that the project can yield. He then has to decide whether to accept that technology 
and thus engage in production, or to continue searching for an entrepreneur with a 
better technology. When making this decision the investor also knows the 
distribution of returns of the entire population of investment projects. 
In the intermediated economy the investor faces the same distribution of 
entrepreneurial projects. Intermediation is simply modelled as a pooling of resources 
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by all investors who then fund entrepreneurs. We abstract from transactions costs in 
this set up and thus the return to a given investor is just the expected return of the 
entire set of entrepreneurial projects minus the share to the entrepreneur which is 
assumed to be identical to the share he receives in the search economy. 
We now describe the search economy and the intermediated economy to 
derive the expected returns faced by an investor. We then use these returns to 
describe the optimal consumption and savings paths for the investors in the 
economy. 
5.2 The Search Economy8 
We describe the outcome in the search economy gIVen the investor has 
decided to invest k #. The entrepreneurs all have a production function 
y = f (k ,K, /) where k is the investment by the investor the entrepreneur is paired 
with, K is the sum of total investment in the economy and I is the amount of labour 
supplied by the entrepreneur. We assume that the entrepreneur has one unit of 
labour which is inelastically supplied. The output of the production function is to be 
interpreted as an instantaneous flow return per unit of time. Because we only 
describe the steady state in the search economy we can suppress the time subscripts. 
Match-specific heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that once a match occurs, a 
productivity parameter ex is drawn randomly from a probability distribution G( ex) . 
Thus a proj ect with productivity ex j has a flow return of y = ex jf (k ,K,I). The 
investor's decision of whether to engage in a given project with return ex j can be 
described by a reservation return rule. The investor will have a reservation return 
ex . if ex . > ex the investor will accept the pro1ect, if not he will reject it and r' J - r J 
continue searching for another project. It is crucial for the description of the search 
economy how the relative values of searching and producing affects the reservation 
return of an investor. 
8 The deri\"ation of the basic model follows Pissarides (1990). 
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There is an equal number of investors and entrepreneurs in the economy. each 
represented by a continuum of size 1. When searching investors meet entrepreneurs 
in random pairwise matches. These matches are described by a Poisson process with 
a given arrival rate9 y > O. In adopting a fixed arrival rate we are abstracting from 
the existence of a search externality since the arrival rate is not a function of the 
number of agents searching. An investor with a reservation return a . will moye 
rl 
from search to production according to a Poisson process with transition rate 
Where [1 - G (ari ) ] is the fraction of the investment projects with returns above the 
agents' reservation return. 
Call the searching state for the investor VI and the producing state V2 . Let 
V Ii be the return to a representative investor i who is searching for an investment 
project, and V2j the present discounted value from engaging in production given 
that the investment project has return a j . 
An investor who after meeting an entrepreneur discovers that the return of his 
project is a j will only accept the match if 
Because the return from production in a given match is increasing in the return of 
the investment project in that match, and the return from searching is independent of 
that specific return, since it depends only on the distribution of returns in the 
economy, a reservation productivity ari will exist, and satisfy 
9 In the search literature it is sometimes assumed that the matching rate is described by a matching 
function which depends on the relative number of the two types of agents in the economy. \Ve 
make the simplifying assumption that the arrival rate is constant and thus independent of the 
number of active searchers. 
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All projects with a return a j ~ ari are accepted. 
Let r be the discount rate in the economy. Then the value of being in the searching 
state for a representative investor i is equal to the discounted value of the 
probability of switching to the productive state Pi times the expected value of being 
in that state plus the probability of staying in the search state 1- Pi times the value 
of being in that state. 
This can also be written 
(4) rVli = Pi(Vli -Vli ) 
where V £ is the expected value of being in the productive state for an investor who 
is currently searching. Since the investor knows that the return will be at least equal 
to his reservation return, V£ can be defined as the expected value of V2j 
conditional upon the return being higher than his reservation return, or 
Let s be the rate at which adverse shocks hit investment projects forcing investor 
and entrepreneur to separate, and ro be the share of the investment project return 
that accrues to the investor. The value of being in the productive state for an 
investor who has invested k # and is engaged in a project with return a j can then 
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be written as the present discounted value of the flow return from the investment 
project plus the probability of remaining in this state (1- s) times the value of being 
in this state plus the probability of switching to the searching state (s) times the 
value of searching: 
This can also be written 
Having described the value functions and the properties that the reservation 
rate of return must satisfy, we proceed in a partial equilibrium setting to solve for 
the reservation rate of return. 
First use (6) to get 
Then substitute from (3) to get 
Equation (7) says that any project that has a return equal to or higher than the 
permanent income from searching will be accepted. To express the reservation 
return in terms of purely exogenous variables, we take conditional expectations over 
equation (6) to get 
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We solve this for Vv and substitute into (4) to get 
TT _ (coo e f (kl< ,K,l) + SV1i J rY 1i -Pi -V,. 
r+s Ii 
Then we use (7) to substitute out r V Ii to obtain the final expression for a . 
rl 
In equilibrium all investors are the same, so they all have the same reservation rate 
of return 
(9) ( ae J a =P r r+s+p 
Projects with a rate of return below a r will not be carried out in this economy. 
Steady state in the search economy is the situation in which, gIven the 
reservation returns of investors and the structural features of the search process, the 
flow of funds in and out of investment projects are equal so that the stock of 
invested funds is constant. If we call the fraction of funds engaged in production =, 
the steady state is characterised by, 
or 
z(: = p(1- z) 
(10) z = p 
s+p 
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Equations (1), (9) and (10) together with the distribution of project returns 
G( a) describe the equilibrium values of p, z a r and a e = E (ala ~ a r) as a 
function of the exogenous variables y ,s and r . 
The expected flow return cp (k 1') to an investor investing k" in the search 
process IS 
(11) cp(k#) = zwa e f(k# ,K,I) 
This is the investors share of the expected return from a project with an 
investment k #, rescaled by z. This rescaling reflects the fact that he will be 
searching some of the time and producing some of the time. In steady state a 
fraction z of the funds invested will be engaged in production. 
5.3 The intermediated economy. 
When describing the intermediating institution we should be careful not to 
make assumptions that clash with the assumptions made in the random matching 
framework since this would undermine the validity of the comparative static 
analysis. 
If we view the intermediary as an institution where all investors place their 
endowments and all entrepreneurs receive their funding, then the equilibrium 
outcome in this economy will be one in which an investor who has invested k ~ 
receives an expected flow return ~ (k;; ), where 
One can describe the main differences in returns on investment in the search 
economy and the intermediated economy by comparing equations (11) and (12). In 
the search economy the distribution of project returns above the reserYation return 
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plays a role through a e = E(o,\o, ~ o, r ) while in the intermediated economy the 
entire distribution of project returns plays a role through E(o,). In the search 
economy only a fraction z of each unit invested is engaged in production while in 
the intermediated economy the entire unit engages in production. Finally, to ensure 
consistency across the institutional regimes we assume that the fraction of total 
returns that an investor receives is the same in the search economy and in the 
intermediated economy i.e. the (0 in equation (12) is the same as the (0 in equation 
(11). 
We have now described the expected returns to 'ail investor in the search 
economy (11) and in the intermediated economy (12). Variables that affect the 
nature of the search process such as the separation rate and the discount rate will 
affect the relative returns in these two investment regimes as will changes in the 
distribution of project returns. We now embed the two regimes in a simple general 
equilibrium framework which provides us with a set up in which we can compare 
the equilibrium outcomes in the two economies and show how these vary when the 
variables mentioned above are changed. 
5.4 Equilibrium 
We can now use equations (11) and (12) as the production functions facing 
investors respectively in the search economy and in the intermediated economy, and 
use these production functions to characterise the optimal investment and 
consumption paths in a standard endogenous growth set up. This solution is 
represented as two first-order differential equations which we derive belowlO. To 
simplify the analysis we adopt a specific functional form for f (0,.,.). We assume 
that, 
10 This derivation follows Lucas(l988) pp.8-9. 
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Where 0 <v < 1, 0 < e < 1 and 0 < ~ < 1. We study the special case from 
Romer(l986) where v = 1 - e which is a situation with indefinite growth in 
equilibrium. 
To simplify notation we will for now aggregate all potential producti\;ty 
parameters in a single parameter A. We then conduct the analysis of the investment 
and consumption decisions of the investor in general terms and subsequently 
substitute in for the values of A in the search economy and the intermediated 
economy respectively. 
We also adopt a specific utility function, namely u(c(t)) = In(c(t)). This 
function is adopted because it gives the simplest solution in tenns of notation thus 
allowing us to focus on the comparative statics. We descrbe the infinite horizon 
investment and consumption plans for a representative investor j with an initial 
endowment kj (0) of the consumption good of the economy. We study his 
optimisation problem given the infonnation available at time zero. This is the 
simplest possible approach since it allows us to carry the analysis through entirely in 
expected value tenns, which implies that we can use representative agent analysis 
both in the intennediated economy and in the search economy. The intennediated 
economy will always be a representative agent economy since all agents are in an 
identical situation at each point in time because they receive a share of the aggregate 
output each period. This is not the case in the search economy where individual 
agents will be in different situations at a given point in time depending on the history 
of productivies of the entrepreneurs they have been matched with up to that time. 
Only at time zero before they have entered the search process will the situation for 
all agents be the same and thus only at time zero can Wt! Justify the representative 
agent approach in the search economy. The time zero optimisation problem of a 
representative investor is, 
00 
(14) max Eo J e -rt In(c) (t)) r> 0 {c),k)} 0 
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·1 
where K(t)· f k j (t)di i.e. the total investment of all i investors in the economv. 
o 
Since all investors are identical we suppress the subscripts in the remainder of the 
analysis. Standard dynamic optimisation gives us the two first-order differential 
equations characterising the optimal paths for k(t) and A(t) where A(t) is the 
marginal utility of consumption which in our set up equals _1_. 
c(t) 
(16) ~g> r - Avk(tr-' K(t)' and, 
(17) k(t) = Ak(tf K(t)9 __ 1_ 
A(t) 
We can find the steady state equilibrium values of k(t) and A(t) by finding 
. . 
the intersection of the two curves k(t) = 0 and A(t) = 0 in a phase plane diagram. 
When doing so we use what is sometimes referred to as a rational expectations 
assumption, namely that in equilibriumK(t) = k(t). This is called the rational 
expectations assumptions because individual agents need to make a forecast of 
K(t) when choosing k(t). In the rational expectations equilibrium the sum of the 
agents' choices add up to the forecasted value and thus agents' actions are 
consistent with the actual outcome. Equilibrium is then characterised by the two 
first order differential equations, 
(16') A(t) = r - Avk(tf+9-1 and, 
A(t) 
(IT) k(t) = Ak(t) v+9 __ 1_ 
A(t) 
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If v + 8 ~ 1 there is ongoing growth in equilibrium. A detailed analysis of this 
situation is given in Romer(1986). In figure 5.1 we reproduce Romer's figure 3 
showing the phase plane diagram of (16') and (11'). This diagram shows that if 
v +8 ~ 1 the k(t) = 0 and )..(t) = 0 loci never intersect and there is ongoing growth 
in equilibrium. Romer shows how the competitive equilibrium trajectory is located 
between the two loci as is illustrated in the diagram. 
Let us now characterise the balanced growth path of this economy with 
v +8 = 1 which is the simplest case of endogenous growth. We notice from (16') 
that, 
A(t) = r - Av since.! = A, this is equivalent to, 
A(t) e 
(18) e(t) = Av - r thus 
e(t) , 
(19) e(t) = e(O)e(AV-r)t 
F or balanced growth we then guess that, 
(20) k(t) = k(O)e(Av-r)t 
With k(O) given we need to determine e(O). This can be done by 
differentiating (20) which yields, k(t) = (Av - r)k(O)e(Av-r)t . We substitute this into 
the capital accumulation identity k(t) = Ak(t) - e(t) and combine with (19). This 
gIves 
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Figure 5. 1. Phase Plane Diagram With v + () ~ 1 . 
@D 
k=O 
k 
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(21) (Av - r)k(O) = Ak(O) - e(O) 
from which e( 0) can be determined. 
The balanced growth equilibrium is thus described by equations (19) (20) and 
(21). 
Thus far in the equilibrium analysis we have suppressed the differences 
between the intermediated economy and the search economy. By substituting the 
different values of A for the search economy and intermediated economy 
respectively from equations (11) and (12) we can now describe the different 
equilibrium paths for these two economies. 
Equilibrium in the Search Economy 
(22a) e(t) = e(O)e(zroa<v-r)t 
(22b) k(t) = k(O)e(zroa<v-r)t 
(22c) (zroa\! -r)k(O) =zroaek(O)-e(O) 
Equilibrium in the Intermediated Economy 
(23 a) e(t) = e(O)e(roE(a)V-r)t 
(23b) k(t) = k(O)e(roE(a)v-r)t 
(23c) (roE (a )v - r)k(O) = roE (a )k(O) - e(O) 
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We will now look at how changes in the economic environment have different 
effects in the two economies and use this analysis to highlight what the economic 
consequences are of the absence of financial intermediaries. 
5.5 Comparative Statics 
If factors in the environment that only affect the search and matching process, 
and not the intennediated economy, change, it will obviously affect the difference 
between these two economies. 
One such factor is the separation rate. If the separation rate of investment 
projects s increases then equation (9) shows that the reservation productivity of 
investors will fall. This makes intuitive sense: an increase in the separation rate 
reduces the expected duration of a future investment project match and hence the 
present value of this project falls. Therefore investors will be less choosy today 
when faced with a project with a given productivity since the value of the 
investment project they might be matched with if they continue to search has been 
reduced. A reduction in the reservation productivity reduces ex e = E(exlex ;::: ex r) 
since lower productivity projects are now included in the distribution of accepted 
projects. The reduction in the reservation productivity increases the arrival rate of 
acceptable projects p (see equation (1». 
If s increases and p falls as a consequence, the effect on the total fraction of 
invested funds engaged in production (z) is apparently ambiguous as can be seen 
from equation (10). However the effect of s on z is of a first-order nature, while 
the effect through p is second order in nature. Therefore we conclude that an 
increase in s will reduce z. Thus the consequence of an increase in the separation 
rate of investment projects is that the expected productivity of projects carried out 
falls as investors accept lower productivity projects. The fraction of invested funds 
that are engaged in production at a given point of time also falls. Therefore the 
productivity per unit invested, zex e unambiguously falls. 
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By contrast a change in the separation rate has no effect on the intennediated 
economy in our set up. Looking at equations (22a) and (22b) we see that the 
increased separation rate reduces the growth rate in the search economy. Also from 
equation (22c) it can be seen that for a given initial capital stock the initial level of 
consumption is reduced as za e falls. Thus an increase in the separation rate reduces 
the growth rate in the search economy and also the initial value of consumption for 
each value of the initial capital stock. 
While changes in the separation rate exclusively affect the search economy, 
changes in the discount rate of investors affects both the intennediated and the 
search economy. An increase in the discount rate r reduces the reservation 
productivity of investors. This reduction is again caused by the fact that the present 
value of future matches falls, this time because they are discounted at a higher rate. 
This makes the value of a project available today relatively more attractive, thus 
reducing the reservation productivity. Thus a e falls as r increases. However the 
reduction in the reservation productivity increases p, so z increases. Thus an 
increase in the discount rate reduces the expected productivity of the investment 
projects undertaken in the economy, but increases the fraction of each unit invested 
that is engaged in production at each point in time. Thus the effect on za e is 
ambiguous depending on which of the two effects dominates. 
The increase in the discount rate has an additional effect on the search 
economy since it reduces the present discounted value of investments. This effect 
shows up in our model through the direct entry of r in equations (22a) and (22b). 
An increase in r will cause investors to consume more today and invest less. This 
effect on its own will reduce the future growth of consumption and the capital 
stock. In the search economy the negative effect on the growth rate of the increase 
in r can be overturned if roza e increases sufficiently i.e. if the increase in the 
discount rate causes the per unit productivity of invested funds to increase by an 
.. d(roz{r)ae(r)-r). 
amount larger than the Increase In r so that ~ o. This can 
dr 
happen if the positive effect of r on = is large and the negative effect of r on a C 
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is small. Thus an increase in r might either increase or decrease the growth rate in 
the search economy. 
As equations (23a) and (23b) show an increase in the discount rate also 
affects the intermediated economy, but only through one of the channels discussed 
above, namely through the increase in consumption today at the expense of 
investment for future consumption. In the intermediated economy an increase in the 
discount rate will therefore unambiguously reduce the growth rate 
The last factor in our model that affects the difference between the 
intermediated economy and the search economy is the distribution of investment 
projects available to investors in the economy. In the intermediated economy only 
the expected return of investments matters as investors are completely isolated from 
idiosyncratic shocks since all projects are pooled at the intermediary. In the search 
economy this is not the case. An investor receives a return that is entirely 
determined by the specific match he is engaged in. Therefore changes in the 
dispersion of the distribution of returns affect the search behaviour of investors. An 
increase in the dispersion of investment returns that leaves the expected value of 
project returns unchanged will affect behaviour in the search economy since 
investors now have the opportunity to engage in future matches with projects that 
have higher returns than under the old, less-dispersed distribution. An increase in 
dispersion of a distribution that leaves the mean unchanged is called a mean-
preserving spread. The simplest possible type of mean-preserving spread is one 
which moves probability mass from the centre of the distribution and places more 
weight on the tails without affecting the mean. A distribution G8 (ex) is a mean 
preserving spread on the distribution G ~ (ex) if 
a h a h 
(24) E(o.) = f adG~ (a) = f adG8 (a) 
a' a' 
a" 
(25) f[G8(ex)-G~(o.)}tex ~O 0. 1 ~o.:t ~exh 
a l 
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In addition it satisfies the single crossing property (which implies that the mean 
preserving spread is of the kind that moves probability mass from the centre of the 
distribution to the tails) if, 
(26) G9 (a) - G~ (a) ~ 0(::; 0) for a ::;ci(~ci) 
where ci IS some a in the support of G i (a) i = ~ ,8 . 
In our model such a mean preservmg spread is equivalent to an increase m 
a e = E(ala ~ a r) for a given a r. This is can be seen if one writes (24) as, 
aT a h aT a h 
(27) J adG~ (a) + J adGIl (a) = J adG9 (a) + J adG9 (a) 
a' aT a' aT 
If we rearrange and use integration by parts we get that, 
a h a h aT J adG 9 (a) - J adG Il (a) = J [G 9 ( a) - Gil (a) }fa 
(28) aT aT a' 
+ a r [G Il (a r) - G9 (a r) ] 
By equation (25) the first term on the right hand side is always positive. The second 
term is positive for a r ~ ci where ci is the same as in equation (25)11. Thus for an 
a r satisfying this condition we get that 
a h a h 
(29) J adG9 (a) - J adGIl (a) ~ 0 
aT aT 
11 Ow proof therefore holds only for the reservation return satisfying this condition. For other 
values of the reservation productivity we cannot provide a proof and rely on the intuitive 
ex-planation. 
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a h 
Since a e =E(ala~ar)= JadG(a) where G(a)=G(a)/[1-G(a r )]and since 
a rebasing of the probability distribution will only increase the relative size of the 
two terms in the right direction since 1- G8 (a) $; 1- G~ (a), we get that 
a h a h 
(30) f adG 8 (a) - f adG~ (a) ~ 0 
We therefore conclude that a e under the more dispersed distribution a - G tl (a) is 
larger than a e under the less dispersed distribution a - G ~ (a). So a mean-
preserving spread can be modelled as an exogenous increase in a e for a given a r . 
From equation (9) we can see that this implies that the search equilibnum 
value of a r increases. As mentioned above this makes intuitive sense. Investors 
now have increased opportunities to be matched with high return projects in the 
future than before the mean-preserving spread, therefore they will be more choosy 
about which projects to accept today. A further consequence of the equilibrium 
increase in a r is that z falls. The equilibrium growth effects in the search economy 
are thus ambiguous depending on whether or not the increase in a e is significantly 
large to offset the reduction in z so that za e increases and with it the equilibrium 
growth rate in the economy. 
While the mean-preservmg spread affects the growth rate in the search 
economy because it alters agents search behaviour and thus their returns from 
investing, it has no effect on the growth rate in the intermediated economy where 
only the mean of the distribution, which has been left unchanged, matters. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In an economy where investors place their funds with intermediaries and 
entrepreneurs borrow from these institutions, only the expected return of the 
171 
available projects matter for the return investors get and consequently this is the 
only factor related to the match between entrepreneurs and investors that affects the 
growth rate. If there are no intermediaries and investors instead are located in an 
economy where they have to seek out entrepreneurs themselves. additional factors 
affect the growth rate of the economy. This is because several factors affect the 
search behaviour of investors, which in turn affect the return they can expect to 
obtain from the search process. To understand this it helps to remind oneself why 
investors are searching. Given an investment opportunity in the search economy an 
investor can either commit his funds now, or continue searching in the hope that he 
will get a project with a higher return. This extra search however comes at a cost 
since his investment funds are idle during the searching period, and in an economy 
with discounting this affects the present value of his returns. 
These two factors work in opposite directions in the case where the discount 
rate is increased. An increased discount rate causes investors to be less choosy thus 
lowering their expected return from a given project. This implies that agents spend 
less time searching and thus more time producing. Depending on which effect 
dominates, the expected return in the search economy goes up or down. The same 
two factors are at play in the situation where the dispersion of returns on investment 
projects goes up. 
All in all the search economy contains an additional channel through which the 
discount rate of the agents can affect the growth rate of the economy, and also a 
channel through which the dispersion of investment returns matter rather than solely 
the mean as is the case in the intermediated economy. In addition the search 
economy provides a set up In which there are equilibrium credit constraints. 
Because z is never unity, there are always funds in the economy searching for 
investment opportunities. The flip side of this is that some entrepreneurs are denied 
funding because investors are looking for better opportunities. This credit constraint 
binds more the higher is the reservation productivity of investors, i.e. the lower is 
investors discount rate and the higher is the dispersion of investment returns. 
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We have presented the simplest possible framework within which the search 
economy can be compared with the intermediated economy. Our model fails to 
address the important question: why do intermediaries emerge? This is one possible 
extension that could be added in the future. Another shortcuming of our analysis is 
that we do not continuously allow agents to update their investment and 
consumption plans as a function of the history of the previous matches they have 
engaged in. While economists do not normally allow the entire history to determine 
the next step of the agent, they normally allow the current state to affect ne:\.1 
periods allocation thus linking the periods. We have completely abstracted from this 
by performing the analysis entirely in terms of time zero expectations. This can be 
justified by the fact that in our set up even finding this type of solution would be 
complicated by the existence of an externality in the investment decision that would 
feed back into individual decision rules. While our model therefore is simplistic it 
does provide a first step towards understanding how the absence of intermediation 
affects the economy. 
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